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ГІБРИДНА РОСІЙСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКА ВІЙНА

в публікаціях, що входять до наукометричної бази даних Web of Science (2014-2022 рр.)

Анотований бібліографічний покажчик

HYBRID RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR

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Російсько-українська війна проти суверенітету та територіальної цілісності України, окупація частини українських територій розпочалася в лютому 2014 року із захоплення Російською Федерацією півострова Крим та збройним військовим конфліктом на сході України – Донбасі.

Російське збройне вторгнення, окупація й анексія Автономної Республіки Крим та міста Севастополя 22 лютого-18 березня 2014 року визнана протиправним, насильницьким відторгненням від держави Україна та незаконним одностороннім приєднанням цих територій до складу Російської Федерації, яка відтоді вважається тимчасово окупованою територією. Насильницька анексія Криму, що відбулася всупереч нормам міжнародного права, не була визнана більшістю світових країн та міжнародних організацій – Генеральною асамблеєю ООН, ПАРЄ, ПА ОБСЄ та ін.

Продовженням збройного конфлікту в квітні 2014 року стало російське вторгнення на територію українського Донбасу. За підтримки проросійських активістів, російським спецслужбам вдалося реалізувати сепаратистський сценарій захоплення влади на Донбасі, організувати антиурядові мітинги, в результаті чого стало можливим проведення місцевих референдумів за відокремлення півдня і сходу України, приєднання цих регіонів до Росії, введення до регіону російського "миротворчого" контингенту. Всупереч Конституції України були утворені терористичні квазідержави (угрупування), що діють на окупованих територіях Донецької області – Донецька народна республіка (ДНР) та Луганської області – Луганська народна республіка (ЛНР) на чолі з проросійськими політичними лідерами – окупаційною адміністрацією РФ.

З квітня 2014 року по квітень 2018 року у Донецькій та Луганській областях, із залученням Збройних сил України, тривала антитерористична операція. Після АТО на сході України була введена в дію Операція об'єднаних сил (ООС), український Донбас опинився у вирі затяжної війни.

Російська Федерація, окрім збройної агресії, застосувала проти України концепцію "гібридної війни", яка має прихований характер та проводиться, переважно, у політичній, економічній, інформаційній та інших сферах з метою дезінтеграції, дестабілізації внутрішньополітичної обстановки, підриву державної влади і довіри населення до влади, розповсюдженням в суспільстві протестних і сепаратистських настроїв.

Ескалацію російської агресії з березня 2021 року пов'язують із масштабними військовими навчаннями НАТО в Європі під назвою *Defender-Europe 21,* що означало "захист Європи" від Балтійського до Чорного моря.

Наприкінці березня – початку квітня 2021 року розпочалося пересування, перекидання та накопичення озброєння, техніки, російських військ, проведення військових навчань біля російсько-українського кордону і

у Чорному морі. Світові лідери намагалися дипломатичними шляхами утримати Росію від повномасштабного збройного вторгнення в Україну.

24 лютого 2022 року розпочалася нова активна фаза російсько-української війни. Росія нанесла повітряні удари по військовим та інфраструктурним об'єктам по всій території України і атакувала кордони України від Полісся до Луганщини.

Увесь цивілізований світ спостерігає за ходом історичних та політичних подій, які розгорнулись в Україні, починаючи з 2014 року. Сучасна російсько-українська війна є надзвичайно актуальною проблематикою новітньої історії України у її глобальному вимірі, вона відразу потрапила в поле дослідницьких інтересів політологів, істориків, науковців всього світу, її абсолютно логічно трактовано в контексті глобальних викликів і загроз та довгострокових наслідків для всіх країн сучасної цивілізації. Наукові розробки за цією тематикою активно розпочалися та постійно продовжуються, що потребує вивчення широкого кола історичних джерел, зокрема: офіційних документів і матеріалів уповноважених осіб суверенних держав та міжнародних організацій; публічних та непублічних документів провідних країн; матеріалів органів українського та міжнародного правосуддя; документальних доповідей; мемуарно-публіцистичних видань; журналістських та медіа видань та ін. Світовою науковою спільнотою оприлюднено ряд мемуарних, інформаційно-довідкових, науково-популярних та наукових праць.

У проблематиці наукових досліджень російсько-української війни важливу роль відіграють публікації, представлені в міжнародних наукометричних базах даних.

Анотований бібліографічний покажчик "Гібридна російсько-українська війна в публікаціях, що входять до наукометричної бази даних Web of Science (2014-2022 рр.)" підготовлено на матеріалах наукових статей, політичних есе, тез доповідей та документів, що увійшли до наукометричної бази даних Web of Science, починаючи з 2014 року і до періоду повномасштабного російського військового вторгнення в Україну 24 лютого 2022 року.

У анотованому бібліографічному покажчику представлено наукові публікації, які досліджують ключові події в Криму та на Донбасі, аналізують політичні, юридичні, інформаційні, економічні та інші напрями гібридної війни Російської Федерації проти України, характеризують різні аспекти концепції "гібридної" агресії, розглядають сучасні погляди на сценарії протидії такій агресії та використання інструментів в цьому протистоянні. Публікації включені до покажчика дають можливість опанувати всю глибину конфлікту та причини сьогоднішньої повномасштабної війни, яка стосується не тільки України, але й усього цивілізованого світу.

Анотований бібліографічний покажчик підготовлено в електронному форматі та представлено на вебсайті Наукової бібліотеки ім. М. Максимовича Київського національного університету імені Тараса Шевченка.

The Russian-Ukrainian war against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, the occupation of part of Ukrainian territories began in February 2014 with the seizure of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation and the armed military conflict in eastern Ukraine - Donbass.

The Russian armed invasion, occupation and annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, on February 22-18, 2014, were recognized as illegal, forcible rejection of Ukraine and illegal unilateral annexation of these territories to the Russian Federation, which has since been temporarily occupied. The forcible annexation of Crimea, which took place in violation of international law, was not recognized by most world countries and international organizations - the UN General Assembly, the PACE, the OSCE PA and others.

The continuation of the armed conflict in April 2014 was the Russian invasion of the Ukrainian Donbass. With the support of pro-Russian activists, Russian intelligence services managed to implement a separatist scenario of seizing power in Donbas, organized anti-government rallies, making it possible to hold local referendums on secession in southern and eastern Ukraine and accession part territories to Russia. Contrary to the Constitution of Ukraine In the occupied territories terrorist quasi-states (groups) were formed operating were created of Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) led by pro-Russian political leaders - the Russian occupation administration.

From April 2014 to April 2018 in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, with the involvement of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, continued anti-terrorist operation. After the anti-terrorist operation in the east of Ukraine, the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) was launched and the Ukrainian Donbas found itself in the midst of a protracted war.

In addition to armed aggression, the Russian Federation has introduced against Ukraine of "hybrid war", which is covert in nature and is carried out mainly in political, economic, informational and other spheres in order to disintegrate, destabilize the domestic political situation, undermine state power and trust public confidence to power, the spread of protests and separatist sentiments in society.

The escalation of Russian aggression in March 2021 is linked to a large-scale NATO military exercise in Europe called Defender-Europe 21, which meant "protecting Europe" from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

At the end of March and the beginning of April 2021, the movement, transfer and accumulation of weapons, equipment, Russian troops, military exercises near the Russian-Ukrainian border and in the Black Sea began. World leaders have tried through diplomatic means to deter Russia from a full-scale armed invasion of Ukraine.

On February 24, 2022, a new active phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war began. Russia has carried out air strikes on military and infrastructure facilities throughout Ukraine and attacked Ukraine's borders from Polissya to Luhansk region.

The whole civilized world is watching the course of historical and political events that have unfolded in Ukraine since 2014. The current Russian-Ukrainian war is an extremely important problems in the recent history of Ukraine in its global dimension, it immediately fell into the field of research interests of political scientists, historians, scientists around the world, it is logically interpreted in the context of global challenges and threats and long-term consequences for all modern civilization. Scientific developments on this topic have been actively started and are constantly continuing, which requires the study of a wide range of historical sources, in particular: official documents and materials of authorized persons of sovereign states and international organizations; public and non-public documents of leading countries; materials of Ukrainian and international justice bodies; documentary reports; memoirs and journalistic publications; journalistic and media publications, etc. The world scientific community has published a number of memoirs, information and reference, popular science and scientific works.

Publications presented in international scientometric databases play an important role in the research of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Annotated bibliographic index "Hybrid Russian-Ukrainian War in publications included in the scientometric database Web of Science (2014-2022)" prepared on the basis of scientific articles, political essays, abstracts and documents included in the scientometric database Web of Science Science, from 2014 until the period of full-scale Russian military invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

The annotated bibliographic index presents scientific publications that study key events in Crimea and Donbas, analyze political, legal, informational, economic and other areas of the hybrid war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, characterize various aspects of the concept of "hybrid" aggression, considering modern views on scenarios counteracting such aggression and using tools in this confrontation. The publications included in the index provide an opportunity to grasp the full depth of the conflict and the causes of today's full-scale war, which affects not only Ukraine but also the entire civilized world.

Annotated bibliographic index prepared in electronic format and presented on the website of the M.Maksymovych Scientific Library of the Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University.

ЗМІСТ

CONTENTS

2014

1. Aliaksandrau, A., & Womack, H. (2014). Brave new war: The information war between Russia and Ukraine. Index on Censorship, 43(4), 54-60. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306422014560963

When the war is on and stakes are high, anything goes. The question is whether a war like this can be decisively won by any side. The impact propaganda has had on societies in the whole post-Soviet region is tremendous. Russians support President Putin and think Ukrainians are fascists. As a response there is a huge growth of anti-Russian attitudes in Ukraine, where people are sure Russia is the aggressor. This alienation between neighbouring nations, which have centuries of history in common – sometimes tragically in common, will take decades to fade away. Andrei Aliaksandrau investigates the new information war as he travels across Ukraine, and Helen Womack reports from Moscow.

2. Allison, R. (2014). Russian 'deniable' intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules. International Affairs, 90(6), 1255-1297. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12170

The Russian military interventions in Ukraine, which have led to the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and to the entrenchment of separatist enclaves in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, directly challenge the post-Cold War European state system. Russia has consistently denied any wrongdoing or illegal military involvement and has presented its policies as a reaction to the repression of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. This article argues that it is important to examine and contest unfounded Russian legal and political claims used by Moscow to justify its interventions. The article proceeds to assess in detail three different explanations of the Russian operations in Ukraine: geopolitical competition and structural power (including the strategic benefits of seizing Crimea); identity and ideational factors; and the search for domestic political consolidation in Russia. These have all played a role, although the role of identity appears the least convincing in explaining the timing and scope of Russian encroachments on Ukrainian territorial integrity and the disruption of Ukrainian statehood.

3. Cybriwsky, R. (2014). Kyiv's Maidan: from Duma Square to sacred space. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 55(3), 270-285. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2014.991341

The word 'Maidan' is shorthand for Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kyiv, Ukraine, as well as a term that in Ukraine has come to signify a large protest gathering, such as the Euromadian protests that overthrew the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych on 22 February 2014. This paper traces the history and changing meaning of the square that is today Maidan Nezalezhnosti, from czarist Kyiv to the present, and then traces protests that began in November 2013 in response to Yanukovych's announcement to abandon Ukraine's quest for admission to the European Union and that resulted in his ouster and war with Russia. Because protestors were killed, the square has now become sacred space. Even as war rages in Ukraine's east, memorials to the fallen, the Nebesna Sotnya, are being designed for the square.

4. Di Rienzo, E. (2014). PAST AND PRESENT OF THE UKRANIAN CRISIS 1914-2014. Nuova Rivista Storica, 98(3), 863-907.

For most of the second half of the 20th century, the Soviet Union controlled Eurasia from central Germany to the Pacific, as far south as the Caucasus and the Hindu Kush. When the Soviet Union collapsed, its western frontier moved east nearly 1000 miles, from the West German border to the Russian border with Belarus. Russian Power has now retreated farther east than it has been in centuries. After the Soviet Union dissolved, Ukraine moved into an alignment with the United States and away from Russia this was a breaking point in Russian history. The Coup d'Etat in Ukraine, in February 2014, was the moment when the post:Cold War world genuinely ended for Russia. The Russians saw the events in Ukraine as an attempt by the United States to draw Ukraine into Nato and thereby set the stage for Russian disintegration.

5. Dunn, E. C., & Bobick, M. S. (2014). The empire strikes back: War without war and occupation without occupation in the Russian sphere of influence. American Ethnologist, 41(3), 405-413. https://doi.org/10.1111/amet.12086

Russia's recent actions in Ukraine constitute a new form of warfare distinctly suited for a 21st-century battlefield. Through a comparative analysis of the political technologies it has deployed there and in two other conflict zones, Georgia and Moldova, we maintain that Russia is implementing a new political strategy that utilizes fear and intimidation to thwart a further eastward expansion of the European Union and NATO. By masking Russian "occupation without occupation" as humanitarian and as fulfilling a "responsibility to protect," Vladimir Putin satirizes the moral and legal arguments used by Western states to justify their own international intervention. Ultimately, we argue that the pervasive fear created by Eurasia's frozen conflicts constitutes a new form of post- Soviet liminality that challenges the norms of the international system.

6. Filatov, B. (2014). I KNOW FOR SURE, HOW WILL IT HAPPEN FACEBOOK POST, APRIL 21, 2014. Ab Imperio-Studies of New Imperial History and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Space(3), 45-48.

This is the English translation of a Facebook post by Borys Filatov, deputy head of the Dnipropetrovsk Regional State Administration in Ukraine Written on April 21, 2014, in the wake of EuroMaidan and amid the escalation of Russia's "hybrid war" against Ukraine, this post outlines a program of Ukrainian patriotism for people who are culturally Russian. Filatov also advances a vision of the hybrid and culturally inclusive Ukrainian nation.

7. Freedman, L. (2014). Ukraine and the Art of Limited War. Survival, 56(6), 7-38. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2014.985432

Putin's power play in Ukraine was impulsive and improvised, without any clear sense of the desired end state. After many months of effort, Russia has achieved limited gains, but at high cost.

8. Hausmann, G., & Penter, T. (2014). The Uses of History Ukraine 2014: Ideology und Historiography. Osteuropa, 64(9-10), 35-+.

At every stage of the conflict in Ukraine, from the Euromaidan to the crisis triggered by Russia's annexation of the Crimea and to the war in the Donbas, the parties to the conflict have resorted to history and concepts of history. Some speak of Cossack traditions of freedom, others of the "defensive struggle against fascism" or of Novorossiia. This is supposed to mobilize support, to legitimize political and military action, and to create identity. These assertions do not stand up to scrutiny. But those who seek to distinguish historical facts from manipulation and propaganda need in-depth knowledge. East European history as a discipline has a lot of catching up to do in researching and teaching of Ukrainian history.

9. Heinemann-Gruder, A. (2014). Politics as War The Radicalisation of Putinism. Osteuropa, 64(9-10), 79-+.

By annexing the Crimea and fomenting war in the Donbass, Russia is pursuing a policy bent on destruction. Its calculation that the West fears a complete break more than Russia has largely born fruit. This policy stems from situational decisions and is an expression of the internal radicalization of the Putin regime. Russia's leadership wants above all to gain recognition for the status it claims; ideology plays a subordinate role. For a new Russia policy, this means the European Union must put much more effort into the stabilisation and democratisation of Ukraine than it has so far. This would include participation in a robust international mission to secure the Ukrainian border. Such a step would rob Russia of its dominance in escalating the conflict. At the same time, arms control talks with Russia must be taken more seriously.

10. Kulyk, V. (2014). UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF EUROMAIDAN. Ab Imperio-Studies of New Imperial History and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Space(3), 94-122.

The article traces the evolution of Ukrainian nationalism from the end of 2013 to the end of 2014 under the influence of mass protests against the antidemocratic regime of President Yanukovych (Euromaidan) and Russia's intervention into Crimea and Donbas. The term "nationalism" is used in the article in a broad sense encompassing elite ideology and politics as well as mass feelings and identities. The analysis of elite "nationalism" is based on a close reading of Facebook posts and other texts of the protest activists, and mass discourse is reconstructed with the help of sociological surveys. The author argues that democratic protest against the Yanukovych regime included a nationalistic element articulated as Ukrainian liberation from Russian dictate. He also shows that the transition from peaceful to violent protest was accompanied by an appropriation of the tradition of armed nationalist resistance to the Soviet occupation of Ukraine after World War II. This appropriation, however, was not limited exclusively to ethnic Ukrainians - it reflected and reinforced a rejection of the Soviet mythology of collaborationism of Ukrainian nationalists of the past with the Nazis. At the same time it made evident the deeply inclusive nature of modern Ukrainian anti-imperial nationalism, the most obvious proof of which is the support it enjoys among Ukrainian Jews or even among Jews who have preserved their ties to the country since leaving Ukraine. Russian aggression further contributed to the rise of inclusivity of Ukrainian nationalism, which now embraces many Russian and Russian-speaking citizens. Being alienated from Russia as a state and even as a people by Russia's aggressive politics, these citizens nevertheless do not exhibit a similar alienation from the Russian language. Hence the new border between Ukrainians and Russians is political rather than linguistic. In the author's view, this fact confirms the inclusive nature of Ukrainian identity and the nationalism that contributes to its formation.

11. Lee, T. H. (2014). The Law of War and the Responsibility to Protect Civilians: A Reinterpretation. Harvard International Law Journal, 55(2), 251-321.

Two seemingly unrelated crises implicating the law of war and the responsibility to protect civilians have arisen in recent years. In 2013, the United States considered military intervention without U.N. Security Council preapproval in Syria after discovering that the government had exterminated its own people with chemical agents. In 2014, Russia sent troops into Crimea, a part of Ukraine, to protect ethnic Russians that Russia claimed were in danger after a political coup in the country. In both cases, the military acts contemplated or undertaken were of dubious legality, albeit under different rubrics. This Article aims to show

how analysis of the lawfulness of military intervention in Syria and Crimea is illuminated by recognizing that both are subspecies of the same problem and may thus be seen as one customary doctrine of international law governing the grounds for war. By custom, a sovereign state may use force in another unconsenting sovereign state without U.N. Security Council authorization or a self-defense justification to protect civilians facing imminent risk of group extermination a threshold that was arguably met in Syria but seemingly not in Crimea. The right to use armed force in such instances is further constrained by the proportionality and exhaustion-of-other means requirements that generally apply to the law of war.

12. Luchterhandt, O. (2014). The Crimean Crisis of 2014 Aspects of Constitutional and International Law. Osteuropa, 64(5-6), 61-+.

The Crimean crisis and the struggle with Russia over Ukraine's territorial integrity mean a limited return to an East-West confrontation in Europe, the likes of which have not been seen since the end of Cold War and the integration of the post-communist states in a new, pan-European system and a global economic, financial, and communication order that is growing ever more deeply and tightly integrated. The Kremlin, which seeks a new, imperial Russian hegemony in the post-Soviet space - now within the regulatory framework of a "Eurasian Union" - felt strategically threatened by the EU-oriented "Maidan-revolution" in Ukraine. Moscow responded by illegally annexing the Crimea - the base of its Black Sea Fleet and a symbol of Russian national greatness - and by destabilizing Ukraine so as to prevent its integration in the West and bind it to Russia permanently.

13. Malek, M. (2014). Moscow's Battle Plan Background on Russia's War in Ukraine. Osteuropa, 64(9-10), 97-+.

Russia's occupation and annexation of the Crimea was not an improvised reaction to the fall of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. It followed plans that had long ago been worked out by the general staff. The same applies to the management of hybrid war in eastern Ukraine. Despite all the denials from Moscow, the facts show that Russia is a warring party. Russia is supporting the insurgents not only with money, training, weapons, and heavy military equipment; it is also intervening in Ukraine with its own troops.

14. Mitrokhin, N. (2014). Infiltration, Instruction, Invasion Russia's War in Ukraine. Osteuropa, 64(8), 3-16.

In early April 2014, Russia launched an operation to destabilize Ukraine. In a first phase, members of the special forces and officers from the secret services helped criminals from the Donbas and Russian nationalists from Russia to seize power in several Donbas cities. Starting in mid-May, former combatants from the wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya as well as politicized members of imperial organisations who had been recruited via draft boards poured into Ukraine. When the Ukrainian Army succeeded in disrupting supply lines from Russia into the Donbas, Moscow deployed regular formations in the second week of August. They pushed back the Ukrainian Army and forced the extremely fragile ceasefire. Russia achieved a military victory. But the political result of this war is completely open.

15. Mitrokhin, N. (2014). Transnational Provocation Russian Nationalists and Secret Agents in Ukraine. Osteuropa, 64(5-6), 157-+.

The separatist insurgency in eastern Ukraine is supported by several groups. The first wave, in early April 2014, consisted mostly of journalists and local politicians who were integrated into transnational neo-Nazi, neo-Stalinist, and ultra-orthodox networks operating out of Moscow. After the men of this first wave had been arrested, a second generation of separatists took its place. This group involves first and foremost heavily armed former soldiers of the wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya. In addition, it includes special units from Russia's military intelligence service GRU, renegade members of Ukrainian police and security forces, Cossacks, radical right-wingers seeking adventure in war, and humiliated, violent young men from Ukraine and Russia.

16. Mullerson, R. (2014). Ukraine: Victim of Geopolitics. Chinese Journal of International Law, 13(1), 133-145. https://doi.org/10.1093/chinesejil/jmu011

The end of the Cold War should also have meant the coming of the flourishing of international law, many (myself included) naively believed. However, the "uni-polar moment" that gained momentum in the 1990s, though its life-span turned out to be rather short, saw a gung ho attitude towards foundational principles of international law such as non-use of force and non-interference in internal affairs of states. NATO's 1999 operation over Kosovo, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 2008 Georgia-Russia war, policies reflected in the slogan "all the options are on the table", and now Ukraine's tragedy show that international law and morality are used mainly as covers in the geopolitical struggle. If the Cold War manifested the competition between two ideologies-capitalism and communism-today's main historical controversy is between the uni-polar and multi-polar visions of the world. It is not ideological, it is geopolitical, where ideology, morality and law are used as tools and collaterals in the struggle for the configuration of tomorrow's world. It is also a struggle for the nature of international law. Will it become a kind of supra-national law (A la EU law for the whole world) dictated from one centre, or will it develop as a legal system based on the balance of interests and values of different states and cultures? The author believes that the world is simply too big, complex and diverse for the first choice to realize in practice. Its rich tapestry cannot be flattened into a carpet where one pattern, be it of a Judeo-Christian, Anglo-Saxon, Confucian, Muslim or even secular liberal-

democratic pattern, prevails. Attempts to force one, "the only true", vision on the whole world not only undermine international law; they are also utopian endeavours fraught with endless conflicts.

17. Ondrejcsak, R. (2014). US POLICIES TOWARDS RUSSIA IN THE LIGHT OF WAR IN UKRAINE: FROM ENGAGING A "COOPERATIVE POWER" TO DEFENSIVE CONTAINMENT OF REGIONAL "CHALLENGER".

The Ukrainian-Russian conflict, which erupted in the spring 2014, was defined as a game changer not only for European security architecture and NATO itself, but also as for the US foreign policy in the regional context. Russia, being one of the focus points of Barack Obama's "change" - with so-called "reset" of bilateral relations was defined as a "cooperative power." According to that concept the United States made endeavours to incorporate Russia to the US-led international system, also by offering unilateral withdrawal from political, economic and also military positions. While the "reset" did not bring watershed-like progress or change in Russian-American relations, on the contrary, the US administration kept the bilateral relations with Russia in "low profile" in comparison to the Asia-Pacific, not to mention the focus on "building strong America at home." The eruption of crisis and later open military conflict in Eastern Europe turned the American attention towards Russia, but with significant limits. First, it will not slow the "rebalancing" towards Asia-Pacific; second, the US engagement in Europe, in general, militarily and politically, remains limited, but with important regional, intra-European rebalance towards the East; third, the US will not take active lead to reverse Russian gains, but will focus on defensive "containment" of Russia, in order to limit its further military, strategic or territorial gains. A major strategic shift could appear only if Russia will decide to destroy the Ukrainian statehood and threaten the Eastern flank of the Atlantic Alliance, which has a potential to rewrite strategic map not only regionally but also on a global scale.

18. Portnov, A. (2014). PORTNOV MAIDAN AND AFTER MAIDAN. Ab Imperio-Studies of New Imperial History and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Space(3), 209-217. https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2014.0068

Andriy Portnov identifies several main characteristics of Euromaidan that had predetermined the main venues of subsequent political developments and also signified potentially productive research agendas. He starts by registering the structural failure of the state as the main reason for Euromaidan and the main challenge to which the Ukrainian society had to respond. His second theme is the ambivalent role of social elevators launched by Maidan: on the one hand, they catapulted new people to prominent positions, while on the other, they helped to integrate old institutions into the new society by "Maidanizing" them with new faces. Portnov then shows how the familiar trope of fixed ethnopolitical identities with clear territorial localization has been compromised by post-Maidan developments, to the utter confusion of Russian strategists and many Ukrainian (and European) intellectuals. Historical parallels have been another discursive strategy exploited by all sides of the Ukrainian conflict to strengthen their case or discredit opponents. By itself, no historical precedence (and no familiar tropes such as "civil war" or "ethnic conflict") can fully explain and express the new and truly unprecedented phenomenon of post-Maidan Ukraine. This brings Portnov to his final point, about the significance for Ukraine of finding its own distinctive subjectivity. He believes that this subjectivity should embrace the fundamental hybridity of Ukraine as a country speaking two main languages (without clear territorial demarcation), practicing three Christian denominations of the Eastern ritual, and combining several coexisting historical memories.

19. Portnoy, A. (2014). The Mantra of Non-interference Systems of Belief among Putin's Friends. Osteuropa, 64(9-10), 5-+.

Russia's actions in Ukraine have polarized the German public. While some simply condemn the annexation of the Crimea and the war in Donbas by referring to international law, others have a different understanding of Russia. Some even openly legitimize the annexation. For them, "the West" is mainly responsible for the crisis. The apologetics of "Putin's friends" feed on a persistent anti-Americanism, the consensus culture and pacifism that emerged in Germany after the Second World War, a historically reductionist and unreflective feeling of guilt towards Russia because of the war, cliches regarding Eastern Europe, and a poor knowledge of Ukraine. This mix is fertile ground for the widespread attitude of non-interference.

20. Portnoy, A. (2014). War and Peace The "Euro-Revolution" in Ukraine. Osteuropa, 64(1), 7-+.

After Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych unexpectedly declined to sign the association agreement with the European Union in November 2013, tens of thousands of people gathered on Kiev's Independence Square to protest this about-face. The protest turned into a broad movement against the corrupt regime and for a life in dignity. The Yanukovych regime tried to stop the protests by using force. In the conflict, over 80 people died. In the protestors' eyes, the regime lost all legitimacy; shortly thereafter, parliament deposed the president. Ukraine is in a deep crisis of sovereignty and is facing its greatest political, economic, and social challenges since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

21. Reisinger, H., & Gol'c, A. (2014). Hybrid War in Ukraine Russia's Intervention and the Lessons for the NATO. Osteuropa, 64(9-10), 119-+.

Russia's annexation of the Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine feed on the perception held by the political elite around President Vladimir Putin that democratization in Ukraine also threatens the authoritarian, order in Moscow. The hybrid war with which Russia answered is nothing new. It involves an effective mix of military and non-military means, conventional and irregular methods including cyber-attacks and propaganda. For a multinational organization such as NATO, which is based on the principle of consensus, a quick and appropriate response is difficult.

22. Sanborn, J. A. (2014). RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM, 1914-2014: ANNEXATIONIST, ADVENTURIST, OR ANXIOUS? Revolutionary Russia, 27(2), 92-108. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546545.2014.973677

This essay describes the modes of imperial action deployed during the July Crisis of 1914. It begins with an assessment of recent works on Russia's role in the outbreak of the war before more closely considering the question of why and how Russia mobilized in late July. The essay concludes with some thoughts regarding Russia's military and diplomatic assault upon Ukraine in 2014 and how the study of events a century ago may help us understand contemporary events more clearly.

23. Skvrnda, F. (2014). WAR OF UKRAINE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT ARRANGEMENTS MULTIPOLAR POWER IN THE WORLD. *International Relations 2014: Contemporary Issues of World Economics and Politics*, **485-494.**

The beginning of the Ukrainian crisis at the end of 2013. International dimension of the Ukrainian crisis and its connection with the creation of multipolarity in international relations in the 21st century. About medial and political interpretation of the Ukrainian crisis and critic of West's view about it. Outline of periodization of development of the Ukrainian crisis and the main events that influenced its international impact. Presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2104. Ukrainian crisis and other crises and conflicts of the 21st century. The domestic and international scenarios of development of the Ukrainian crisis.

24. Stewart, S. (2014). New Wine in Old Bottle Ukraine's Political Elite. Osteuropa, 64(9-10), 169-+.

Ukraine is facing a tremendous reform agenda. With the election of a new parliament in October and the formation of a coalition government in addition to the presidential elections in May the conditions to tackle this agenda are now in place. However, the political elite includes not only new, reform-oriented groups but also numerous influential forces which do not support a transparent, efficient form of politics based on the needs of the broader population rather than on special interests. The war in the Donbass region increases the risk that Ukraine will remain mired in the existing structures, although even in the absence of war a fundamental change in Ukrainian politics would be far from assured.

25. Vogel, T. (2014). Overextension and Disinterest The European Union, the Neighbourhood, and Ukraine. Osteuropa, 64(9-10), 51-+.

The conflict between the West and Russia is also a crisis in European foreign and security policy. Disagreement and disinterest among the member states, turf wars within European Union institutions, and the long processes of coordination between Brussels and the national capitals have encouraged this crisis. To date, there has been no open, comprehensive assessment of the internal mistakes made over the past year. Such a study would be a prerequisite for a new European Ostpolitik that includes all of the countries in the neighbourhood as well as Russia.

26. Voswinkel, J. (2014). Cynicism with a Journalistic Face Russian Media, Power, and Ukraine. Osteuropa, 64(5-6), 175-+.

Since January 2014, Russian television has taken a particular perspective on Ukraine. The reporting is unparalleled in its aggressiveness and demagoguery. Television channels show alleged "concentration camps for pro-Russian activists", talk of a "genocide" directed against Ukraine's Russian-speakers, and vilify the Euromaidan protest movement as "fascism". No slur is too absurd for broadcast. Political operatives are at work behind this campaign of disinformation. But to implement it, compliant journalists are needed. Editors, reporters, and presenters lend themselves to this for reasons of cynicism and political conviction. The fact that professional ethics and professional standards get lost in the process does not bother them. They see themselves in an information war with the West.

27. Wendland, A. V. (2014). Fumbling in the Dark "Experts" during the Ukraine Crisis: A Polemic. Osteuropa, 64(9-10), 13-+.

After a year of discussion about the crisis in Ukraine and Russia's war against Ukraine, it is time to take stock. The renaissance of geopolitical fatalism, the sovereignty over interpretation asserted by self-proclaimed experts, the historically taboo thoughts, and the speechlessness of specialists, in particular historians, yield a nightmarish report: faced with its greatest challenge, Germany's Eastern Europe experts have failed.

2015

1. Adamski, L. (2015). Observing the Observers The OSCE and Russia's Aggression against Ukraine. *Osteuropa*, *65*(1-2), 43-+.

As a result of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe has once again gained the status of a major international organisation after years of declining importance. It dispatched to Ukraine a large civilian observer mission. In addition, the OSCE observes two crossings on the Ukrainian-Russian border and plays an important role as mediator in the trilateral contact group. However, the observer mission is poorly equipped, and personnel are often recruited with a lack of regard for professional criteria. For too long, the mission was intent on maintaining diplomatic equidistance and therefore failed to document Russia's massive and obvious involvement in the war. The fact that Russia is a warring party but pretends to be an intermediary and can at the same time paralyse the OSCE, which makes decisions based on consensus, reduces the chances for success for the organisation and its missions.

2. Alenga, D. (2015). Ukraine's Fault Lines: The Quest for Regional Hegemony in the Post-Soviet Space. *Soviet and Post Soviet Review*, *42*(2), 150-173. https://doi.org/10.1163/18763324-04202003

This paper presents a critique of the European Union's flagship Eastern Partnership Initiative (EaP) within the context of its geopolitical ramifications on the political crisis in Ukraine. It particularly highlights the role of the Russian Federation as the principal protagonists and its quest to counter the EU's normative power within their shared neighborhood. The EaP has among its goals promoting a broad range of political and economic reforms with the partner states with the view to help them deepen liberal democratic values and enhanced security and stability within the framework of an enhanced Association Agreement. The Kremlin believes the EaP undermines Russian interest in the region. This paper therefore presents a critical analysis of the contending dynamics of the competing efforts to use Ukraine as the launching pad to reshape the post-Cold War regional order.

3. Armistead, E., & Starsman, S. (2015, Mar 24-25). Perception Shaping and Cyber Macht: Russia and Ukraine. *Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Warfare and Security* **[Proceedings of the 10th international conference on cyber warfare and security (iccws-2015)]. 10th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (ICCWS), Univ Venda, SOUTH AFRICA.**

This paper continues the process of laying the groundwork for a new comprehensive academic theory on Cyber Macht (Cyber Power). In this particular paper, the authors have conducted a case study that will focus on Perception Shaping with the thesis that truth and the internet have long been uncomfortable partners. Public opinion can often be easily shaped by tailoring information for specific groups and by not presenting or suppressing information not supportive of the desired public impression. The authors will use the conflict between the Ukraine and Russia in Eastern Europe in a case study to analyze how each side is attempting to use the media to their advantage in this conflict. While a war has not been officially declared (yet), sovereign territory has been invaded, personnel have been killed and is these researchers opinion that information operations (IO) is playing a huge role how this conflict is being conducted. This paper will analyze the efforts of various IO initiatives by both sides and attempt to determine the key factors of success.

4. Aust, M. (2015). Not Like in "The Life of Brian" A Response to Anna Veronika Wendland's Criticism. *Osteuropa*, *65*(1-2), 193-+.

Anna Veronika Wend land's allegation that East European History as a discipline has failed in the face of the Russia-Ukraine crisis and the war in the Donbas is untenable. Historians have spoken up in various ways. Whether specialists appear in public depends more on the laws governing the media than the debate culture of historians. Nor does the thesis hold that expertise in Ukraine is a career risk, or that Ukraine is not addressed in courses. However, more effort is needed to anchor Ukraine in Eastern Europe's trans-regional history.

5. Bechev, D. (2015). Understanding the Contest Between the EU and Russia in Their Shared Neighborhood. *Problems of Post-Communism*, *62*(6), 340-349. https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2015.1067751

The Ukraine crisis has turned the EU and Russia from uneasy partners into rivals in the shared neighborhood. But the rivalry differs from traditional power politics as seen during the cold war. While the EU is not a serious competitor in the security field Russia is unable to present a credible alternative to integration into the Single Market. As a result competition is most pronounced at the level of discourse. Othering the EU has also been an aspect of Putin's quest for legitimacy at home. That is a reason enough to expect that the contest between Moscow and Brussels will last.

6. Behrends, J. C. (2015). A Year of Violence Russia's State Crisis and the War against Ukraine. *Osteuropa*, *65*(3), 47-+.

The annexation of the Crimea and the undeclared war against Ukraine once again show the significant role violence plays in post-Soviet Russia. The forms of violence range from coercion to resolve economic conflicts to the 1993 coup and the shelling of the Russian Supreme Soviet, from the "war on terror" against its own citizens in the North Caucasus to open or hybrid wars beyond its own borders. The extraordinary role of violence is an expression of a deep structural crisis of Russian statehood and the deformation of politics. Russia's leadership acts in a friend-or-foe modus, using repression at home and aggression abroad. The stabilisation and consolidation of Ukraine and its neighbours in Eastern Europe is the central task of European security policy and German "Ostpolitik". in Russia, those social forces that advocate civil values deserve support.

7. Bezruk, T., & Umland, A. (2015). The Azov Case Volunteer Battalions in Ukraine. *Osteuropa*, *65*(1-2), 33-+.

Volunteer battalions are a response to Russia's covert invasion of Ukraine. While most of the formations can be considered as a war-related version of civil society within post-revolutionary Ukraine, there are volunteer formations that bear the marks of "uncivil society". Among them is the Azov Battalion. Its history is sketchy, its leadership and symbolism are fascist. But Azov, which has been upgraded to a national guard regiment, is atypical.

8. Blockmans, S. (2015). Crimea and the quest for energy and military hegemony in the Black Sea region: governance gap in a contested geostrategic zone. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, *15*(2), 179-189. **https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2015.1060016**

Russia's annexation of Crimea and its destabilization of Eastern Ukraine have radically altered the European security order, with the Black Sea region becoming an acutely contested geostrategic zone. Russia's strategic interests in the Black Sea region, especially in terms of energy and military presence, collide with those of Ukraine, Turkey, the European Union and the United States, among others, and expose the governance gap left by the existing conventions and institutions in dealing with the region. It is argued that Russia's move to annex Crimea was a strategic decision made irrespective of the destructive effect on the post-Cold War order. Furthermore, until a new normal has been accepted by the main players, there is no hope of revising the existing conventions and institutions pertaining to the basin.

9. Bomsdorf, F. (2015). Clarity and Consistency Russia Policy in Times of War. *Osteuropa*, *65*(1-2), 65-+.

The annexation of the Crimea in March 2014 and Russia's war against Ukraine are an attack on Europe. The West must adjust to sustained confrontation with Russia. The mantra that security and stability in Europe cannot be achieved without Russia is questionable, as is the admonishment of Europeans - to themselves! - to maintain dialogue with the Kremlin. Putin's revisionist confrontation course demands a clear response. These include re-establishing a Western defence capability, containment against aggression, sanctions, and comprehensive support for Ukraine. What is needed is a Western policy along the lines of "peaceful coexistence": cooperation wherever possible, resistance wherever necessary.

10. Chifu, I. (2015). Hybrid War - a Limited and Unlimited War. *Rethinking Social Action. Core Values*, 239-244.

Hybrid war, a concept issued in the last decade, has been involved in an explosive evolution in the last two years due to the international security environment and the use of such a concept in reality. The ISIL developments in Iraq and Syria, the annexation of Crimea after the invasion of the "little green men" that took over administrative buildings and blocked military units, the proxy war in Eastern Ukraine, all showed us different forms of hybrid war. This quickly became a part of military, political and strategic documents. Once again, a revision of the concept allowed us to make some remarks about the ability of this new type of war typical for the beginning of the 21-st century to be at the same time limited and unlimited. Limited because the parties do not use all the arsenal and capabilities at their disposal and unlimited because of the lack of rules of engagement in this kind of conflict.

11. Ciolan, I. M. (2015). SECURITY IN CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE: EASTERN PARTNERSHIP LOOKING TOWARDS RIGA SUMMIT. *Europolity-Continuity and Change in European Governance*, *9*(1), 31-44.

The aftermath of the Vilnius Summit raised many questions regarding the effectiveness of the European foreign policy in the Eastern partnership countries. The previous incidents show the imperious need of a security dimension for the Eastern Partnership. A new European security system is required to offer better solutions to a region that struggles with the annexation of Crimea, violent conflicts in the Donbas area in Eastern Ukraine, the 2008 Georgian-Russian war and the five frozen conflicts at the Eastern frontier of the EU. In this paper, I will present from a macro-level analysis the main transformations and challenges of the Eastern Partnership after the Vilnius Summit until the Riga Summit2, elaborate on the expectations from the upcoming Riga Summit and its importance in the actual context and offer some insights in the main reasons why controlling the Eastern neighbourhood is important for both European and Russian security.

12. Cottiero, C., Kucharski, K., Olimpieva, E., & Orttung, R. W. (2015). War of words: the impact of Russian state television on the Russian Internet. *Nationalities Papers-the Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, *43*(4), 533-555. **https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2015.1013527**

How effective is Russian state television in framing the conflict in Ukraine that began with the Euromaidan protests and what is its impact on Russian Internet users? We carried out a content analysis of Dmitrii Kiselev's "News of the Week" show, which allowed us to identify the two key frames he used to explain the conflict - World War II-era fascism and anti-Americanism. Since Kiselev often reduces these frames to buzzwords, we were able to track the impact of these words on Internet users by examining search query histories on Yandex and Google and by developing quantitative data to complement our qualitative analysis. Our findings show that much of what state media produces is not effective, but that the "fascist" and antiAmerican frames have had lasting impacts on Russian Internet users. We argue that it does not make sense to speak of competition between a "television party" and an "Internet party" in Russia since state television has a strong impact in setting the agenda for the Internet and society as a whole. Ultimately, the relationship between television and the Internet in Russia is a continual loop, with each affecting the other.

13. Creuzberger, S. (2015). The Legend of Breach of Promise Russia, the West, and the NATO Enlargement to the East. *Osteuropa*, *65*(3), 95-+.

The annexation of the Crimea and Russia's war against Ukraine have sparked a debate over whether the West bears a share of responsibility for the military escalation. One position claims that Russia's elite feels threatened by the eastern enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The West, it is said, broke a promise made during the "2 + 4" negotiations that it would not expand NATO to the east. This interpretation is void of any basis in fact: there was no such promise.

14. da Costa, W. M. (2015). The new uplifting of Russia, the US / NATO and the crisis in Ukraine: the Geopolitics of the New World Order. *Confins-Revue Franco-Bresilienne De Geographie-Revista Franco-Brasileira De Geografia*, *25*.

This paper examines important aspects of the international scene in the early 21st century from a geopolitical point of view, highlighting the process of return of Russia as a great power. The approach combines regional geography, geopolitics, history and theory of international relations and seeks to focus on the analysis of relevant aspects of Russian history, from the Tsarist period, via the socialism of the USSR, the decline after 1991, the return from 2000 and the current regional and global political power strategy, which is highlighted in its rivalry with the US / NATO and the conflict with Ukraine. In addition to the analysis of this journey, it seeks to understand the particular mode of action of the great powers in their constant struggle to maintain and extend aspects of their world power, especially in the last two decades. He points at the same time to the remarkable revival of ther geopolitical point of view and its ability to untangle the complex web of international relations policy in the context of the current transition from one world order to another, previously designated as tripolar.

15. Dimitrova, P. (2015). The Memory of the Second World War: between the Past and the Present. *Bulgarian Historical Review-Revue Bulgare D Histoire*(1-2), 203-211.

The article looks through the changes in the memory of the Second World War as part of the transformations in the ideas that were established after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the disappearance of the Marxist-Leninist ideology dominance in the East European countries. The author offers her version of the transformations in the memory of the Second World War, while analyzing the process of the Holocaust ideas' establishment and the need for condemnation of all totalitarian regimes. According to her, two parallel processes take place in Europe after 1989 the establishment of the Holocaust as a main event during the whole world war, going from West to East, and the enforcement of the view for similarity between the two totalitarian regimes the National-Socialist and the Bolshevik, going in the opposite direction. The second process of European revisionism requires not only condemnation of the Communist crimes against humanity in a way similar to the condemnation of the Nazi crimes through the Nurnberg tribunal, but also a full revision of the views on the reasons, the driving forces and the results of the Second World War. In such way, the confrontations between Russia and the West nowadays, related mostly to the accession of Crimea and the war activities in Ukraine, also have their impact on the past: 70 years after its end, the war is starting to look more and more not like a collision between the anti-Hitler coalition and the Axis powers, but like a fight between two totalitarian regimes, in which, for one reason or another, most of the then existing countries were included.

16. Dragneva, R., & Wolczuk, K. (2015). *The Association Agreement: Trilateralisation amidst War*. **https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137516268.0011**

This chapter examines Russia's efforts to stymie the conclusion of the economic part of the Association Agreement, the so-called DCFTA, which provides for Ukraine's deep economic integration with the EU. These efforts drew the EU into the Ukraine-Russian imbroglio as the forcefulness of Russia's objections to the DCFTA required a response from the EU. While these objections offer a penetrating insight into Russia's

broader security and geopolitical concerns, the EU's response also highlights the challenges it faced in addressing technical issues and rules in the context of high (geo)politics and peace-building efforts.

17. Dragneva, R., & Wolczuk, K. (2015). *The Military Backlash.* **https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137516268.0010**

The dramatic events in Ukraine in February 2014 resulted in the collapse of Yanukovych's regime and a change of government. One of the first steps of the new leadership was to assert the pro-European course. These events, however, triggered a backlash from Russia. This chapter focuses on its military and political dimensions. Russia's response directly sought to fundamentally weaken Ukraine's resolve to persist with the European choice by re-drawing Ukrainian statehood. Russia's actions also sought to expose the limits of the EU's readiness to support Ukraine during this period, and in particular its search for a political settlement in the face of Russia's armed suasion. This chapter will explore the contours of these events with a view to understanding Russia's strategy.

18. Dragneva, R., & Wolczuk, K. (2015). *Ukraine Between the EU and Russia: The Integration Challenge Conclusions.* **https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137516268.0012**

This chapter draws the broad lessons of the crisis and explores its key implications for Ukraine, Russia and Europe. In its third decade of independence, Ukraine faces a significant geopolitical challenge in that the EU is somewhat ambivalent about Ukraine's pro-European choice - while Russia is dead set against it. However it is clear that Ukraine is willing to now pursue its European aspirations despite the costs. This is an admittedly formidable challenge - not only because of the war but in particular due to the dire state of the economy and decayed state institutions. Whether or not Ukraine can sustain this integration choice in the face of significant challenges emanating from the East and West has yet to be seen. Nevertheless, faced with Russia's coercive power, Ukraine has, after years of merely declaring a pro-European orientation, begun to display a new degree of assertiveness and single-mindedness in pursuing this course.

19. Erol, M. S., & Oguz, S. (2015). Hybrid Warfare Studies and Russia's Example in Crimea. *Gazi Akademik Bakis-Gazi Academic View*, *9*(17), 261-277.

Although Hybrid Warfare is an old concept, theoretical studies in the western countries mainly began in the post-Col War era, focusing on asymmetrical threats against conventional superiority of western countries such as USA or Israel. September 11th attacks and 2006 Israel-Lebanon war played important roles for the evolution of hybrid warfare theories. However, there has not any consensus among scholars on a exact or unique definition of hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare became one of the main security issues for the West and especially for NATO after the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Russian military strategies, called "hybrid warfare" by the western countries, resulted in the successful annexation of Crimea and, caused a serious security problem for the West resulting important structural and functional changes for the military system of NATO. Russian activities, which have been based on surprise, ambiguity and deniability, presented a unique example for hybrid warfare studies.

20. Forsberg, T., & Herd, G. (2015). Russia and NATO: From Windows of Opportunities to Closed Doors. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, *23*(1), 41-57. **https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2014.1001824**

The Ukrainian crisis and Russia's annexation of Crimea marks a new low in RussiaNATO relations. When we examine the relationship between NATO and Russia through the postCold War era, we can ask: was the deterioration in relations determined by geopolitical, historical, cultural and identity factors, or could sustainable partnership might have been possible had alternative decisions been taken? We argue that different reasons account for each of the four instances of deterioration in the relationship. Throughout the period some constants can be identified: cooperative rhetoric rarely mirrored reality; a mismatch in expectations, commitments and perceptions torpedoed the prospect of a more stable cooperative partnership; and, a surprising persistence in low-key but significant cooperation can be noted. The article concludes with the observation that dissonance at the heart of NATO-Russia relations is best understood as the consequence of Russia's attempt to navigate its way through a strategic trilemma and divorce signals Russia's failure to square the circle.

21. Freedman, L. (2015). Ukraine and the Art of Exhaustion. *Survival*, *57*(5), 77-106. **https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.1090132**

With no strategy for bringing their war to a conclusion, Ukraine and Russia are now seeking each other's exhaustion.

22. Gilley, C. (2015). OTAMANSHCHYNA? THE SELF-FORMATION OF UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN WARLORDS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURIES. *Ab Imperio-Studies of New Imperial History and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Space*(3), 73-95. **https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2015.0078**

The article reviews some of the empirical and terminological problems associated with examining the autonomous military formations active in the current war in Ukraine. The article suggests that an understanding of a historical example of such independent bands - otamanshchyna during the Russian Civil War, 1917-1922 - might offer a means of studying the current participants in the war in the Donbas. This approach shows how military men actively engage in the construction of identities to make sense of their activity. It also reveals that the current commanders have often drawn on a set of invented traditions similar to their Civil War counterparts - above all related to the early modern Cossacks.

23. Gjeta, G. (2015). NATO'S CHALLENGES IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER. *Socioint15: International Conference on Social Sciences and Humanities*, 707-713.

After the end of the cold war the issue of NATO's future has become one of the most discussed topics in the international arena. The question is what role has already NATO in the security of European states? And how effective will be its role facing the challenges of today? North Atlantic Alliance as an organization that continues to maintain a spirit of cooperation in the area of security and defense of the sovereignty of all states undertakes to engage member of states to discuss the new challenges which it is facing today. We can't deny the important role has played NATO to defuse conflicts in Kosovo-Serbia 1999 issue, in the prevention of ethnic and territorial conflicts in the Balkans, and stabilization relations between the parties in conflict. In the new world order NATO is faced with challenges such as terrorism, extremism, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic conflicts. As a result of these developments is not easy for international institutions to afford these changes and new threats that are risking global security. These developments are very problematic after heavy slap stability, peace and security in the world because intend to wrenching the sovereign states, hit relations between states violation international principles and laws. A challenge of globalized terrorism was not previously a serious challenge globally as it is today. Crimean issue will qualify as challenges and serious threat to the security and stability of Europe, since the Cold War. The annexation of the Crimea by Russia and ongoing threats against Ukraine are a memory to countries in Eastern Europe, and especially the Balkans, NATO constitutes the backbone of national and European security. NATO pretend to become the leading player in the global security, but this extension requires deeper commitment among allies more susceptible to threats. Major threat that is coming across global security today is the terrorist organization ISIS, a radical extremist organization with the potential and military vehicles, which is putting at risk not only the Middle East countries, but Europe and the United States of America. The elimination of this organization and other terrorist groups is the duty immediate to global security and highlights the necessity of NATO's evolution. The role of NATO in the security of peace is irreplaceable but above all, it should serve as a catalyst for security in the world answered many concerns deriving as a result of violation of safety.

24. Grodeland, A. B. (2015). Perceptions of civil rights, security and the "war on terror": East and West compared. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, *48*(4), 317-335. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2015.10.003

This article explores the tension between civil rights and security by examining the perceptions of the general public and elites in Eastern and Western Europe on (i) the terrorist threat; (ii) external pressure to stay within or step outside the law when combatting terrorism; and (iii) how best to combat terrorism. Large scale qualitative and quantitative data collected in Western and Eastern Europe before the terrorist act in Norway in 2011 and the Russian intervention in Ukraine and subsequent annexation of the Crimea in 2014 suggest that at the time terrorism was perceived as a greater threat in Western than in Eastern Europe. Further, Europeans felt that the US had extended pressure on their countries to combat terrorism by stepping outside the law. While ordinary citizens believed that terrorism should be fought by introducing more security if necessary at the expense of civil rights elites emphasized the need to protect civil rights while combating terrorism. Finally, European Muslims claimed that the terrorist threat was exaggerated and that protecting civil rights is more important than combating terrorism.

25. Gulina, O. (2015). No More War Refugees from Eastern Ukraine. *Osteuropa*, *65*(4), 131-+.

More than two million people from eastern Ukraine have left their homes since the outbreak of fighting. One-third has fled to other locations in the Donbas; one-third has moved to other regions within Ukraine; and one-third has fled abroad, primarily to Russia. To a certain extent, Russia and Belarus have relaxed the legal regulations for entry, residence, and work. But Russia also uses the refugees and citizenship rights specifically in the pursuit of foreign policy. Mired in a difficult economic situation, Ukraine is trying to cope with more than one million internally displaced persons.

26. Haukkala, H. (2015). From Cooperative to Contested Europe? The Conflict in Ukraine as a Culmination of a Long-Term Crisis in EU-Russia Relations. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, *23*(1), 25-40. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2014.1001822

The article looks at the European Union's (EU) attempts at ordering the Pan-European space and how Russia has sought to position itself in the EU-centric unipolar order and how that has affected the development of EU-Russia relations during the post-Cold War era. The analysis will move in four successive steps: (i) the

development of the EU's attempts at hegemonic, post-sovereign ordering is reconstructed; (ii) the development of EU-Russia relations in light of these processes is analysed; (iii) then, the crisis in Ukraine as a certain culmination point is discussed; (iv) the article ends with conclusions concerning the development of EU-Russia relations in light of the problematic as well as an assessment of the significance of this particular facet in the wider processes of ordering discussed in the Special Issue together with a prognosis concerning the future.

27. Herron, E. S., Thunberg, M. E., & Boyko, N. (2015). Crisis management and adaptation in wartime elections: Ukraine's 2014 snap presidential and parliamentary elections. *Electoral Studies*, *40*, 419-429. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2015.07.009

Democratic states face logistical challenges managing elections that are magnified when territorial integrity is threatened. This article investigates the effects of conflict and occupation on election administration and outcomes, using data from Ukraine's 2014 snap presidential and parliamentary elections. We analyze the effects of the conflict, reflected in the movement of polling stations, reduced participation, and partisan results. Our findings suggest that the Ukrainian state was successful at containing the conflict, limiting its effects on voters and administrators.

28. Heyne, S., & Grunert-Baillet, B. (2015). The Group as an Island in the Ocean of Conflicts - Report on a Russian-Ukrainian Training Group led by two German Groupanaysts. *Gruppenpsychotherapie Und Gruppendynamik*, *51*(4), 288-307. https://doi.org/10.13109/grup.2015.51.4.288

This article reports on a self-experience group, which was led by the two authors over a period of two years (3/2013-3/2015) in Moscow. The Russian-speaking participants came from Russia and Ukraine. The group meetings were held with interpreters. The non-verbal communication in the group was also given special attention in this setting. Many group-dynamic problems could be attributed to the framework, which offered plenty of opportunities. For example, the group also met shortly after the uprising at the Kiev Maidan in February 2014 and ended during the war in eastern Ukraine. The report tries to shed light on the interactions between the environment and group dynamics. In addition to the trans-generational trauma in the matrix of the group, the threatening situation in reality increasingly played a role. Thus, the end of this encounter group is shaped in a particular way.

29. Hopmann, P. T. (2015). The United States and the OSCE after the Ukraine Crisis. *Security and Human Rights*, *26*(1), 33-47. https://doi.org/10.1163/18750230-02601007

Ever since negotiations on the Helsinki Final Act opened in Helsinki in 1973, the United States has regarded the Conference (later Organization) on Security and Co-operation in Europe with some ambivalence. The role of the Helsinki Final Act in establishing a normative regime that contributed significantly to undermining the authoritarian regimes in the former Warsaw Pact countries, eventually bringing an end to the Cold War, is widely recognized and appreciated in the United States. However, the expanded post-Cold War role of the OSCE has received less attention in us foreign policy and, with respect to issues of European security, has clearly been assigned a secondary role in that policy behind the NATO Alliance. Those knowledgeable about the OSCE in the United States widely regard its role in positive terms on issues such as human rights, rights of persons belonging to minorities, rule of law, election monitoring and other "soft" security issues. However, the OSCE role in "hard" security issues has been given little attention and receives only limited support, due largely to its inability to achieve consensus on most serious security problems and its lack of resources to effectively implement those decisions that it takes. Nevertheless, the recent crisis in Ukraine has awakened us interest in the OSCE as the institutional framework best able to manage that crisis. The challenge for the German Chairmanship in 2016 will be to build upon this renewed us attention to the OSCE's role in "hard" security issues, in promoting negotiated resolutions to this and other stalemated - conflicts, in rebuilding the badly damaged regime of confidence-building measures and conventional arms control, as well as responding, within the multilateral OSCE framework, to new security threats, such as cyber warfare and countering violent extremism.

30. Horbyk, R. (2015). Little Patriotic War: Nationalist Narratives in the Russian Media Coverage of the Ukraine-Russia Crisis. *Asian Politics & Policy*, *7*(3), 505-+. https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12193

The developments in Ukraine in 2014, including Euromaidan demonstrations, annexation of Crimea by Russia, and war in the country's two Eastern regions, became so intensely reported by Russian media that they often overshadowed internal newsi. In this review, I will try to take a closer look at the Russian discourses on Ukraine.

31. Hoskins, A., & O'Loughlin, B. (2015). Arrested war: the third phase of mediatization. *Information Communication & Society*, *18*(11), 1320-1338. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118x.2015.1068350

After Broadcast War and Diffused War comes Arrested War, the latest paradigm of war and media. Each paradigm coincides with a discrete phase of mediatization. This article explains how war and media

operated during each phase, describing the key characteristics of war, the form and nature of the prevailing media ecology, and how power was exercised by and distributed within government, military, and media elites. Following the sense of flux and uncertainty during the second phase of mediatization, when digital content and non-linear communication dynamics generated Diffused War, Arrested War is characterized by the appropriation and control of previously chaotic dynamics by mainstream media and, at a slower pace, government and military policy-makers. We use the ongoing Ukraine crisis to examine Arrested War in operation. In setting out a new paradigm of war and media, we also reflect on the difficulties of periodizing and historicizing these themes and ask what theoretical and conceptual tools are likely to be needed to understand and explain Arrested War.

32. Hossein-Zadeh, I. (2015). WW III: More Interclass than International. *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology*, *14*(1-2), 146-157. https://doi.org/10.1163/15691497-12341337**

Most pundits of historical developments tend to perceive another worldwide war, often called ww III, in a manner similar to World Wars I and II; that is, large-scale deployment of military means in pursuit of destruction and/or defeat of international adversaries. While prospects of such an ominous scenario certainly cannot be ruled out, there is reason to believe, however, that the much talked-about ww iii may be of a different form: more inter-class than international. Viewed in this light, ww iii is already here; it has indeed been raging on for years: the unilateral, cross-border neoliberal war of austerity on the 99 percent on a global level.

33. Hudson, R. (2015). The End of the End of the Cold War: Current Dilemmas Confronting European Security in the Wake of the Ukrainian Conflict. *European Integration: New Prospects*, 55-79.**

Seventy years after the founders of modern Europe set out to bring stability, union and prosperity to a continent wracked by conflict, Europe and its principal political manifestation, the European Union, is currently confronted with a renewed, and potentially defining struggle against the re-energised forces of internal division and fragmentation, external hostility and encroachment. In the aftermath of Russia's recent dismemberment of a European country by the annexation of Crimea, and its involvement in the currently frozen conflict recently fought out in eastern Ukraine, Europe is facing an increasingly insecure future. Indeed it would seem that, for the first time since the end of the Cold War twenty-five years ago, there are doubts as to whether or not the European Union's borders any longer remain secure. It is against this backdrop that President Putin's apparent attempts to re-establish 'Soviet-era spheres of influence' affect not only Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, but also Central and Eastern European countries which are much closer to the heart of Europe, such as Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia, and EU member states such as Hungary and Slovakia. By reviewing the foundations of Euro-Atlantic Security in the aftermath of the Second World War and appraising the Post-Cold War security structure, this chapter er will consider competing claims in the post-2000 Putin era between Western security institutions and the new Russian security doctrine aimed to control the "near abroad" (former Soviet space). Twenty-five years after the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe are we now at the end of the End of the Cold War? By considering the new security threats to Europe, this chapter will assess today's European security agenda, or the lack of it. With its security focus elsewhere in the world, perhaps the United States, the traditional guarantor of European security might not be able to provide such guarantees today. Perhaps the EU's Eastern Partnership initiative has been proven to be too ambitious in the light of recent developments. Has the crisis in Ukraine opened Cold War wounds, and what are the regional repercussions of this frozen conflict? Indeed, have any mistakes been made by the Western Alliance in its approach to Russia's legitimate interests. Has the West made an (un) intentional contribution to the current state of affairs and what is the future of the political and security order in Europe?

34. Jahn, E. (2015). New Edition of the East-West Conflict? Challenges to Peace and the New Wars in Europe. *Osteuropa*, *65*(3), 25-+.**

Russia's covert war in Ukraine triggered a civil war in the country's east. This military expansion has its roots in the political split in Ukrainian society and a profound crisis between the West and Russia. However, this is not a return of the East-West conflict, but a new kind of conflict between Moscow and Brussels, which had already assumed bellicose dimensions in Kosovo in 1999 and in South Ossetia in 2008. The war in Ukraine and the deep crisis in relations between the West and Russia can be overcome only if a pan-European economic and security cooperation structure is created that regulates the integration competition between Moscow and Brussels, between eastern autocracy and western democracy. To this end, a compromise between the warring factions in Ukraine is also required.

35. Jan, M. N. I., & Haruna, A. L. (2015). War Crimes and the Downing of Malaysian Airliner MH-17. *Pertanika Journal of Social Science and Humanities*, *23*, 83-95.**

The downing of Malaysian Airliner MH 17 is not the first incident of shooting down a civilian airliner. There are several other cases where civilian aeroplanes carrying passengers were shot down. The case of MH 17 is a recent incident that attracts condemnation from the international community. MH 17 was shot down

within the territorial air space of Ukraine, an area under the control of the separatists who are fighting against the government of Ukraine. It was alleged that the airliner was downed by the separatists who are enjoying the support of the Russian government. The same accusation is levied against the Ukrainian government. Thus, this article examines the shooting down of the Malaysian airliner MH 17 and determines who should be responsible for the heinous crime. It examines whether the conflict in Ukraine amounts to an international armed conflict under international humanitarian law (IHL) which can be linked with the downing of MH 17. The article further examines the probable responsibility and jurisdictional problems to be faced in prosecuting the crime of shooting down MH 17 and the possible claims for compensation to the victims' family. The article posits that the situation in Ukraine is indeed an armed conflict and the shooting down of Malaysian airliner MH 17 constitutes a war crime of targeting civilians as envisaged under the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The jurisdictional problems in prosecution of the crime may be addressed by invoking universal jurisdiction. It is recommended that an international criminal investigation should be launched on the downing of MH 17 in order to find the culprits responsible for the crime for the purpose of subsequent prosecution for war crimes and compensation claims.

36. Kandiyoti, R. (2015). *New Cold War?* https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137501646.0012

This chapter summarizes the main points concerning the current impasse in the trans-European gas trade, the limits of rolling NATO and the EU eastwards, Germany's new posture within the emerging European matrix, Ukraine's ever more precarious positioning in Eastern Europe and the state of the new Cold War. Surfacing differences between European and American objectives concerning the conflict in Eastern Europe are also summarized.

37. Kandiyoti, R. (2015). *Powering Europe: Russia, Ukraine, and the Energy Squeeze Introduction.* https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137501646.0005

Natural gas from Russia represents a significant proportion of EU energy imports. This introductory chapter outlines recent shifts in the post-Soviet geopolitical settlement between the EU, NATO and Russia and its impact on trans-European energy links. In Ukraine, the heart of Russia's gas transmission networks, competition for influence between the West and Russia has exacerbated cleavages in society, leading to war in the East and the prospect of a new Cold War across Europe.

38. Kandiyoti, R. (2015). *Russian Geopolitics and Ukrainian War.* https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137501646.0010

This chapter reviews relations between the EU-NATO tandem and Russia during the period leading up to the latest Ukrainian crisis. President Yanukovich was overthrown following his decision to join the Eurasian Customs Union and power in Kiev has passed to Western Ukrainian nationalists. After Russia annexed Crimea, a rebellion was set off in the Donbas against the new power in Kiev. The decision to restore Kiev's authority in the East by force of arms has led to civil war. Successive stages of the conflict are explored to identify the forces shaping the fortunes of Ukraine, at the heart of Europe's energy transmission networks.

39. Kanet, R. E. (2015). The failed Western challenge to Russia's revival in Eurasia? *International Politics*, 52(5), 503-522. https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2015.28

The current crisis in Russia's relations with the West has more often than not been blamed in the West on Russia itself and the authoritarian policies pursued by Vladimir Putin. As reprehensible as many aspects of Russian policy might be, the West has contributed to the deterioration in the relationship by ignoring Russian policy concerns and attempting to take advantage of Russian weakness. By acting thus the West has not only created major problems for itself. It has also made any diplomatic solution to the Ukraine tragedy increasingly unlikely.

40. Kasperski, T. (2015). Nuclear power in Ukraine: Crisis or path to energy independence? *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 71(4), 43-50. https://doi.org/10.1177/0096340215590793

Ukraine is a major nuclear power, with 15 reactors that produce more than 13,000 megawatts of electricity annually. Nuclear power has become important in contemporary Ukraine as the country's leaders seek energy independence from Russian oil and gas amid significant tensions between the two countries in the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea and as its proxy war in eastern Ukraine continues. Other challenges to Ukraine's determination to expand nuclear energy production include the costly legacy of the Chernobyl disaster; bureaucratic changes that have blurred responsibilities for promotion and regulation of nuclear power; cost overruns typical for nuclear power everywhere; the aging of power stations; and uncertainty in how to deal with nuclear dependence on Russia in terms of both nuclear technologies and the nuclear fuel cycle. Yet Ukraine remains determined to produce the lion's share of its electricity from nuclear power plants.

41. Kriz, Z., & Sgem. (2015, Aug 26-Sep 01). NATO AND THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE: DIFFERENT REACTIONS TO THE RUSSIAN ACTION. *International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conferences on Social Sciences and Arts* [Sgem 2015: political sciences, law, finance, economics and tourism, vol i: law,

political sciences]. 2nd International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on Social Sciences and Arts (SGEM 2015), Albena, BULGARIA.

The relations between NATO and Ukraine have been discussed in scholarly literature for the two last decades. This issue obtained new dynamics after the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine, which had led to the annexation of Crimea and occupation of the eastern parts of the country by Russian army and forces controlled by Russia. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, NATO condemned the Russian policy on many occasions, provided Ukraine with diplomatic support and launched several programs that were supposed to help Ukraine eliminate deficits in its military capacity limiting Ukrainian possibilities to face Russian aggression. However, NATO member states are not united in their attitude towards the ongoing crisis and one can identify at least four groups of states in NATO. The first group consists of fundamental critics of Russian behaviour because the Russian activities undermine the ongoing international order. The second group is comprised of states that are forced to criticise the Russian actions because they fear Russian expansionism. Their attitude is based on the bad historical experience with Russia and the mistrust towards Russia is historically deeply rooted. The third group of states is formed by the NATO members that prefer to avoid any deterioration in the NATO-Russian relations, criticise the imposed sanctions and call for negotiations with Russia. The fourth group of states does not pay significant attention to this issue and its position is not clear. And last but not least, there are countries in NATO that undermine the NATO cohesion, as they do not condemn the Russian activities at all. Therefore the ongoing crisis is a very important test of the NATO cohesion and readiness for action.

42. Kroenig, M. (2015). Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War. *Survival*, *57*(1), 49-70. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.1008295

If Russia were to rerun its playbook from Ukraine against a NATO member, how would the West respond?

43. Kuzio, T. (2015). Rise and Fall of the Party of Regions Political Machine. *Problems of Post-Communism*, *62*(3), 174-186. https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2015.1020127

There is very limited Western scholarship on the Donbas region, despite its being the center of Europe's worst conflict since World War II. The Donbas region did not wish to join Soviet Ukraine in 1918, was not a source for Soviet Ukrainian leaders, and has high levels of Soviet nostalgia, low support for Ukrainian independence, and relatively high levels of support for separatism. The Donbas-based Party of Regions political machine won a plurality in three Ukrainian elections (2006, 2007, and 2012); its leader, Viktor Yanukovych, was the country's prime minister in 2002-4 and 2006-7 and president in 2010-14. Yanukovych provoked two revolutions: one that prevented him from becoming president (2004) and another that ousted him from power (2014). The November 2013-February 2014 Euromaidan crisis, which led to the flight of Yanukovych, Russian annexation of the Crimea, and the Donbas separatist conflict, also led to the disintegration of the Party of Regions in Kyiv and in its two regional strongholds. This article analyzes the factors behind the rise and fall of the Party of Regions and its Donbas-based political machine, and its implications for Ukrainian domestic politics and foreign policy.

44. Larsen, J. A. (2015). NATO Nuclear Policy, the Ukraine Crisis, and the Wales Summit. *Nuclear Threats and Security Challenges*, 85-95. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9894-5_8

NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept called upon the Alliance to carry out three core tasks: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. Since the beginning of the Alliance each of those tasks has been emphasized at different times. Following the 9/11 attacks NATO joined the United States in becoming an expeditionary alliance, focusing on crisis management and collective security through robust partnership programs and out of area conventional military operations around the globe. Deterrence policy, and nuclear matters in particular, were de-emphasized. Indeed, some argued that there was no longer any requirement for NATO to have a nuclear strategy, nor US warheads stationed in Europe. With the end of its mission in Afghanistan at the end of 2014, the member states were already facing the challenge of determining whether the next version of NATO would continue to play the same expeditionary role. Some of the new member states in Central Europe, however, were hoping to return to an emphasis on Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: collective security and territorial defense. Russia's aggression in early 2014 against Ukraine made that a much more immediate concern for the Alliance as a whole, and gave greater import to the NATO summit later that year. This chapter considers NATO nuclear policy in light of recent events and decisions from the September Wales Summit. It reviews the significant diminishment of the nuclear mission since the end of the Cold War, and addresses possible changes or updates to that mission given Russia's sudden change from strategic partner to potential adversary. It emphasizes the importance of deterrence, which includes nuclear weapons, missile defenses, and conventional forces, to the underlying mission of the Alliance, which is the security of the member states, their populations, and their strategic interests.

45. Levchuk, G., Blasch, E., & Ieee. (2015). Probabilistic graphical models for multi-source fusion from text sources. *2015 Ieee Symposium on Computational Intelligence for Security and Defense Applications (Cisda)*, 140-149.

In this paper we present probabilistic graph fusion algorithms to support information fusion and reasoning over multi-source text media. Our methods resolve misinformation by combining knowledge similarity analysis and conflict identification with source characterization. For experimental purposes, we used the dataset of the articles about current military conflict in Eastern Ukraine. We show that automated knowledge fusion and conflict detection is feasible and high accuracy of detection can be obtained. However, to correctly classify mismatched knowledge fragments as misinformation versus additionally reported facts, the knowledge reliability and credibility must be assessed. Since the true knowledge must be reported by many reliable sources, we compute knowledge frequency and source reliability by incorporating knowledge provenance and analyzing historical consistency between the knowledge reported by the sources in our dataset.

46. Lilei, S. (2015). The Ukraine crisis: a multidimensional analysis in China. *Eastern Journal of European Studies*, 6(2), 159-175.

As one of the most serious geopolitical crisis since the end of the Cold War, the Ukraine Crisis has an impact not only on the reshaping of the Eurasian political architecture, but also on the reconstruction of the world order. This paper deploys content analysis of 45 academic papers on the "Ukraine Crisis" in Chinese core journals (CSSCI) from December 2013 to April 2015, which are further compared with 56 papers whose research subject is "Ukraine politics" in the same journal database from January 2004 to November 2013. Therefore, the current paper explores what the Chinese academia discussed about Ukraine, from a wider range of perspectives, including international political economy, politics, security and international relations over the past 10 years. The findings of the conducted research suggest that Chinese scholars offer a multidimensional analysis on the development of Ukraine Crisis. From an institutional transformation perspective, Ukraine is an important case of political failure leading to social disorders. From a geopolitical perspective, Russia, the United States and the European Union each have their specific objectives in Ukraine. From an imperial studies approach, although the " new Cold War" thesis has been overplayed, Russia seeks to double its efforts in order to look for alignment with anti-West forces, resulting in more complication among major countries. The impact of the crisis is yet to be felt globally and its warning lessons are to be learned by China.

47. Menon, R., & Rumer, E. (2015). *Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order.*

The current conflict in Ukraine has spawned the most serious crisis between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War. It has undermined European security, raised questions about NATO's future, and put an end to one of the most ambitious projects of U.S. foreign policy—building a partnership with Russia. It also threatens to undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts on issues ranging from terrorism to nuclear proliferation. Each side is betting that political and economic pressure will force the other to blink first. Caught in this dangerous game of chicken, the West cannot afford to lose sight of the importance of stable relations with Russia. This book puts the conflict in historical perspective by examining the evolution of the crisis and assessing its implications both for Ukraine and for Russia's relations with the West more generally. Experts in the international relations of post-Soviet states, political scientists Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer clearly show what is at stake in Ukraine, explaining the key economic, political, and security challenges and prospects for overcoming them. They provide a comprehensive and accessible study of a conflict whose consequences will be felt for many years to come.

48. Movcan, V. (2015). Leaving the Space Between Ukraine: Trade Integration and Foreign Policy. *Osteuropa*, 65(1-2), 159-+.

Ukraine's main trading partners are the European Union and Russia. The largest share of trade in goods and services are with them, from them flows most direct foreign investment into the country. Ukraine has long sought to modernise its economy by moving closer to the EU. Russia uses the Ukrainian-Russian integration that already exists, above all in the energy sector, to counteract this. Since the EU course was not uncontroversial in Ukraine, Kiev balanced between Brussels and Moscow. With Russia's annexation of the Crimea and the war unleashed in the Donbass, this seesaw course should be over.

49. Panek, J., Brychtova, A., & Sgem. (2015, Aug 26-Sep 01). RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT OVER CRIMEA ON THE MAP. *International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conferences on Social Sciences and Arts* [Sgem 2015: political sciences, law, finance, economics and tourism, vol i: law, political sciences]. **2nd International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on Social Sciences and Arts (SGEM 2015), Albena, BULGARIA.**

As much as guns and warships, maps have been used as tools of imperialism. Nations and empires are not natural features within the landscape. They are social constructs, created in order to convert the Earth into a huge real-estate market. The Russian Ukrainian conflict is not fought, only in Ukraine, but also on every

map, that shows Crimea. Cartography was coined as a science of princes; as it was these elites who used maps to take land and natural resources from those without power - local people. In the last three decades we have observed enormous advances in technologies and that has resulted in the democratisation of cartography and Geographic information systems. This has led to new approaches in mapping, such as critical cartography, counter mapping, GeoParticipation as well as carto-vandalism. In this paper the authors discuss the role of maps in the political struggle for a specific area - the Crimean peninsula. The paper aims to ignite the discussion about the social implications of maps as tools of power and technological dominance in the current digitalised world. It results in three thematic maps designed to represent attitudes of selected map providers towards mapping the Russian-Ukrainian conflict over Crimea by the end of 2014.

50. Pasare, I. C. (2015, Jun 11-13). RISKS, THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES AT THE EASTERN BORDER OF NATO AND OF THE EU. *Knowledge Based Organization International Conference* **[21st international conference the knowledge-based organization]. 21st International Scientific Conference on The Knowledge-Based Organization (KBO), Nicolae Balcescu Land Forces Acad Sibiu, Sibiu, ROMANIA.**

The twenty first century has presented us with distinctly new kinds of security challenges. These new challenges have specific information components. In some cases, the crisis is essentially about information such as cyber-attacks against government or critical private sector information systems. In others, the information needs for crisis managers are critical but do not yet enjoy a robust infrastructure. The risk of a traditional war on the European continent is not the same as during the Cold War. Nevertheless, at sub-regional level there still occur phenomena of instability and crisis and trends of fragmentation and isolation of certain states. "The current crisis in Ukraine is affecting as a whole, the strategic interests of the Romania in the Region, and I think at issues like: the border security of NATO and EU, the European path of the Republic of Moldova, the situation of Romanians in Ukraine, the democratization of the Wider Black Sea Region and ensuring of energy security" (Eduard Hellvig, SRI director, AGERPRESS interview, March 31, 2015)".

51. Paul, A. (2015). The EU in the South Caucasus and the Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War. *International Spectator,* **50(3), 30-42. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2015.1054223**

Despite hopes that it would act as a transformative tool in the South Caucasus to strengthen democracy, stability, security and regional cooperation, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) has produced limited results, with the region more fragmented today than it was five years ago. Russia's war against Ukraine has further exacerbated the situation, raising concerns over the extent to which South Caucasus countries can genuinely rely on the West. Today, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have different geostrategic trajectories. While Georgia has stuck to the Euro-Atlantic track, Armenia joined the Russian-led Eurasian Union in January 2015. Meanwhile Azerbaijan has the luxury of choosing not to choose. Developments in the region have demonstrated that a 'one size fits all' approach does not work and a more differentiated policy is required.

52. Pavlyuk, L. (2015). Vocabularies of Colliding Realities: A Representation of Conflict and War in the Ukrainian Media. In V. Stepanenko & Y. Pylynskyi (Eds.), *Ukraine after the Euromaidan: Challenges and Hopes* **(Vol. 13, pp. 241-255).**

Ukraine's protest movement of 2013–14, known as the Euromaidan, and its culmination, the people's uprising in late 2013–early 2014 became one of the most dramatic world events in recent years. The accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation and military conflict in the Donbas demonstrate that the dramatic dynamics of the country's ongoing transformation are still far from predictable. This book examines the manifold aspects of Ukraine's current crisis and its political upheaval. The contributors to the book, Ukrainian experts in a variety of disciplinary fields, explore social, political and cultural reasons and factors behind the country's transformation in its national and regional dimensions, the impact of Ukraine's revolution on European and global politics, and also the new challenges of tough reforms with which the country is faced. The contributors share the view that the Euromaidan brought new opportunities for Ukraine's modern development and the greatest historical chance for the country's European future since independence in 1991.

53. Pettersson, T., & Wallensteen, P. (2015). Armed conflicts, 1946-2014. *Journal of Peace Research,* **52(4), 536-550. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343315595927**

In 2014, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) recorded 40 armed conflicts with a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths, up by six from 2013. This is the highest number of conflicts reported since 1999, and 11 of these conflicts were defined as wars, that is, conflicts generating 1,000 or more battle-related deaths in one calendar year. Further, an escalation of several conflicts, coupled with the extreme violence in Syria, resulted in the highest number of battle-related deaths in the post-1989 period. Yet, compared to the large-scale interstate wars of the 20th century, the number of fatalities caused by armed conflicts in 2014 was relatively low. Additionally, seven conflicts identified in 2013 were no longer active in 2014. However, four new conflicts erupted in 2014, all of them in Ukraine, and three previously registered conflicts were restarted by new actors. Furthermore, six conflicts reoccurred with previously registered actors. A positive development, however, is the increase to ten of the number of peace agreements concluded and signed in 2014, which

represents a further four compared with 2013. And although this increase is part of a positive trend since 2011, it is worth noting that several peace processes remained fragile by the end of the year.

54. Ping, C. (2015). Has Capitalism Defeated Socialism Yet?-Kornai's Turnaround on Liberalism, and the Evaporation of Myths about Eastern Europe. *International Critical Thought*, **5(1), 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1080/21598282.2015.996049**

The Hungarian economist Janos Kornai has warned the West of the possibility of a reversal of liberalization in Eastern Europe. He advocates a new policy of containment aimed at countries such as Russia and China. This prompts us to investigate the truth concerning the transition in Eastern Europe. After 1990 the West recalculated economic data from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (FSUEE thereafter) before 1990, for creating an illusion that "shock therapy" had made progress in FSUEE. However, the Eastern Europeans including the Hungarians, who were enthusiastic for liberalization from socialism, soon discovered that joining the European Union (EU) was damaging the interests of the majority of people in Eastern Europe, while Western Europeans also came increasingly to oppose the financial burdens imposed by EU enlargement and immigration inflows. The short-sighted transition strategy carried out in Eastern Europe and the preoccupation with geopolitical interests have in fact exacerbated the EU's economic crisis, triggering a civil war in Ukraine and causing Russia to become disillusioned with the West. Kornai's theory of soft-budget constraints as well as his anti-Keynesian policies during the transition recession, is responsible for the economic downturn triggered by rapid liberalization in Eastern Europe. The reversal of the liberalization trend in Eastern Europe and the change in the mass psychology of Eastern Europeans towards the West together constitute an important rebuff to utopian capitalist thinking in China. Has capitalism defeated socialism, as Western propaganda claims? The success of China's autonomous open-door policy and the failure of Eastern Europe's unilateral opening indicate that the collapse of the FSUEE occurred mainly for political rather than economic reasons.

55. Plociennik, S. (2015). Well-suited or Ill-suited? Poland as a Role Model for Reforms in Ukraine. *Osteuropa*, **65(3), 163-+.**

Poland's radical economic and political reforms after 1989 were an enormous success. In Ukraine, Warsaw's liberal path is considered a role model. However, circumstances differ considerably. Ukraine's economic decline may indeed be so glaring that the population is ready for far-reaching reforms. However, it is incomparably more difficult to reform Ukraine's deformed oligarchic capitalism, and Russia's war against Ukraine diverts resources. In addition, the international situation is much worse than it was for Poland in 1989: The EU will not support Ukraine to the same extent as it did the Central European countries, and the years of global neoliberal consensus are over.

56. Portnov, A. (2015). The New Heart of Ukraine? Dnipropetrovsk after Euromaidan. *Osteuropa*, **65(4), 173-+.**

In Dnipropetrovsk Russian, Ukrainian, Soviet, and Jewish layers of history overlap. The metropolis in South-Eastern Ukraine has so far managed to resist the war that Russia, with the help of armed groups in the Donbas, has unleashed. That has a lot to do with the work of billionaire Ihor Kolomoiskyi and the Private Group. Together with the regional authorities, they have seized on the traditional self-confidence of Dnipropetrovskers and offered a new form of local patriotism that is closely linked with political loyalty to Ukraine. Dnipropetrovsk is the first city to manifest a decidedly Ukrainian political nationalism. This nationalism is compatible with the Russian language and Russian or Jewish identity.

57. Pyung-Kyun, W. (2015). The Russian Hybrid War in the Ukraine Crisis: Some Characteristics and Implications. *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, **27(3), 383-400.**

This paper examines some characteristics of the Russian hybrid war in the Ukraine crisis since 2014, and then explores its implications. The hybrid approach is designed to generate "plausible deniability," allowing Putin maximal tactical flexibility while avoiding responsibility. Russia's hybrid warfare can be traced with some devices: propaganda (including cyber attack), tactics, the militants, and weapons. The meaning of the Russian hybrid war in Ukraine is focused on the three points. Firstly, Russia's new approach, " hybrid war" cannot be considered independent of a long professional experience of Putin's KGB operations before becoming a politician. Secondly, hybrid type warfare in Ukraine is not the first time for Russia. Putin previously applied his new kind of war almost unnoticed to the small and remote Georgia and Transnistria, but it cannot go without being understood when applied on a scale as large and visible as Ukraine. Thirdly, Russia's actions in Ukraine have exploded the notion that expansive communications technologies and economic interdependence were fostering a kind of grand bargain. The Ukraine crisis suggests that world history after the Cold War is at an inflection point. In a world of hybrid warfare or non-linear conflict, we need to find new forms of deterrence.

58. Riabchuk, M. (2015). 'Two Ukraines' Reconsidered: The End of Ukrainian Ambivalence? *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, *15*(1), 138-156. **https://doi.org/10.1111/sena.12120**

The 2014 Russo-Ukrainian war, euphemistically called the 'Ukraine crisis', has largely confirmed, on certain accounts, a dramatic split of the country and people's loyalties between the proverbial 'East' and 'West', between the 'Eurasian' and 'European' ways of development epitomized by Russia and the European Union. By other accounts, however, it has proved that the Ukrainian nation is much more united than many experts and policymakers expected, and that the public support for the Russian invasion, beyond the occupied regions of Donbas and Crimea, is close to nil. This article does not deny that Ukraine is divided in many respects but argues that the main - and indeed the only important - divide is not between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, or Russophones and Ukrainophones, or the 'East' and the 'West'. The main fault line is ideological - between two different types of Ukrainian identity: non/anti-Soviet and post/neo-Soviet, 'European' and 'East Slavonic'. All other factors, such as ethnicity, language, region, income, education, or age, correlate to a different degree with the main one. However divisive those factors might be, the external threat to the nation makes them largely irrelevant, bringing instead to the fore the crucial issue of values epitomized in two different types of Ukrainian identity.

59. Romaniuk, A., & Gladun, O. (2015). Demographic Trends in Ukraine: Past, Present, and Future. *Population and Development Review*, *41*(2), 315-+. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2015.00049.x

Ukraine, during the first half of the twentieth century, underwent a series of man-made demographic catastrophesWorld War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, the 1932/33 famine linked to land collectivization, the massive deportations and executions of Stalin's Great Terror, and World War II. This article assembles estimates of the demographic impact of these deadly events. In their absence, it is estimated that Ukraine's hypothetical population would have been 87 million on the eve of independence in 1991, instead of its actual 52 million. Pre-independence demographic losses were episodic and driven by external forces. By contrast, since independence in 1991, Ukraine has experienced a sustained demographic crisis of its own making. Ukraine's population declined from 52 million in 1990 to 45 million by 2013. Fertility, while it has recovered from its lowest point, remains at a TFR of about 1.5far below replacement. Emigration, although the greatest hemorrhage of young people in the 1990s is over, is still of concern. The loss of Crimea and the unsettled state of affairs in Southeastern Ukraine give further cause for concern.

60. Ryan, M. C. (2015). A Second Chance to Miss the Same Opportunity: Post-Putin and the Potential Re-Emergence of a More Reasonable Russia. *American Foreign Policy Interests*, *37*(3), 148-156. https://doi.org/10.1080/10803920.2015.1056684

At some point, possibly sooner and more suddenly than expected, Vladimir Putin will go the way of his autocratic predecessors and, along with him, Putinism. Russia will once again find itself at a crossroads. At that moment, as they have so many times before, the longings inherent in every Russian to be both a great Slav and a modern European will visit internal turmoil on the troubled souls of a proud nation. This recurring Russian spring offers the world yet another opportunity to embrace the Russian people. The presence of Putin is a clear indication that our generation missed our previous opportunity. His inevitable departure will be our second chance to miss the same opportunity unless we start to try to see the world as Russians do and then begin to communicate with them in ways that translate well into their perception of the world around them.

61. Rynning, S. (2015). The false promise of continental concert: Russia, the West and the necessary balance of power. *International Affairs*, *91*(3), 539-552. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12285

The war in Ukraine is revelatory of a malaise in Europe's security order created by Russia's resistance to western institutions on the one hand and the western desire to maintain these institutions while partnering with Russia on the other. Absent a sense of priorities, western policy risks contributing to the erosion of Europe's security order that Russia seeks in opposition to western ambition. Europe's order is premised first and foremost on a distinctively western concert of nationswhereby Euro-Atlantic states coordinate policy according to a common purpose layered into both NATO and the EUthat forms part of a wider balance of power between Russia and the West. Western policy should aim to strengthen the concert and clarify the balance. However, the prevalent desire to include Russia in the concert confuses matters in a major way, eroding both the underlying sense of priorities and the foundation for order. This article examines this threatening erosion and traces it to three underlying trends: political contestation with regard to the meaning of restoration' post-1989; military instability following from the unpredictability of hybrid war'; and moral equivocation on the part of the West when it comes to defending the Euro-Atlantic security order. The article concludes that given the depth of contestation, western allies should learn to distinguish concert from balance and act on the condition that the former, a vibrant western concert, is a precondition for the latter, a manageable continental balance.

62. Rywkin, M. (2015). Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order. *American Foreign Policy Interests*, *37*(3), 177-178. https://doi.org/10.1080/10803920.2015.1056685

Right after the Winter Olympics, Vladimir Putin chose to shake up the post-cold war order Europe, declaring that he is taking defensive s to preserve Russia's security against con-tinuous North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) enlargements that were supposedly being conducted in the United States' interests, According to that version, the final bitter pill Moscow refused to. swallow was the vision of Ukraine moving into the American camp—with Kiev's rejection of the Russian-led Custom Union membership in favor of assoc atus in the EU, That move was interpreted in Moscow tep toward "defanging" Russia's defen and a final weakening of Russia in line with the 1991 dissolution of the U.S.

63. Rywkin, M. (2015). Russia: An Adventure to Restore the Empire. *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 37(2), 95-99. https://doi.org/10.1080/10803920.2015.1038923

The official Russian position in the Ukrainian crisis is based on a reversal of reality: Ukraine is accused of deceit, the European Union of aggression, and the United States of pulling the strings behind the scenes. Russia is presented as a victim, and its agents in Donbass as freedom fighters. Moscow does not care if its arguments are believable or not and appears ready to sever its historic ties with Europe in order to adopt a Eurasian identity whose only characteristic seems to be the rejection of Western ties. While Moscow managed to recover Crimea, it drove itself into political isolation and revived the cold war. Having cornered itself by its own doings while being simultaneously afflicted by a serious economic downturn caused mainly by falling oil prices and Western sanctions, the Kremlin can see no possible way out and risks becoming more and more aggressive.

64. Sakwa, R. (2015). The death of Europe? Continental fates after Ukraine. *International Affairs*, 91(3), 553-579. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12281

The unravelling of the post-Cold War security order in Europe was both cause and consequence of the crisis in Ukraine. The crisis was a symptom of the three-fold failure to achieve the aspirations to create a Europe whole and free' enunciated by the Charter of Paris in 1990, the drift in the European Union's behaviour from normative to geopolitical concerns, and the failure to institutionalize some form of pan-continental unity. The structural failure to create a framework for normative and geopolitical pluralism on the continent meant that Russia was excluded from the new European order. No mode of reconciliation was found between the Brussels-centred wider Europe and various ideas for greater European continental unification. Russia's relations with the EU became increasingly tense in the context of the Eastern Partnership and the Association Agreement with Ukraine. The EU and the Atlantic alliance moved towards a more hermetic and universal form of Atlanticism. Although there remain profound differences between the EU and its trans-Atlantic partner and tensions between member states, the new Atlanticism threatens to subvert the EU's own normative principles. At the same time, Russia moved from a relatively complaisant approach to Atlanticism towards a more critical neo-revisionism, although it does not challenge the legal or normative intellectual foundations of international order. This raises the question of whether we can speak of the death of Europe' as a project intended to transcend the logic of conflict on the continent.

65. Samokhvalov, V. (2015). Ukraine between Russia and the European Union: Triangle Revisited. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 67(9), 1371-1393. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2015.1088513

Ukraine has long been considered as a bone of contention between the EU and Russia which could eventually lead to a geographical split of the country. This interpretation, however, fails to explain the dynamic of the Ukrainian revolution and Russian-Ukrainian war. To address the deadlock in understanding the mixed dynamics of the situation in Ukraine, the article argues that the relations in the EU-Ukraine-Russia triangle are affected by the combination of choices that the Ukrainian political class, business elites and broader society make in four major dimensions: internal political practices; economic dimension; a dimension of international politics; and an ideological dimension.

66. Schumacher, T., & Nitoiu, C. (2015). Russia's Foreign Policy Towards North Africa in the Wake of the Arab Spring. *Mediterranean Politics*, 20(1), 97-104. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2015.1007006

Since coming to power in 2000, Russian president Vladimir Putin has tried to construct a narrative of regaining Russia's status as a major global power. However, in practice the Kremlin has yet to create a coherent strategy or achieve a sense of a co-ordinated foreign policy. While North Africa has not been at the forefront of this narrative, recently Moscow has intensified its diplomatic links and cooperation with the regimes in the region. The Arab Spring presented Russian policy makers with a series of challenges regarding the uncertainty of the developments in the region, but also with renewed economic opportunities. This profile analyses Moscow's relationships with the countries in North Africa (Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria) in the wake of the Arab Spring. In each case the Kremlin aimed to take advantage of the new opportunities without really being guided by an overarching strategy for the region. However, Russia increasingly seems to be keen to position itself in the region as an alternative to the EU or the US, not least in light of the current war in Ukraine.

67. Shelest, H. (2015). HYBRID WAR & THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP: WAITING FOR A CORRELATION. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 14(3), 45-53.

Following Russia's actions in Ukraine, the discourse of "hybrid warfare" became a hotly debated topic among political experts. While not new for practitioners, the scale and scope of this hybrid war, as well as the

unpreparedness of EU member states and their partners, resulted in the need to face new challenges and to address unknown threats that cannot be addressed by single actors. In this article, the author analyzes the ways hybrid warfare targets the Eastern Partnership states, which in addition to Ukraine are second-level targets, and underscores the necessity to correlate European policy towards Eastern neighbors in consideration of the reality and threats of hybrid warfare.

68. Shulga, O. (2015). Consequences of the Maidan: War of Symbols, Real War and Nation Building. In V. Stepanenko & Y. Pylynskyi (Eds.), *Ukraine after the Euromaidan: Challenges and Hopes* **(Vol. 13, pp. 231-239).**

Ukraine's protest movement of 2013–14, known as the Euromaidan, and its culmination, the people's uprising in late 2013–early 2014 became one of the most dramatic world events in recent years. The accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation and military conflict in the Donbas demonstrate that the dramatic dynamics of the country's ongoing transformation are still far from predictable. This book examines the manifold aspects of Ukraine's current crisis and its political upheaval. The contributors to the book, Ukrainian experts in a variety of disciplinary fields, explore social, political and cultural reasons and factors behind the country's transformation in its national and regional dimensions, the impact of Ukraine's revolution on European and global politics, and also the new challenges of tough reforms with which the country is faced. The contributors share the view that the Euromaidan brought new opportunities for Ukraine's modern development and the greatest historical chance for the country's European future since independence in 1991.

69. Souleimanov, E. A. (2015). A Contested Triangle Russia, the West, and the "Islamic State". *Osteuropa*, **65**(11-12), 23-+.

The "Islamic State" poses only a limited threat to Russia. Nevertheless, Moscow repeatedly insists that Russia is threatened by the IS to the same extent as the West. In doing so, Moscow wants to legitimize its intervention in Syria and conceal the fact that its bombardments keep the regime of Bashar Assad in power. At the same time, talk of the "common threat posed by IS" works to overcome the rift with the West caused by Russia's annexation of the Crimea and its war in eastern Ukraine. The aim is to bring the West around to normalising relations with Russia in the name of the struggle against IS.

70. Stulberg, A. N. (2015). Out of Gas? Russia, Ukraine, Europe, and the Changing Geopolitics of Natural Gas. *Problems of Post-Communism*, **62**(2), 112-130. **https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2015.1010914**

Curiously, a gas war was averted at the apogee of the 2013/4 Ukrainian crisis. Russia, Ukraine, and European consumer states not only refrained from precipitous shut-offs that marred conflicts in 2006 and 2009, but deepened mutual energy ties as the crisis unfolded. This article highlights shortcomings with the contemporary debate over Russia's energy weapon made evident by the mixed diplomacy and outcomes in these successive gas crises. It then probes change to the roles, postures, and relationships among key stakeholders embodied by an emerging Europe-Eurasian gas network. The latter arguably upends classic realpolitik assumptions about pipeline politics, while illustrates how Russia is down but not out amid transformation in the regional gas landscape.

71. Vukadinovic, L. C. (2015). NATO AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION - FROM FUNCTIONAL COOPERATION TOWARD NEW TENSIONS. *Politicka Misao-Croatian Political Science Review*, **52**(2), 181-205.

Functional cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation is a necessity within the contemporary international relations. However, due to a lack of mutual trust which is still being felt and competitively set objectives of both players, such cooperation is sometimes difficult to achieve. Author starts by presenting and analyzing the existing examples of cooperation between the two states on global issues (fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, natural disasters, training of security forces in Afghanistan) -most of which is taking place in Afghanistan. She continues by elaborating on the situation in the Arctic territories where both NATO and the Russian Federation are just starting to position their interests. Again, it is the global challenges to security that might bring the positions of the two players closer in this area (such as climate changes, safety of transport routes, energy exploitation), but based on their activities so far the author concludes that this area might also become an area of confrontation. Finally, the author analyses two major issues (missile defense in Europe and further NATO enlargement) that have been principal problems in NATO-Russia relations ever since the end of the Cold War. Regardless of the current crisis in Ukraine it is apparent that future relations between NATO and the Russian Federation will continue on two parallel tracks: functional cooperation on one, and "cold peace" on the other.

72. Yekelchyk, S. (2015). NATIONAL HEROES FOR A NEW UKRAINE: Merging the Vocabularies of the Diaspora, Revolution, and Mass Culture. *Ab Imperio-Studies of New Imperial History and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Space*(3), 97-123. **https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2015.0061**

Taking as its point of departure the 2015 "decommunization" legislation in Ukraine, this article looks at the transformation of historical memory in that republic from the late 1980s to the present. The author argues that the new canon of national heroes developed through the gradual transformation rather than the radical

rejection of Soviet historical narratives, with the Cossacks being the most successful example of a historical symbol supporting a uniting, civic identity for a new Ukraine. Two case studies are used to demonstrate the challenges of merging the nationalist mythologies preserved in the Ukrainian diaspora with the models inherited from Soviet times: that of diaspora-funded films about the Ukrainian insurgents of the 1940s and the cult of the otamans developed by a network of regional historical clubs in central Ukraine. Both projects produced highly divisive historical mythologies that often employed incongruent cultural models reusing the Soviet cliches. Both also constructed an ethnically exclusive vision of Ukraine's past, as opposed to an inclusive, civic one. The Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine and the subsequent war in the Donbas gave a powerful impetus to the process of memory work in Ukraine, while at the same time furnishing the inclusive, multinational canon of the "Heavenly Hundred," who died for a democratic Ukraine. However, there exists a very real danger that the process of constructing a new Ukrainian historical memory can be hijacked by radical nationalists or discredited by Soviet-style administrative feats.

73. Zayarnyuk, A. (2015). A REVOLUTION'S HISTORY, A HISTORIANS' WAR. *Ab Imperio-Studies of New Imperial History and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Space*(1), 449-479. https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2015.0000

The article explores the ways in which historians of Ukraine are trying to make sense of modern political developments: the Maidan revolution and the Russo-Ukrainian war. It argues that much of the historical commentary on the Ukrainian events is shaped by the essentialist understanding of both identity and history. Scrutinizing the use of evidence, references to history, and moral judgment in recent texts of historians discussing Ukraine, the author argues that attempts to find explanations for a contemporary crisis in the cultures and structures of the past are not only historically inaccurate but also much less insightful than experiments with applying only the methods of historical inquiry, removed from any teleological explanatory frameworks. Pointing to the gaps in our knowledge of Ukraine, the author also urges historians to be more circumspect and considerate when dealing with still unfolding events that affect millions of our contemporaries.

2016

1. Ackermann, F. (2016). Lithuania's Politics of History and Russia's War in Ukraine. *Osteuropa*, *66*(3), 111-+.

Lithuanian society did not observe the Euromaidan in Ukraine from afar. It saw itself directly affected. Russia's annexation of the Crimea and the war of intervention in eastern Ukraine unleashed fears of a similar aggression on the part of Russia in the Baltic region. The war also changed Lithuanians' self-understanding of their country's own history. In debates over German and Soviet rule, an escalation and relativisation of positions is taking place. History and memory are becoming a screen for projecting the present political conflict with Russia.

2. Ambrosio, T. (2016). The rhetoric of irredentism: The Russian Federation's perception management campaign and the annexation of Crimea. *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, *27*(3), 467-490. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1151653

Following the February 2014 fall of Viktor Yanukovych as president of Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Western government in Kiev, Russia initiated an irredentist intervention to annex the Crimean peninsula. Although much attention has focused on the use of military forces without country or unit insignia (the little green men' of irregular warfare), a crucial part of this operation involved a complex and multilayered perception management campaign to advance a self-interested narrative, which defined the contours of debate, justified their actions at home and abroad, and provided those actions with legal and normative legitimacy. This article examines the Kremlin's rhetoric in three areas: Crimea's secession from Ukraine was a legal act of self-determination; Russia possesses justifiable historical, cultural, and legal claims to Crimea; and, Western criticism of Russia's actions are dishonest and a reflection of their anti-Russian, Cold War mentality.

3. Averre, D. (2016). The Ukraine Conflict: Russia's Challenge to European Security Governance. *Europe-Asia Studies*, *68*(4), 699-725. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1176993

This essay uses the concept of security governance to explore the implications of Russia's intervention in Ukraine for the rules-based security order in Europe. It outlines key ideas in the literature about the post-Cold War European security order with respect to Russia's role and examines Russian debates on the Ukraine conflict. It then investigates European institutions' reaction to the conflict in order to understand to what extent Russia's exclusion (as a result of the West's policy of containment and deterrence) or self-exclusion now constitutes a structural factor in the security politics of the wider Europe. The essay concludes with the analysis of the challenges facing both Europe and Russia and considers the prospects for re-shaping this order to give meaning to partnership and shared security governance.

4. Bagheri, S., & Akbarpour, H. R. (2016). Reinvestigation of the West's sanctions against Russia in the crisis of Ukraine and Russia's reaction. *1st International*

Conference on Applied Economics and Business, *36*, 89-95. https://doi.org/10.1016/s2212-5671(16)30019-3

Sanction has been used repeatedly throughout the history. But the frequency of the use of sanction, as a tool to change the behavior of a regime or even a regime change, significantly increased after World War. But the most widespread and newest use of sanctions is between the West and Russia in Ukraine's crisis. In this crisis, America and European Union are trying to change Russia's behavior by imposing large volume of commercial and financial embargo and sanctions against individuals. On the other hand, Russia tries to deal with Western sanctions by imposing sanctions on Europe's citrus as well as European officials. In general, there is an obstacle, called the right of veto, for consensus on the sanctions against Russia and on the other hand, the other multilateral and unilateral sanctions outside the mechanism of the Charter is not contraindicated, but they cannot be imposed unlimitedly and regardless of imperative laws, the general principles of law, the specific rules of the Charter, human rights and humanitarian law. However, in this crisis, the political umbrella has made it actually difficult to apply definitive legal opinion.

5. Banasik, M. (2016). HYBRID WAR OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR SECURITY OF UKRAINE AND EURO-ATLANTIC AREA. *European Journal of Transformation Studies*, *4*(2), 39-51.

The current situation in Ukraine confirms that the European thesis on solving conflicts within peace and diplomacy categories does not work in a perfect way. The evaluation of the Russian Federation's activity (RF) after occupying the Crimea shows that strategic objectives of Moscow have spread farther. In the strategic dimension the hybrid war led by Moscow is measured up against the entire NATO as perceived being the main threat. Past experiences in Ukraine and the theory assessment show that the new generation war run by the RF embraces multi-storey efforts directed at the state's function destabilizing, changing the internal order or/and leading to the state's bankruptcy not even necessarily seizing its territory. The complex nature of the hybrid threats requires undertaking integrated actions by the international community. It seems it will be possible to reach it while having the common NATO and EU doctrine on the hybrid threats counteraction. States, particularly those endangered, should draw up and implement their own accustomed strategy of the national security that will let opposing both classical and hybrid threats with as well as without the NATO aid.

6. Barna, C., & Dugan, C. (2016). The Ukrainian Hybrid Warfare and Neuroscience - Dismantling Some Facets of the Psychosphere. *Countering Hybrid Threats: Lessons Learned from Ukraine*, *128*, 115-140. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-651-4-115

The goal of the paper is to establish to what extent military neuroscience plays a part (or can be used to explain some features) in the designing of the irregular (hybrid) warfare. Using the Eastern border of Ukraine and the Crimea crisis as the object of study, we question three facets of this type of confrontation. First, tailored propaganda that synergically combined classical themes with more advanced neuromarketing-like features, persistently targeting different features of memories (real, idealized history, recycled themes from old soviet propaganda) from multiple media channels - TV, radio, social media - and by highlighting the efforts to strengthen Russian collective identity. The second issue brought into discussion refers to the manipulation of medical infrastructure, including the medical staff, facilities, drugs, knowledge of medical data (including general and targeted behavioral data - psychological, psychiatrical, neurological and endocrinological) etc., as a means to consolidate the control over civilian population, spreading false medical rumors, demonizing the opponent and creating data collection and influence networks. The last feature is probably the most important and controversial - the use of psychotropic substances or more advanced forms of psychological control combined with other means of manipulating external motivation (money, rewards, blackmail, citizenship, ideology, political and economic privileges, etc.) by unconscripted individuals - "national rebels" (difficult to distinguish from mercenaries, delinquents, social outcasts, mentally ill) involved in a decentralized low intensity conflict, an intrinsic feature of irregular warfare. In the end, one of our conclusion is that the changing shape of the mind-based dimension ("psychosphere") of future wars should have an adequate response in developing the medical intelligence studies, and especially the military neuroscience branch.

7. Bebiakova, D. (2016). EU-Ukraine Trade Relations. *Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on European Integration 2016 (Icei 2016)*, 72-79.

EU is trying to improve the interrelationship with Ukraine since 1994." Ukraine and the EU started to negotiatate on an Association agreement in 2009. However, it was not enough to make closer ties between EU and Ukraine. The goals of the article are to describe all aspects of development, affecting the deepening of the integration process and thus the trade between Ukraine and the EU. Key results article is that the EU offered Ukraine to become part of the Association Agreement in the context of deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA). Based on these facts DCFTA was the main core of negotiation process between EU and Ukraine. Human rights issue was one of the most important conditions in ratification of this trade agreement. Ukraine tried to prepare the DCFTA according to the conditions of modernizing and adjusting economy and trade based on European standards. The process of ratification of Association Agreement was rejected by Victor Yanukovych in 2013. Subsequently thousands of people protested in Maiden movement and it caused the start

of civil war and Russian annexation of Crimea. Based on these events EU deferred the implementation of the DCFTA from September 2014 to January 2016.

8. Bechtel, T., Truskavetsky, S., Capineri, L., Pochanin, G., Simic, N., Viatkin, K., . . . Ieee. (2016). A Survey of Electromagnetic Characteristics of Soils in the Donbass Region (Ukraine) for Evaluation of the Applicability of GPR and MD for Landmine Detection. *Proceedings of 2016 16th International Conference on Ground Penetrating Radar (Gpr).*

In order to design holographic and impulse GPRs, as well as metal detector (MD) sensors for humanitarian demining in the Donbass conflict zone, we have compiled a listing of the AP and AT mines that have been confirmed in use in Donbass, and their dimensions and construction. Just as importantly, we have attempted, from existing literature (since it is an active war zone), to characterize the specific soils in this region in order to understand the physical property contrasts between mine casings/components and the soils in which they may be buried, as well as the propagation characteristics of radar signals in these soils. We conclude that MD should be generally effective for locating Donbass mines, and GPRs operating near the frequency of 2GHz should provide sufficient penetration for detection and, simultaneously, sufficient resolution to assist with discrimination of mines from clutter. As is common in GPR applications, the main limiting factor may be soil moisture content, so operations may be restricted to dry periods or seasons. Field measurements are scheduled to confirm the values from the literature.

9. Bogolib, T. (2016). ENSURING SMART, SUSTAINABLE, INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGIONS OF UKRAINE IN THE CONDITIONS OF STRUCTURAL CRISIS. *Baltic Journal of Economic Studies*, *2*(3), 10-16.

The formation of the economy based on knowledge-based innovative economy, new economy, at the present stage of social development is defining the international concept, according to which knowledge play a primary role, and their production is a source of economic growth and competitiveness. The economy is based on knowledge that provides a smart, sustainable and inclusive development. The purpose of the study. Showing that the implementation of the Strategy "Europe 2020", the main directions of the Fourth Industrial Revolution in the Ukraine will be able to provide smart, sustainable, inclusive development of the regions of Ukraine, will help to overcome the crisis and become a source for economic growth. Research methods. In the process of writing were used scientific methods, methods of analysis and synthesis, method of scientific abstraction. The results of the study. Macroeconomic instability has been transformed at the regional level, which led to the deepening of regions differentiation, particularly as it affected old industrial regions, including Donetsk and Luhansk. The crisis of public finances does not allow attracting of financial resources for economic development. As a result of hybrid war, the outflow of foreign investment amounted to 12.6 billion dollars USA. A significant part of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions is completely destroyed. Along with this, it's perfect conditions in order to abandon the old and build new. There are all conditions to implement actively the European strategy "Europe 2020" and the main directions of the Fourth Industrial Revolution to a new stage of economic development, and ensure smart, sustainable and inclusive development of the regions of Ukraine. Conclusions and discussion position. The future of Ukraine and its regions depends on the activity of the Strategy "Europe 2020" and the main directions of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. In Ukraine, in the regions, the main emphasis is on export-oriented industries: coal, metallurgical, chemical, machine-building industry. Technically they are 3 and 4 technological structures, so they cannot become the breakthrough sectors of the Ukrainian economy, so the main emphasis should be on smart, sustainable and inclusive development.

10. Boller, F., & Werle, S. (2016). Fencing the bear? Explaining US foreign policy towards Russian interventions. *Contemporary Security Policy*, *37*(3), 319-340. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.1202653

Despite the burgeoning literature on Russia's renewed power politics, little attention has been paid to the fact that US reactions towards Russia's military interventions were all but coherent. The USA has chosen weak measures in Georgia in 2008 (shaming) compared to its assertive response in Ukraine in 2014 (sanctions, hard deterrence). This article assesses the explanatory power of neorealist, liberal and constructivist theories for the variation in US reactions towards Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine. Our argument is that the constructivist perspective explains the cases best as it highlights the power and communality of normative assessments. The Ukraine crisis was perceived by the USA as a violation of core international norms, especially the non-use of force and the principle of territorial integrity. Relevant international norm carriers shared this assessment of the conflict. In contrast, the perception of the Georgian war centred on the issue of democracy promotion. While democracy is an important aim of US foreign policy, it does not summon the same normative importance as general principles of international law. Furthermore, the perception of the Georgian war remained contested among Western allies, which decreased the communality of the normative assessment.

11. Bozzo, L. (2016). More may be Better, Perhaps: Nuclear Weapons, Proliferation, and International Politics in the Post-global Age. *Non-Proliferation,*

Safety and Nuclear Security: Collected Essays on Technologies and International Policies, *126*, 23-45. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-615-6-23

After being pushed into the background of the academic discussion on the evolution of the post-bipolar international politics, the debate over the role of nuclear weapons and the effects of their proliferation has partially revived in the recent months, following the signing of the agreement with Iran and the armed confrontation in the eastern regions of Ukraine. This article reviews the most prominent scholarly contributions on classical nuclear deterrence theory and sheds light on the new challenges of nuclear proliferation in contemporary international politics. In the post-global international system the old central axis of the system has been substituted by less stable relations both at global and regional levels. Today state and non-state actors involved in nuclear relations belong to different 'civilizations', and the traditional deterrence exercised by states toward non-state actors may be totally ineffective, given that de-territorialised and transnational terrorist organizations are impermeable to conventional nuclear threats. In this complex environment, the nuclear non-proliferation regime created during the Cold War looks manifestly inadequate to face the new challenges, and its main pillar, the NPT, is subject to many pressures that could lead to its collapse.

12. Bratu, R. (2016). Living on the Edge: Ukraine's Ambiguous War on Corruption. *Addressing Security Risks at the Ukrainian Border through Best Practices on Good Governance*, *129*, 57-64. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-710-8-57

This article argues that anti-corruption is not just a set of technical tools, but a complex political exercise in modernisation that mobilises key resources and different categories of actors. It shows that, historically, the international community's concern with good governance in Ukraine has been materialised in the form of numerous anti-corruption conditions attached to transnational aid flows. Despite important improvements at institutional levels, the local practices and everyday routines have not changed fundamentally. The article develops a more nuanced explanation of the new "war on corruption" in Ukraine by focusing on three main elements: actors, institutions, and practices of anti-corruption.

13. Bukkvoll, T. (2016). Why Putin went to war: ideology, interests and decision-making in the Russian use of force in Crimea and Donbas. *Contemporary Politics*, *22*(3), 267-282. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2016.1201310

Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the country's prominent role in instigating and supporting an anti-Kiev rebellion in Donbas, surprised the world. This study seeks to explain Russian behaviour in these two cases. Because of the recent nature of events, there is so far not an abundance of reliable sources. Thus, some of the findings in this study should be seen as suggestive rather than conclusive. It is argued that dominating Russian axioms about Russians and Ukrainian being one people; the West using popular uprisings as a means of war against unwanted regimes; and Western exploitation of Russian weakness for 20 years; all constitute necessary preconditions for the Russian behaviour. However, the explanation is not complete without considerations on the dominant position of people with background from the Federalnaia Sluzhba Bezopasnosti in the inner decision-making circle, and on Putin's risk-taking, improvisation and emotions.

14. Chifu, I. (2016). Hybrid Warfare after a Long Term Informational War. *Countering Hybrid Threats: Lessons Learned from Ukraine*, *128*, 34-43. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-651-4-34

The hybrid warfare in Eastern Ukraine didn't appear suddenly, without a proper preparation in terms of military preparedness, recruiting, training, identifying local support and fundamental changes in the mood of the population. Everything has been put in place after a very clear long term propaganda and control of the public space, but especially based on a well-established informational war developed in the region of Donbas and also at different levels in the whole of Ukraine. The difference in the region of Donetsk and Luhansk was is that it was a more targeted operation and the population had a higher degree of openness in absorbing this propaganda fitting with local beliefs, cultural background and level of education of the average population, including the presence of former members of the institutions present in the Soviet Union period. This capacity and possibility to replicate the change of the perception of a given targeted population, by inoculating a pre-determined narrative and alternative reality that fits in the plans of the aggressor, could be used for further developing the war inside Ukraine, especially in the larger region called Novorossia.

15. Chirtoaga, R. (2016). Goals and Methods of the Russian Federation in the Ukrainian Crisis. *Countering Hybrid Threats: Lessons Learned from Ukraine*, *128*, 233-240.   https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-651-4-233

Russian Federation pursues an international policy based on its national interests, seen from the standpoint of actual governing elite, and taking in consideration balance of power in the region and objective capabilities of Russia. Therefore a main key for correct reading of Kremlin's behavior in Ukrainian crisis would be adequate understanding of every of this variables. Second part of the equation represents background of the conflict: non-political conditions of existence of societies involved in it - technological, economic, humanitarian, etc. According to this line of reasoning 'unconventional war' is not totally new type of

warfare, but rather an adoption of previously existing methods of confrontation between state actors and between elites to present-day conditions (excluding several aspects conditioned by change in technology).

16. Cimbala, S. J. (2016). Unblocking inertia: US-Russian nuclear arms control and missile defenses. *Defence and Security Analysis*, *32*(2), 115-128. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2016.1160485

The United States and Russia, in the aftermath of Russia's annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine, seem to have ditched entirely the "reset" in their political relations. Despite this odor of Cold War redux, there remain the opportunities and necessities for renewed attention to strategic nuclear arms control as between the two governments. US and NATO missile defenses as planned for European deployment figure into this equation, although in somewhat unpredictable ways, given technological uncertainties in existing and foreseeable defenses, as well as the possibility of improved delivery systems for offensive conventional or nuclear weapons.

17. Coupe, T., & Obrizan, M. (2016). The impact of war on happiness: The case of Ukraine. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, *132*, 228-242. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.09.017

In this paper, we study how war affects happiness using data from the on-going conflict in Ukraine. Using a difference-in-difference design, we find that the average level of happiness declined substantially in areas that experience war directly, with the drop in happiness being roughly comparable to the loss of happiness a relatively well-off person would experience if he/she were to become a poor person. At the same time, despite the fact that the war in the East dominates the local media in Ukraine, respondents in other regions of Ukraine are about as happy as they were before the war.

18. Coupe, T., & Obrizan, M. (2016). Violence and political outcomes in Ukraine-Evidence from Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, *44*(1), 201-212. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2015.10.001

In this paper, we study the effects of violence on political outcomes using a survey of respondents in Sloviansk and Kramatorsk - two cities that were affected heavily by the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. We show that experiencing physical damage goes together with lower turnout, a higher probability of considering elections irrelevant and a lower probability of knowing one's local representatives. We also find that property damage is associated with greater support for pro-Western parties, lower support for keeping Donbas in Ukraine and lower support for compromise as a way to stop the conflict. Our paper thus shows the importance of investigating the impact of different kinds of victimization, as different degrees of victimization can have different, sometimes even conflicting outcomes. Our paper also suggests that one of the more optimistic conclusions of previous studies, that victimization can increase political participation, does not necessarily carry over to Ukraine, which illustrates the importance of country and context-specific studies. Journal of Comparative Economics 44 (1) (2016) 201-212. Kyiv School of Economics Kyiv, Ukraine; University of Duisburg-Essen and CINCH Essen, Germany.

19. Demmel, V. (2016). Ribbon of Saint George Order of Glory, Symbol of Remembrance, Pro-Kremlin Icon. *Osteuropa*, *66*(3), 19-+.

Since 2005, the orange-black Ribbon of St. George has been Russia's most important symbol for remembering victory in the Great Patriotic War. The colours of the ribbon go back to a ribbon on which the Order of St. George, first awarded in the mid-18th century, was worn in the Russian Empire. In the Soviet Union as well, these were, starting in 1942, the colours of a badge then called the Guards ribbon. During the protests against election fraud in winter 2011/2012, the ribbon for the first time became a symbol of the Putin regime's followers, who now wore it outside the celebrations of Victory Day on May 9. After the upheaval in Ukraine in February 2014, it became a symbol for the insurgents and separatists in the Crimea and Ukraine's east. In Russia, it is now omnipresent and has often become a largely meaningless symbol that is even used to market consumer products.

20. Dobo, R., & Sgem. (2016, Apr 06-09). ICE-KRIM: THE NEW COLD WAR. *International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conferences on Social Sciences and Arts* [Sgem 2016, bk 2: political sciences, law, finance, economics and tourism conference proceedings, vol i]. 3rd International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on Social Sciences and Arts, SGEM 2016, Vienna, AUSTRIA.

In todays Globalised world, new challenges arise because of globalisation itself. Globalisation meant the creation of a more interconnected world with the free flow of goods, capital, people, ideas and information. The fall of the Soviet Union and the Eastern-Block on one side provided a push to globalisation as borders fell. This also meant, that the informal system of international cooperation, both on a political and economic level disintegrated, and states, political and economic actors are faced with a new ever changing environment. Globalisation itself in this sense ended consistency and stability. The paper will summarise and contrast global happenings with statements and media releases by the different international actors, showing some of the non consistencies and double standards of the actors. The global economic effects of these happenings will also be

shown at slow economic transition, like the Eastern-European economics in the 1990's and during the Russian Economic Crisis of 1997-1998, which can be contrasted with immediate economic disruptions similar to the ones related to Ukraine, Turkey and Syria, namely embargos and counter embargos which made the relationship of Russia and the West frosty.

21. Driscoll, J., & Maliniak, D. (2016). With Friends Like These: Brinkmanship and Chain-Ganging in Russia's Near Abroad. *Security Studies*, *25*(4), 585-607. **https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2016.1220208**

Unrecognized statelets may be forming in the Eastern Donbas region of Ukraine under the aegis of Russian protectiona frozen conflict. Georgia's past provides a useful cautionary tale in reference to Ukraine's probable future. The very same conceptual debates that are currently underway in the West with respect to Ukrainecredibility of great-power security guarantees versus chain-ganginghave, over the past twenty years, generated policies that facilitated the rise of political coalitions within Georgia that prefer war with Russia to any other outcome.

22. Duvanova, D., Nikolaev, A., Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, A., & Semenov, A. (2016). Violent conflict and online segregation: An analysis of social network communication across Ukraine's regions. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, *44*(1), 163-181. **https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2015.10.003**

Does the intensity of a social conflict affect political division? Traditionally, social cleavages are seen as the underlying cause of political conflicts. It is clear, however, that a violent con fat itself can shape partisan, social, and national identities. In this paper, we ask whether social conflicts unite or divide the society by studying the effects of Ukraine's military conflict with Russia on online social ties between Ukrainian provinces (oblasts). In order to do that, we collected original data on the cross-regional structure of politically relevant online communication among users of VKontakte social networking site. We analyze the panel of provinces spanning the most active phases of domestic protests and military conflict and isolate the effects of province-specific war casualties on the nature of inter-provincial online communication. The results show that war casualties entice strong emotional response in the corresponding provinces, but do not necessarily increase the level of social cohesion in interprovincial online communication. We find that the intensity of military conflict entices online activism, but activates regional rather than nation-wide network connections. We also find that military conflict tends to polarize some regions of Ukraine, especially in the East. Our research brings attention to the underexplored areas in the study of civil conflict and political identities by documenting the ways the former may affect the latter. Journal of Comparative Economics 44 (1) (2016) 163-181. Department of International Relations, Lehigh University, United States; Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, University at Buffalo, SUNY, United States; Lehigh University, United States; Department of Computer Science and Information Systems, The University of Jyvaskyla, Finland.

23. Fedcenko, J., Romanjuk, V., & Zdanova, M. (2016). Against Propaganda and Lies StopFake.org: Principles and Prospects. *Osteuropa*, *66*(6-7), 205-+.

When Russia annexed the Crimea and plunged eastern Ukraine into war, it simultaneously launched a propaganda campaign. To combat the disinformation and false reporting, instructors and students at the Mohyla School of Journalism in Kiev organised the information portal Stop.Fake in March 2014. Stop.Fake uncovered over 1,000 cases of manipulation and lies from Russian sources. Every day, some 130,000 readers visit the portal, which no longer exposes fake stories, but stands for quality joumalism. It sees prospects in exploring the tension between politics, propaganda, and publishing.

24. Fenstermacher, L. (2016, Apr 18-20). Information Fusion for the Gray Zone. *Proceedings of SPIE* **[Signal processing, sensor/information fusion, and target recognition xxv]. Conference on Signal Processing, Sensor/Information Fusion, and Target Recognition XXV, Baltimore, MD.**

United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) recently published a white paper describing the "Gray Zone", security challenges characterized by "ambiguity about the nature of the conflict, opacity of the parties involved...competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality."(1) Ambiguity and related uncertainty about actors, situations, relationships, and intent require new approaches to information collection, processing and fusion. General Votel, the current SOCOM commander, during a recent speech on "Operating in the Gray Zone" emphasized that it would be important to get left of the next crises and stated emphatically, "to do that we must understand the Human Domain."(2) This understanding of the human domain must come from making meaning based on different perspectives, including the "emic" or first person/participant and "etic" or third person/observer perspectives. Much of the information currently collected and processed is etic. Incorporation and fusion with the emic perspective enables forecasting of behaviors /events and provides context for etic information (e.g., video).(3) Gray zone challenges are perspective-dependent; for example, the conflict in Ukraine is interpreted quite differently by Russia, the US and Ukraine. Russia views it as war, necessitating aggressive action, the US views it as a security issue best dealt with by economic sanctions and diplomacy and the Ukraine views it as a threat to its sovereignty.(4) General Otto in the Air Force ISR 2023 vision document stated that Air Force ISR

is needed to anticipate strategic surprise.(5) Anticipatory analysis enabling getting left of a crisis inherently requires a greater focus on information sources that elucidate the human environment as well as new methods that elucidate not only the "who's" and "what's", but the "how's and "why's,"extracting features and/or patterns and subtle cues useful for forecasting behaviors and events; for example discourse patterns related to social identity and integrative complexity(6). AFRL has been conducting research to enable analysts to understand the "emic" perspective based on discourse analysis methods and/or text analytics.(7) Previous results demonstrated the value of fusion of emic and etic information in terms of improved accuracy (from 39% to 86%) in forecasting violent events.(8) This paper will describe new work to extend this to anticipatory analysis in the gray zone.

25. Fialova, Z. (2016). Agents of Peace or Conflict? The Role of Civil Society Actors in Conflict Management. *International Crisis Management: Nato, Eu, Osce and Civil Society: Collected Essays on Best Practices and Lessons Learned*, *127*, **127-138. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-641-5-127**

Conflict management, especially when taking into consideration civil war or international violent conflict, can be effective and sustainable only when it is rooted in local social structures. Civil society actors can be agents of peace or, on the contrary, can bring about conflict escalation and violence. Economic and social development should be included in conflict management strategies. However, very often this becomes a dividing factor when development is not inclusive and its benefits are not distributed fairly. Disrespect for human dignity is often what escalates a conflict. On the other hand, education, employment, and prospects for a better life are what motivate people to build peace. Development organizations apply "Do No Harm" principles so as not to contribute to local conflicts by unfair distribution of resources or power. It is crucial to build peace via the action of local people who have already got the trust of their communities (community leaders, mobilizers, teachers, elders, etc.). Such people or organizations, especially if have done any kind of successful community development work before, have the potential to be "the connectors" in resolving the conflict. Peace can be achieved neither from outside nor from above. Nevertheless, conflict may serve as a catalyst to mobilize civil society. The growth of volunteerism and social activism in Ukraine serves as proof. International assistance in conflict management should focus on strengthening the local capacities for building peace.

26. Furgacz, P. (2016). Russian Information War in the Ukrainian Conflict. *Countering Hybrid Threats: Lessons Learned from Ukraine*, *128*, **207-216. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-651-4-207**

The conflict in Ukraine unambiguously proves that information warfare became a very important, if not crucial, element of the Russian way of pursuing hybrid war. As an old maxim goes: Truth is a first casualty of war. This rule undoubtedly is even more relevant in hybrid war than it is in conventional war. Even before the conflict in Ukraine broke out in its entirety Russian, Ukrainian and Western societies have been subjected to a very intensive propaganda campaign initiated by the Kremlin and carried out by the Russian media and intelligence apparatus. In the eyes of the Russian strategists and military planners the information warfare is a normal, justified and desired response to political and security threats to Russia as they are perceived by Moscow. The conflict in Ukraine showed how Russian intelligence services employ information warfare in practice. Selected features of Russian information warfare in Ukraine will be discussed and elaborated in the presentation. Dramatic events in Crimea and Donbas taught us that informational threat in hybrid warfare by any means should not be underestimated and neglected.

27. Galeotti, M. (2016). Hybrid, ambiguous, and non-linear? How new is Russia's 'new way of war'? *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, *27*(2), **282-301. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129170**

Russia's recent operations in Ukraine, especially the integrated use of militias, gangsters, information operations, intelligence, and special forces, have created a concern in the West about a 'new way of war', sometimes described as 'hybrid'. However, not only are many of the tactics used familiar from Western operations, they also have their roots in Soviet and pre-Soviet Russian practice. They are distinctive in terms of the degree to which they are willing to give primacy to 'non-kinetic' means, the scale of integration of non-state actors, and tight linkage between political and military command structures. However, this is all largely a question of degree rather than true qualitative novelty. Instead, what is new is the contemporary political, military, technological, and social context in which new wars are being fought.

28. Giessmann, H. J. (2016). Conflict Transformation and the Russia-Ukraine Crisis. *International Crisis Management: Nato, Eu, Osce and Civil Society: Collected Essays on Best Practices and Lessons Learned*, *127*, **14-23. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-641-5-14**

The rapid deterioration of Russia-Ukraine relations in 2014 has reopened a discussion amongst European policymakers and experts about whether Putin's Russia can still be considered a reliable security partner. Russia's flagrant violation of the Budapest Agreement in annexing Crimea seems to indicate the opposite. Retrospectively, it looks as if Europe and Russia have missed their chance to transform the previous

Cold War order into a trusted relationship. A new East-West conflict is on the rise, as even the mutual deterrence vocabulary of the past has re-entered the political stage. It is difficult to imagine how this conflict could be 'de-escalated' without tackling the underlying motivations and mutual perceptions on either side. Certainly, mistrust can hardly be negotiated away if the facts seem to tell the opposite tale. The current crisis management needs to be complemented by conflict transformation efforts. This paper elaborates how conflict transformation can help rebuild trust through cooperation.

29. Goble, P. (2016). Russian national identity and the Ukrainian crisis. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, *49*(1), 37-43. **https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2015.12.006**

No aspect of the Russian Ukrainian war has proved more unexpected than the revelation that Ukrainian national identity both ethnic and civil is far stronger than almost anyone thought, while Russian national identity is far more fragmented and weak than most expected. That was especially surprising to many because Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine on the assumption that Ukrainians are not a "real" nation unlike Russians and that his actions were advancing the interest of what the Kremlin leader chooses to call "the Russian world". One result of this discovery has been that the Kremlin has had to take Ukrainian identity more seriously. Another has been that it has gone to great lengths to promote Russian national identity via state-controlled media, but the latter effort has come up short because Moscow's ability to promote Russian identity is limited by the same three factors that have restricted previous Russian rulers: the fundamental weakness of Russian identity, the tensions inherent between identities the state supports and those it fears, and the reactions of the increasingly numerous non-Russian nationalities to any ethnic Russian identifications.

30. Goltsov, A. G. (2016). REGIONAL GEOPOLITICAL PROJECT "INTERMARIUM": PERSPECTIVES OF REALIZATION. *Sravnitelnaya Politika-Comparative Politics*, 7(4), 95-107. **https://doi.org/10.18611/2221-3279-2016-7-4(25)-95-107**

The emergence of geopolitical projects of association of the countries in the "Intermarium" dates back to the period after the First World War. In the era of the Cold War, some countries of the Baltic-Black Sea region were part of the Soviet Union, while others were Soviet satellites. Expansion of NATO and EU toward the East in post-bipolar period has resulted in strengthening of the position of the West in Central and Eastern Europe. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have turned into an outpost of the West on the border with Russia. Implementation of the "Eastern Partnership" project leads to increased influence of the EU in Ukraine and Moldova. Possible geoeconomic integration within the "Intermarium" is to be of low efficiency. Belarus has a key strategic position in the region and is an ally of Russia. Potential threats that are emanate from the geopolitics of Russia in Eastern Europe, encourages countries of the Baltic-Black Sea region to develop new geopolitical projects in creating of defensive military-political association. Contemporary neo-imperial geopolitics of the US in Europe is aimed at strengthening of its influence and provides, in particular, the support to projects of regional interstate associations, designed to "containment" of Russia. For the countries of the Western Europe geopolitical projects of integration associations in the Baltic-Black Sea region can be designed to form a "cordon sanitaire" for the isolation of Russia Ukraine is a most interested country in the implementation of the military-political project "Intermarium". The potential military-political association "Intermarium" will be fully functioned only under condition of preservation of the confrontation between the West and Russia.

31. Gotz, E. (2016). Neorealism and Russia's Ukraine policy, 1991-present. *Contemporary Politics*, *22*(3), 301-323. **https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2016.1201312**

What lies behind Russia's Ukraine policy? This article places Russia's current actions in Ukraine into a broader temporal and theoretical perspective. Drawing on the work of John Mearsheimer, I adjust neorealist theory to explain why and how major powers build regional spheres of influence. Briefly, the theory says that major powers use soft-power and hard-power tools to constrain the foreign-policy autonomy of neighbouring states. How major powers choose between these tools depends on the level of external pressure. My analysis shows that this argument goes a long way to explain the overall pattern and development of Russia's Ukraine policy over the last 25 years.

32. Gotz, E. (2016). Russia, the West, and the Ukraine crisis: three contending perspectives. *Contemporary Politics*, *22*(3), 249-266. **https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2016.1201313**

The purpose of this special issue is to examine the international dimension of the Ukraine crisis. The focus is on Moscow's actions towards Ukraine, and what they imply for European security and Russia-Western relations more generally. This introductory article takes stock of the current debate. Three major positions are identified, here labelled revisionist Russia' (Perspective I), victim Russia' (Perspective II), and troublemaker Russia' (Perspective III). The first sees Russia as an aggressive, neo-imperialist power that wants to overturn Europe's post-Cold War order. The second holds that Russia is a status-quo power that defends its geopolitical interests and honour against Western encroachments. The third views Russia as a mischief-maker, whose ruling elite purposefully creates external conflicts, such as the one in Ukraine, to divert attention from internal problems. This article presents the arguments of each perspective. Moreover, it discusses gaps and limitations

of the existing positions along with some policy tradeoffs. Finally, it provides an overview of the entire special issue and lays out how the individual contributions that follow address the identified shortcomings.

33. Granzer, H., Hagen, R. M., Warnke, P., Bock, W., Baumann, T., Schwarz, N. G., . . . Koeller, T. (2016). MOLECULAR EPIDEMIOLOGY OF CARBAPENEM-RESISTANT ACINETOBACTER BAUMANNII COMPLEX ISOLATES FROM PATIENTS THAT WERE INJURED DURING THE EASTERN UKRAINIAN CONFLICT. *European Journal of Microbiology and Immunology*, *6*(2), 109-117. https://doi.org/10.1556/1886.2016.00014**

This study addressed carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii complex (ABC) isolates from patients that were injured during the military conflict in the Eastern Ukraine and treated at German Armed Forces Hospitals in 2014 and 2015. Clonal diversity of the strains and potential ways of transmission were analyzed. Patients with one or several isolation events of carbapenem-resistant ABC were included. Isolates were characterized by VITEK II-based identification and resistance testing, molecular screening for frequent carbapenemase genes, and DiversiLab rep-PCR-based typing. Available clinical information of the patients was assessed. From 21 young male Ukrainian patients with battle injuries, 32 carbapenem-and fluoroquinolone-resistant ABC strains were isolated. Four major clonal clusters were detected. From four patients (19%), ABC isolates from more than one clonal cluster were isolated. The composition of the clusters suggested transmission events prior to the admission to the German hospitals. The infection and colonization pressure in the conflict regions of the Eastern Ukraine with ABC of low clonal diversity is considerable. Respective infection risks have to be considered in case of battle-related injuries in these regions. The low number of local clones makes any molecular exclusion of transmission events difficult.

34. Greta, M., & Pakosz, M. (2016). Ukrainian Economic Reforms: Current Status And Perspectives In The Face Of Competition On European Union Markets. *Comparative Economic Research-Central and Eastern Europe*, *19*(2), 75-91. https://doi.org/10.1515/cer-2016-0014**

The conflict in Ukraine since the beginning of 2014 has been the important in the history of Ukraine as an independent state. Despite the danger of economic collapse, the loss of Crimea, and war in its most industrialized region, Ukraine is still trying to conduct reforms and implement Western standards. Through persistent work Ukraine has been moving forward, despite all the difficulties. The society is staying together with the government to save the economy and defend the integrity of the whole country. This article outlines key processes in the Ukrainian reforms during 2014 and describes the cooperation of Ukraine with the European Union and international organizations in the field of financial support and reforms. The main goal of the article is to present the situation in various spheres of the country's development, but it is also an attempt to present a wider perspective on both the achievements and shortcomings in the process of reforms. The authors focus on those aspects having a significant impact on the Ukrainian economy after February 2014.

35. Hager, R. P. (2016). History and Culture in Russia and Ukraine: How to Complicate a Crisis of European Security. *Democracy & Security*, *12*(3), 211-218. https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2016.1205335**

Russia's annexation of Crimea was a major blow to the post-World War II security order in Europe and could well be the start of a new Cold War. This is especially the case since it was followed by the initiation of a proxy war in eastern Ukraine. The two works reviewed here deal the current crisis and provide historical background. Although there are actual concrete "national interests" involved in the Russian-Ukrainian relationship, the differences in how history is remembered complicates any attempt at resolving the issues.

36. Hill, F. (2016). Putin: The one-man show the West doesn't understand. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, *72*(3), 140-144. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1170361**

The West is at an inflection point in its relations with Russia; the stakes for having an accurate understanding of its president, Vladimir Putin, have never been higher. A misreading of this man - now one of the most consequential international political figures and challengers to the US-led world order since the end of the Cold War - could have catastrophic consequences. Russia's 8,000 nuclear weapons (and the vehicles to deliver them to any point on the globe) underscore the huge risks of not understanding who Putin is, what he wants, how he thinks, and why. Where do his ideas and conceptions come from? How does Putin look at the outside world? Why did he annex Crimea in 2014 and intervene in Syria in 2015? What does he know about the West? What does he think about the United States? These are all critical questions.

37. Hogenraad, R. L. (2016). Deaf sentences over Ukraine: Mysticism versus ethics. *Digital Scholarship in the Humanities*, *31*(4), 725-745. https://doi.org/10.1093/llc/fqv021**

We look to unlock the verbal code of President Putin and NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen during the Ukrainian crisis. On 18 March 2014, referring to the medieval history of Russia, Putin expressed a vision

that invites to explore the role of ancestral mental images as an instance of people with a direct knowledge of spiritual truth. Looking for spiritual truth is often at the edge of words, forcing the speaker to resort to poetic language to convey an inspired message beyond common understanding. Using a fragment of Martindale's creativity model, we look for indicators of insight (regressive thought, metaphors, dual-coding of images and emotions) in Putin's and NATO's speeches over a short take of recent history, December 2013-September 2014. Among obvious results, the annexing of Crimea to the Russian Federation (18 March 2014) sparked new words in both Putin's and NATO's speeches. The May 9 'Great Victory Day' also affected Putin's speeches. After May 9, a visible discontinuity marks the speeches of both Putin and NATO, but in opposite directions. Higher scores of metaphoric thought in Putin contrasts with lower scores in NATO. Finally, the threat index increases moderately in both cases, yet bears no strong relation to the ups or downs of visionary metaphoric thought in either Putin or NATO. The two corpuses contain the words 'value' and 'border' in plenty, pushing linguistic detection scholars to explore new frontiers.

38. Holovka, A. (2016). INFORMATION THREATS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, SOCIETY (EXPERIENCE OF UKRAINE). *Baltic Journal of Economic Studies*, *2*(3), 42-47.

The scientific article deals with both integral vision of the contemporary informative risks in the globalized world and their classification. The essence of the informative security is exposed, which is one of main factors of steady development of the modern informative society. In consideration of the foreign practice, the experience of Ukraine is also analyzed in counteraction to the contemporary informative threats. The effective policy of safety and counteraction to the informative threats is one of the basic constituents of the state national safety system and at the same time testifies to the correct character of connections between the public organs and the society. Under the conditions of unrestrained progress of information technologies and general informatization in all sectors of people's life (politics, economy, defense, energy etc.), providing of control and defense of informative space of the country becomes much more difficult task. Modern Ukrainian realities certify convincingly, that Ukraine is in an extremely difficult political situation that influences all spheres of Ukrainians' life. The key reason of such situation is a military-informative aggression against Ukraine from Russia, which is the fact of waging a "hybrid war". As it is known, this type of war combines the application of both classic soldiery instruments (military technique, firearms, regular troops) and methods of informative influence (cyber-attack, informative diversions, aggressive propaganda, impact on public opinion). This factor encourages such research. The object of the study is the phenomenon of information risks in the modern world. Subject of research - is the impact of modern information threats to the state and society, namely the economic, political and social spheres. For a holistic analysis of the subject of research was used appropriate methodology - systematic approach, method of comparative analysis, general scientific methods (analysis, synthesis, generalization, induction, deduction etc.). The article is aimed to illuminate the essence and the basic types of informative threats. The result was formulated comprehensive conclusions: First, explained the importance of understanding of informative threats, and presents their essence and classification. In addition, explained that while researching this question it is important to analyze the whole category of informative security, which is a component of the state national security. The experience of Ukraine that got into the conditions of external military-informative aggression can be an example in this context. In the study of Ukrainian realities, it is determined that modern information challenges affecting important areas of social reality.

39. Hudson, M. (2016). Ukraine and the New Economic Cold War. *International Critical Thought*, *6*(4), 556-569. https://doi.org/10.1080/21598282.2016.1242344

This paper examines the politics of two rival loans to Ukraine, one from Russia and one from the IMF. While the Russian loan was made at the behest of the elected government of Ukraine as a gesture of solidarity between two closely intertwined post-Soviet economies experiencing similar difficulties, the IMF loan was not only a tool of vain US policy to retain purchase on fast-developing events in Ukraine, it was made in violation of the IMF's own rules. The loans form a critical chapter the contemporary transition from the geopolitical economy of US and Western dominance to one of multipolarity.

40. Huhtinen, A. M., & Rantapelkonen, J. (2016). Junk Information in Hybrid Warfare: The Rhizomatic Speed of Social Media in the Spamosphere. *Proceedings of the 15th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (Eccws 2016)*, 136-144.

The near exponential growth in social media (SM) communications is widely reported and services such as Twitter and Facebook duly have a combined user base in the billions. The growth of SM as a communication tool in recent years has also forced governments to consider the cyberspace as an important arena for strategic communication and disseminating their message. Further to this, if disseminated messages are misleading, distorted or false, a speedy response is required to limit the damage they can wreak. Recent events in Europe, such as the war in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, the Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 tragedy and the War in Syria, as revealed in reports by The Interpreter magazine, the Bellingcat open source investigation group and Russia Today (RT) respectively, show that misinformation is rife in SM. In this paper we analyze two case studies, namely Finland's Rapid Reaction Force and the Arrest of a Russian Citizen in Finland at US Request. We adopt a so- called rhizomatic focus to assess social networking spam and the

consequences that this phenomenon creates for interaction in the security cases (Deleuze and Guattari 1983). In both case studies we analyze the respective timeline of events and the social media impacts on the rhizomatic " spam" information context. We argue that the rhizomatic way in which junk information spreads within social media is comparable to a ` spam world'. This spam world results from a technologized infrastructure that facilitates social media interaction without a proper understanding of the context of events.

41. Jeswal, R. (2016). Battlespace Perspectives of Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine. *Countering Hybrid Threats: Lessons Learned from Ukraine*, *128*, 85-95. **https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-651-4-85**

A Battlespace perspective on the depth of hybrid warfare as seen in Ukraine, has a backdraft and also the butterfly effect. Hyper accelerated reengineering or reinventing is required on all levels, strategic, tactical and operational. Hybrid warfare can only evolve if no interventions are installed such is the nature of this dynamic system. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield rests on multirole in a multi-operational theatre which would incorporate all these factions: civil wars, army factions, quasi-military units, partisans with outside support, insurgents, militarized criminal gangs, grounds for violent extremist organizations, communal and commodity riots, overall - General Lawlessness. Hybrid wars don't just "pop-up" they are a product of long-term "play". Russia has been employing not only the military Instrument of Power (IOP) of the modern state, but also the economic, informational, and diplomatic IOPs in its hybrid threat construct. The deployment of long-term efforts on to Ukraine through "gas wars" to food embargo (introduced and then lifted) was to weaken, the already weak economy and political system. Denial, Deception, Provocation & Rumors are part of hybrid war-gaming (keeping in mind the recent investigation by Novaya Gazeta states that Russia is controlling the flow of jihadist in to Syria.) "Bratstvo" wants the war in eastern Ukraine to be a religious war. Like all hybrid warfare spillovers, Ukrainians are dissatisfied with the new government, its broken institutions and endemic corruption. So the need to take advantage of the situation has led them to state, that this can only be solved, by creating a national elite composed of people determined to wage a sort of Ukrainian jihad against the Russians. Noble or not many factions globally are fighting for "their" cause against "their" evil - affecting geopolitics, global security, and international relations and tearing the fabric of humanity. Forging a new consensus on a division of power and resources is a huge challenge and failure tends to lead to renewed strife giving the crisis another new complex face. Hybrid warfare has a successive cycle spanning borders. Being cognizant of what actions are taken today will determine the course of tomorrow.

42. Jungling, K. (2016). Russia Policy: Courage to Criticise Lessons from the Handling of the Chechen War. *Osteuropa*, *66*(6-7), 159-+.

Three decades have passed since relations between Russia and the West have been as bad as they are now. The reason is the annexation of the Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine, which Russia provoked. Can Russia be made to change course by means of criticism? Or are topics of conflict to be avoided in order to prevent greater alienation? During the Second Chechen War, criticism of human rights violations had an immediate effect in some cases. Nothing similar is to be expected today. Nonetheless, the West should cultivate an open and critical interaction with the Putin administration so that it does not lose credibility in the long term.

43. Karabulut, A. N. (2016). Old War, New Strategy: Russian Doctrine of Hybrid Warfare for the Twenty First Century and Its Implementation during the Crisis in Ukraine. *Uluslararasi Iliskiler-International Relations*, *13*(49), 25-42. **https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.463055**

In February-March 2014, Russian Federation invaded Crimean region of Ukraine not by using any regular war technique, but rather by exploiting Ukraine's internal powers. This application may denote permanent changes in post-Cold War security environment. Russian tactics require orchestrated use of military and non-military actors and manipulation of internal powers inside the targeted country to achieve a common political objective. This new war technique, commonly referred to as hybrid warfare, is not something NATO has prepared itself for, and hence created concerns for NATO allies, which have similar characteristics as Ukraine. This article will explore general characteristics of hybrid warfare by examining how Russia understands it and how she implemented it in Ukraine.

44. Karagiannis, E. (2016). Ukrainian volunteer fighters in the eastern front: ideas, political-social norms and emotions as mobilization mechanisms. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, *16*(1), 139-153. **https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2016.1148413**

Following the outbreak of the insurgency in eastern Ukraine, thousands of volunteers joined pro-Kiev battalions. Although they have fiercely fought against pro-Kremlin forces, very little is known about them. The article will investigate why individuals have engaged in such a risky endeavour for no obvious material reward. It will claim that ideas, political-social norms and emotions have functioned as mobilization mechanisms that can explain individual decisions. Based on interviews, the article will argue that the mobilization of Ukrainian volunteer fighters has a strong cognitive-normative-emotional dimension that cannot be ignored and should be further explored.

45. Sola, N. F. (2016). Ukraine. From the Maidan Revolution to the Donbass War. *Revista Electronica De Estudios Internacionales*(32).

In 2016, two years after what we know as the Donbass War began, the Spanish publisher Comunicación Social published a 410-page book in which several authors try to draw a map of what is happening in Ukraine, thinking about the background immediate Euromaidan, but also making a political and contextual reading. The compiler is the researcher and academic Ruben Ruiz Ramas.

46. Khaldarova, I., & Pantti, M. (2016). FAKE NEWS The narrative battle over the Ukrainian conflict. *Journalism Practice*, *10*(7), 891-901. https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2016.1163237

The crisis in Ukraine has accentuated the position of Russian television as the government's strongest asset in its information warfare. The internet, however, allows other players to challenge the Kremlin's narrative by providing counter-narratives and debunking distorted information and fake images. Accounting for the new media ecology-through which strategic narratives are created and interpreted, this article scrutinizes the narratives of allegedly fake news on Channel One, perceiving the fabricated stories as extreme projections of Russia's strategic narratives, and the attempts of the Ukrainian fact-checking website Stopfake. org to counter the Russian narrative by refuting misinformation and exposing misleading images about Ukraine. Secondly, it analyses how Twitter users judged the veracity of these news stories and contributed to the perpetuation of strategic narratives.

47. Kolsto, P. (2016). Crimea vs. Donbas: How Putin Won Russian Nationalist Support-and Lost it Again. *Slavic Review*, *75*(3), 702-+.

The article analyzes how the nationalist segment of the Russian public has engaged in attempts to interpret and evaluate the Crimean annexation and the war in Donbass. The Crimean annexation was justified in the Kremlin by a novel use of nationalist rhetoric. Initially, this rhetoric paid off particularly well-boosting Putin's popularity ratings and endearing him to virtually all Russian nationalists. He could present himself as the foremost defender both of ethnic Russians abroad and of Russia's state interests, stealing the thunder from Russian ethnonationalists and the state-centered nationalists alike. However, in spite of the initial euphoria, the war in Eastern Ukraine has antagonized the nationalist segment of the Russian public which had been won over by the Kremlin only months earlier. Russian TV footage of burned houses in East Ukrainian towns and hamlets prompted questions about why Putin was not doing more to defend them.

48. Kolsto, P. (2016). Symbol of War - But Which One? The St George Ribbon in Russian Nation-Building by Pal Kolsto. *Slavonic and East European Review*, *94*(4), 660-+.

The article examines the short but eventful history of the St George ribbon, which since 2005 has been used in Russia as a symbol of the Soviet victory in the Great Fatherland War. The ribbon 'action' has become a major societal and political event, involving millions of participants in various activities in the weeks leading up to Victory Day, 9 May. Since the main purpose of state-sponsored national symbols is to provide nodal points around which people can develop a common political identity, the St George ribbon campaign can be regarded as a great success. However, the Putin regime has increasingly politicized this symbol, which serves to a high degree as a badge of allegiance to the Kremlin and its policies. Since the outbreak of war in Eastern Ukraine the St George ribbon has become highly controversial in most of the former Soviet republics.

49. Konoplyov, S., & Urbanskiy, A. (2016). Hybrid War in Ukraine: What is Next? *Countering Hybrid Threats: Lessons Learned from Ukraine*, *128*, 96-101. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-651-4-96

In 2014, Russia's actions in Ukraine were based on the concept of "hybrid war" which is - from the structural and functional points of view - unique in many ways. The form of war is "hybrid" however the content is "asymmetric," which means: war between belligerents whose relative military power and strategies/tactics differ significantly. Most clearly the nature of this type of war was demonstrated by the annexation of Crimea. Later this intervention was followed by Russian support to local radical elements in Donbass and a full-scale invasion of Russian troops in Eastern regions of Ukraine, which the Kremlin still doesn't acknowledge. Although the nature of each specific element of this "hybrid war" is not new and has been used in almost all the wars of the past, what is unique is the coherence and interplay of all elements, the dynamism and flexibility of their use and the paramount importance of the information factor. Moreover, the information factor became an independent component of its own and is no less important than military actions. Moscow's intervention in Ukraine has demonstrated that Western policymakers from EU and NATO need to take these factors into account when crafting new concepts and re-examining existing strategies aimed to maintain the European borders unchanged and secure.

50. Kri, Z., & Sgem. (2016, Apr 06-09). IS UKRAINE READY FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP? *International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conferences on Social Sciences and Arts* [Sgem 2016, bk 2: political sciences, law, finance, economics and tourism conference proceedings, vol i]. 3rd International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on Social Sciences and Arts, SGEM 2016, Vienna, AUSTRIA.

Responding to the violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity by Russia, the Ukrainian political leadership has declared its intent to join NATO. This paper analyses whether Ukraine is prepared for NATO membership. The Study on NATO Enlargement defines several key criteria for new members. Four are essential: the establishment of a consolidated democratic political system, including democratic civil-military relations; the ability of the candidate's armed forces to meet NATO obligations to provide security for the international community; the settling of territorial disputes with neighbours; and public support for NATO membership. Evaluated on these criteria, Ukraine is not ready for NATO membership. Ukraine is not a consolidated democracy: ambiguously distributed competencies between the executive and legislative branches allow political actors to make controversial decisions and take steps that favour short-term, many times personal, interests over long-term national goals. Civil-military relations have not been democratized to the extent demanded by NATO. The culture within the Ukrainian military has roots in both democratic values and in the communist past. Finally, the very existence of volunteer battalions contradicts democratic civil military relations. Ukraine is also a country with unresolved territorial disputes with neighbours, disputes it is certain not to have resolved in the near future. Russian policy has resulted in the illegal annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in Donetsk and Luhansk. These shortcomings are unlikely to be overcome in a matter of a few years, as the current Ukrainian political leadership believes. Ukraine thus has much work to do to stand even a chance of joining NATO.

51. Kulyk, V. (2016). National Identity in Ukraine: Impact of Euromaidan and the War. *Europe-Asia Studies*, *68*(4), 588-608. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1174980

The essay examines the impact of the Euromaidan protests and the subsequent Russian aggression on Ukrainian national identity. It demonstrates that national identity has become more salient vis-a-vis other territorial and non-territorial identities. At the same time, the very meaning of belonging to the Ukrainian nation has changed, as manifested first and foremost in increased alienation from Russia and the greater embrace of Ukrainian nationalism. Although popular perceptions are by no means uniform across the country, the main dividing line has shifted eastwards and now lies between the Donbas and the adjacent east-southern regions.

52. Lane, D. (2016). The International Context: Russia, Ukraine and the Drift to East-West Confrontation. *International Critical Thought*, *6*(4), 623-644. https://doi.org/10.1080/21598282.2016.1242084

President Putin is widely portrayed as a threat to peace and to the international order; and Russian intervention in Ukraine and Crimea is often taken as a measure of this aggressive external policy. It is contended that aggression in international affairs has different causes and consequences. The paper examines the crisis posed in Ukraine following the flight of President Yanukovich and the institution of a pro-NATO and pro-European Union government. Russia's actions are considered in the wider context of the political transformation in Soviet space, the enlargement of the European Union and the expansion of NATO. Russia's economic and military strengths and weaknesses are outlined against the background of the development of the Eurasian Economic Union. It is contended that Russian policy under President Putin has been defensive and reactive.

53. Lanoszka, A. (2016). Russian hybrid warfare and extended deterrence in eastern Europe. *International Affairs*, *92*(1), 175-+. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12509

Russia's use of force against Ukraine since early 2014 has prompted some observers to remark that it is engaging in hybrid warfare'. This form of military statecraft has made other former Soviet republics, such as the Baltic countries, fear that Russia would use subversion rather than pursue a conventional military engagement against them. Despite this concern about Russian hybrid war, existing descriptions of this form of war suffer from conceptual weaknesses. In this article hybrid warfare is conceived as a strategy that marries conventional deterrence and insurgency tactics. That is, the belligerent uses insurgent tactics against its target while using its conventional military power to deter a strong military response. The article then outlines why some former Soviet republics are susceptible to Russian hybrid warfare, allowing it to postulate inductively the conditions under which hybrid warfare might be used in general. The analysis yields two policy implications. First, military solutions are not wholly appropriate against hybrid warfare since it exploits latent ethnic grievances and weak civil societies. Second, only under narrow circumstances would belligerents resort to hybrid warfare. Belligerents need to be revisionist and militarily stronger than their targets, but they also need to have ethnic or linguistic ties with the target society to leverage in waging hybrid warfare.

54. Lemnitzer, J. M. (2016). International Commissions of Inquiry and the North Sea Incident: A Model for a MH17 Tribunal? *European Journal of International Law*, *27*(4), 923-944. https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chw056

After spending more than a century on the fringes of international legal discourse, international commissions of inquiry have recently begun to feature more prominently in academic and political debate. Their embrace of international criminal law has prompted a debate whether they are stepping outside their

traditional mandate as fact-finding bodies. As this article will show, this dispute misunderstands the Hague tradition and ignores the historical role of early commissions of inquiry in shaping our ideas of holding perpetrators of mass atrocities to account or of letting international bodies decide the responsibility and guilt of individuals involved in controversial incidents. While being almost completely unknown today, the North Sea Incident Commission of 1905 had explicit authority to decide upon the responsibility, blame and punishment for an incident in which the Russian Navy had killed and injured British fishermen while engaged in operations linked to the Russo-Japanese war. It pioneered an adversarial model of a commission of inquiry that could serve as a useful model for an investigation into the downing of flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine in July 2014 since it meets all Russian objections against the UN Security Council draft that was vetoed in July 2015.

55. Liubarets, A. (2016). The Politics of Memory in Ukraine in 2014: Removal of the Soviet Cultural Legacy and Euromaidan Commemorations. *Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal***(3), 197-214.**

The year 2014 brought great social and cultural disruptions to Ukraine. Euromaidan, the annexation of Crimea, and war in the Donbas led to significant social and political changes, with crucial transformations in Ukrainian historical memory playing an important role in them. Public appeals to history accompanied most political processes in 2014 and were always used for self-legitimization by both sides of the conflict. Changes in attitude towards the Soviet cultural and historical legacy and the formation of a new memory about Euromaidan ("the invention of tradition") might be considered as a major shift in this field. The aim of this article is to observe and analyze major trends of the politics of memory in Ukraine in 2014 and early 2015.

56. Lobanov, N. (2016). EUROPEAN UNION STRATEGIC NARRATIVE TOWARDS THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S ESCALATION: STOP, SLOW OR GO? *Eastern Partnership under Strain - Time for a Rethink? (Eurint 2016)***, 9-26.**

The narrative dimension of the EaP programme was considered by the European policy makers of secondary relevance as it was focused on the bureaucratic aspects of the economic and judicial convergence of the target countries with the European Union through "regulation setting". The importance of these aspects has clearly increased after the Russian Federation used hybrid war tactics in Ukraine since 2013 based on a fabricated Strategic Narrative that relied on the "Reflexive Control" and "Informational Warfare" principles to a great effect. The growingly opposing information spheres, the Russian and the European, have an enormous importance for the political discourse in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries. By drawing on a closer examination of a number of primary and secondary sources - including important events, official texts, and excerpts from interviews - this paper aims at comprehending the formation, projection and reception in the EaP states of the Strategic Narratives of the Russian Federation and the European Union since 2013.

57. Lubej, J. V. (2016). Contemporary Ukrainian Migration Problems in a Light of Euromaidan's Protests and War. *Ars & Humanitas***,** *10***(2), 63-78. https://doi.org/10.4312/ars.10.2.63-78**

The present article focuses on the great numbers of economic and political Ukrainian migrants who have been migrating because of their desire for a better life or who have, forcibly, been internally displaced because of the war in eastern Ukraine. The article presents the reasons for and the consequences of the aforementioned migrations as evinced in the humanistic beliefs reflected in the essays, considerations and diary entries of esteemed Ukrainian writers (Jurij Andruhovic, Andrej Kurkov, Tanja Maljarcuk, etc.) - especially as have been observed in the light of Europeanism in Ukraine and the Ukrainian (non)-presence in Europe. The article is also interested in how this problematic is reflected in public discourse. It appears that the topic is less present in the primary sense, while emphasis is laid on the causes that led to the present situation: the question of nationality, identity, and the stressing of patriotism.

58. Lutsevych, O. (2016). Civil society versus captured state: a winning strategy for sustainable change. *Development in Practice***,** *26***(5), 646-656. https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2016.1188885**

In the West, Ukraine is known as country of wasted potential, and most recently the scene of a proxy war between the West and Russia. What is often missing in the analysis is that, internally, the country faces serious nation- and state-building challenges. These call for development of institutions, values, and behaviours that could sustain an open democratic system of governance. A strong and sustainable civil society is an integral part of such a system. In 2013 a popular uprising toppled the corrupt regime of Victor Yanukovych. This triggered the Russian annexation of Crimea and unleashed a violent separatist movement in Ukraine's industrial heartland, the Donbass. Since 2014 Ukraine has been both under external attack and simultaneously trying to reform its corrupt and captured political system. En Occident, l'Ukraine est connue comme un pays au potentiel inexploite, et plus recemment la scene d'une guerre par procuration entre l'Occident et la Russie. Un element souvent absent de cette analyse est le fait qu'au niveau interne, le pays se heurte a de serieux defis sur le plan de la construction de la nation et de l'Etat. Ces defis exigent le developpement d'institutions, de valeurs et de comportements qui pourraient soutenir un systeme democratique

ouvert de gouvernance. Une societe civile solide et durable constitue une partie integrale d'un tel systeme. En 2013, un soulevement populaire a renverse le regime corrompu de Victor Yanukovych. Cela a declenche l'annexion de la Crimee par la Russie et dechaine un mouvement separatiste violent dans le cOEur industiel de l'Ukraine, le Donbass. Depuis 2014 l'Ukraine est soumise a une attaque externe tout en tentant de reformer son systeme politique corrompu et capture. En Occidente, Ucrania es reconocido como un pais cuyo potencial se encuentra desaprovechado y que, en los ultimos anos, fue escenario de una guerra indirecta entre Occidente y Rusia. Un aspecto que no suele figurar en los analisis tiene que ver con los retos muy serios enfrentados por el pais internamente en terminos de construccion de la nacion y el Estado. Estas tareas implican el desarrollo de instituciones, valores y comportamientos que permitan sostener un sistema de gobierno abierto y democratico. Una parte integra de este sistema radica en la existencia de una sociedad civil fuerte y sostenible. En 2013, un levantamiento popular derroco al corrupto regimen de Viktor Yanukovich, desencadenando la anexion rusa de Crimea y un movimiento separatista violento en Donbas, corazon industrial de Ucrania. Desde 2014, al mismo tiempo que experimenta embates externos, Ucrania intenta reformar su sistema politico corrupto y capturado.

59. MacFarlane, S. N. (2016). Kto Vinovat? Why is there a crisis in Russia's relations with the West? *Contemporary Politics*, *22*(3), 342-358. **https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2016.1201315**

This article addresses the deterioration in relations between Russia and the West from their high point in the early 1990s to the current conflict over issues such as Ukraine and Syria. It discusses the dominant modes of understanding that decline, notably the propositions, on the one hand, that this decline is a result of Western policies and, on the other hand, that the decline follows naturally from the characteristics and aspirations of the Russian state and its leaders. It suggests that the deterioration is best understand as a result of multiple, reinforcing factors related to the internal characteristics of Russian political culture and the political system, and also to Russia's experience in international relations since the end of the Cold War.

60. Malai, I. (2016). Crisis in Ukraine: a Platform for the Expansion of "Hybrid War" or Another "Frozen Conflict". *Countering Hybrid Threats: Lessons Learned from Ukraine*, *128*, 141-147. **https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-651-4-141**

Ukraine's lack of preparedness to oppose Russia's "hybrid aggression" as well as Russia's official denial of its military participation in the conflict allowed the Kremlin to control the initiative up to a particular point. Therefore, the Ukrainian Parliament's decision to launch a counter terrorist operation on the territories, taken under control by the separatists, was a logical step. At the same time, despite the fact that the warfare acquired the character of a local armed conflict and direct military interference on the part of Russia became obvious (use of heavy artillery from the Russian territory, border crossings by the units of the Armed Forces of RF, etc.), the Ukrainian government did not declare martial law.

61. Malakhov, V. A. (2016). To Deviate from Maidan (Polemical Remarks). *Russian Studies in Philosophy*, *54*(3), 212-222. **https://doi.org/10.1080/10611967.2016.1251239**

Although far from being a supporter of Russian officialdom, in the present article the author will defend a position of dissent in relation to Maidan. In his view, the problem with Maidan is its lack of dialogue, overt or covert appeal to force, disregard for the fragility of Ukraine as a whole, and rejection of Ukraine's deep ties with Russia, which for Ukrainian culture are essential. According to this view, the phenomenon of Maidan, and the subsequent course of events, cannot be made to fit the Procrustean bed of preformed ideological stereotypes. Therefore, the current crisis in Ukraine and surrounding areas requires a more realistic approach, and a better understanding among the parties involved on the basis of fundamental human values. If realized, such an understanding could be a profound historical outcome of the current crisis.

62. Malyarenko, T., & Galbreath, D. J. (2016). Paramilitary motivation in Ukraine: beyond integration and abolition. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, *16*(1), 113-138. **https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2016.1148414**

A common theme in historical and contemporary warfare is the role of militias. Militias, both pro-government and rebel, act beyond their sponsors or else they would be understood as part of the armies that go to war. We think of militias as paramilitaries, approximate but not collocated with the military. Paramilitaries are ordinarily recruited and resourced differently. They are also ordinarily tactically different, playing a role in front line warfare where the intensity may be high, but where the position is fast changing or distributed in local areas. As the conflict literature will show, militias, or paramilitaries, are a common feature of any conflict and thus it is no surprise that we see their use in Ukraine. For the conflict in Ukraine, we use the term paramilitaries to indicate those forces that are fighting at the front line for both the Kyiv government and rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk, with these being considered pro-Russian' and even include Russian citizens. Relying on the pro-government militias literature, we show how militias on both sides play an important role in the conflict but also pose the biggest threat to a sustainable peace.

63.   Marshall, A. (2016). From civil war to proxy war: past history and current dilemmas. *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, *27*(2), 183-195. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129172

The use of surrogate or 'proxy' actors within the context of 'irregular' or guerrilla conflict within or between states constitutes a phenomenon spanning nearly the whole of recorded human military history. Yet it is a phenomenon that has also acquired urgent contemporary relevance in the light of the general evolution of conflict in Ukraine and the current Middle East. This introduction to a special issue on the theme investigates some potentially important new avenues to studying the phenomenon in the light of these trends.

64.   Matveeva, A. (2016). No Moscow stooges: identity polarization and guerrilla movements in Donbass. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, *16*(1), 25-50. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2016.1148415

The paper argues that the grounds for the conflict in Donbass were prepared when different sections of Ukraine's population developed conflicting perspectives of the past, the role of Russia in Ukraine's history, and of how relations with the West should evolve. These differences lay the foundations for what became polarized identities and mutually exclusive ideologies. The study goes on to explore a changing political landscape of a leaderless uprising and formation of a protest movement out of locally available ingredients, the emergence of armed militias in unfolding security vacuum and the developments on the battlefield. As the rebel-held territories drifted away from mainland Ukraine, their new identity was formed by the war. The paper argues that understanding the internal dynamic of the guerrilla war and population's survival has been key to the resolution, which is increasingly unlikely.

65.   Medar, S. (2016). Intelligence in Hybrid Warfare. *Countering Hybrid Threats: Lessons Learned from Ukraine*, *128*, 50-53. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-651-4-50

Today's world conflicts have been diversified according with participants objectives. 4GW, Hybrid Warfare, Proxy Warfare, Lawfare and other types of wars a currently developing in different areas. These wars are theoretically clear but in practice there are differences of interpretation accordingly with combatants' intentions. All these wars have a common need to clarify not only objectives but to classify them according with a matrix. This common need is Intelligence. Planning, collection, analysis and dissemination of Intelligence is different from one type of war to another one. The presented paper try to underline how these actions must be effected according with which type of war.

66.   Mosquera, A. B. M., & Bachmann, S. D. (2016). Lawfare in Hybrid Wars: The 21st Century Warfare. *Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies*, *7*(1), 63-87. https://doi.org/10.1163/18781527-00701008

In the context of 'Hybrid Warfare' as 21st Century's threat to peace and security, this paper intends to address the role of Lawfare. The use of law as a weapon, Lawfare,(1) can have a tangible impact on democratic States when their adversaries use it in an exploitative way. Lawfare can be used in the context of Hybrid War.(2) Examples of Hybrid Warfare as witnessed in the Russian/Ukrainian conflict of 2014/2015 and the ongoing conflict with Daesh are particularly sensitive to Lawfare due to an apparent asymmetric adherence to the international rule of law among involved actors. The different legal and ethical approach of democratic States in warfare and their - non-democratic opponents in Hybrid War scenarios has the potential to impact negatively on the eventual prompt success of Western military actions. The authors argue that against this backdrop it is essential for law-abiding nations to adapt an approach which uses counter-Lawfare means in support of its own legitimate objectives and to prevent opponents from using it law as a weapon for their own strategic purposes.

67.   Myshlovska, O. (2016). *Nationalising Fluid and Ambiguous Identities: Russia, Western Ukraine and Their Ukrainian and Russian Minorities, Diasporas and 'Compatriots Abroad'* (Vol. 14).

This paper studies the transformation of ethnic and linguistic identities in the Russian Federation and Ukraine over the last two decades in a comparative manner on the examples of the Ukrainian minority in Russia and the Russian minority in western Ukraine. In both cases there has been the most important re-identification with the 'titular' nationality among all minorities of the two countries. The paper holds that this change can be understood only if the reality of mixed and fluid ethnic and linguistic identities is considered. Sociological surveys which do not constrain the respondents to choose one ethnic identification and in-depth interviews show a great degree of mutual influence and penetration of Ukrainian and Russian identities and languages even in the case when the separation between the two groups is most pronounced as in western Ukraine. The paper also considers the phenomenon of politicisation of ethnicity, which recently most vividly manifested itself in the seizure of Crimea by Russia and the proxy war in eastern Ukraine, and surviving Soviet legacies in the ways national identities and languages are treated in the political discourse and legislation. Political discourses of both countries continue to advance the vision of well-bounded and separate Ukrainian and Russian ethnic and linguistic identities, do not accept the 'localization' of their 'compatriots' in the neighboring country, problematise mixed and fluid identities and continue to treat citizens of other countries

as their own by essentializing their ethnic belonging. The fluidity of identities and politicization has made the fulfillment of demands for political, educational or cultural rights of both minorities very challenging.

68. Nate, S. (2016). Black Sea, "Cold Sea": The Geopolitical Crossroad of Civilizations. *Countering Hybrid Threats: Lessons Learned from Ukraine*, *128*, 251-258. **https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-651-4-251**

New prospects for regional developments in the Black Sea area show a new pattern for conflicts and power influences. Arms race evolution and achieving the national interest at all costs is an evidence of the Cold War Era. Delimitation of global or regional influence remains a central element of international players. Tensions in Ukraine and Crimea implicitly indicate the point of incidence of Europe, USA, and Russia in the Black Sea Region. Military, economic, political, and energy reasons make up a difficult scenario in which most countries in the area experience. The uncertain future of the region seems to be maintaining buffer zones and semi-frozen conflicts for an indefinite period.

69. Nitoiu, C. (2016). Towards conflict or cooperation? The Ukraine crisis and EU-Russia relations. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, *16*(3), 375-390. **https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2016.1193305**

The Ukraine crisis and Russia's contribution to it have raised numerous concerns regarding the possible emergence of a new Cold War' in Europe. At the same time, Ukraine's popular choice and enthusiasm for European integration expressed clearly on the streets of Kyiv seem to have caused Russia to adopt a (neo)revisionist attitude. In this context, relations between Russia and the EU (and the West for that matter) have been limited, frozen and directed on path towards conflict. This article analyses how the traditional dichotomy between conflict and cooperation in EU-Russia relations was replaced by conflict in the context of the Ukraine crisis. The article contends that the breakdown of the symbolic and peaceful cohabitation between the EU and Russia has been influenced by the fact that both actors have chosen to ignore key tensions that characterized their post-Cold War interactions. The article identifies three such tensions: the first emphasizes divisions between EU member states and their impact on coagulating a common EU approach towards Russia; the second (geopolitical) tension highlights the almost mutually exclusive way in which the EU and Russia's security interests have developed in the post-Soviet space; finally, the third contends that a clash of values and worldviews between the EU and Russia makes conflict virtually unavoidable.

70. Ojog, V. (2016). Patterns of Russian Intelligence "Active Measures" in Frozen Conflict Zones. *Countering Hybrid Threats: Lessons Learned from Ukraine*, *128*, 198-206. **https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-651-4-198**

Strategy and tactics of Russian intelligence active measures evolved in the period of the Cold War with a various range of effects and consequences. Still, in the context of new geostrategic paradigm, Russia showed its revisionist aims and tendency to stop possible EU-NATO expansion and power projection, by controlling the key areas of the Black Sea region. Moreover, Russian intelligence active measures are mainly focused on frozen conflict zones within ex-Soviet states as Georgia, the Ukraine, and the Republic of Moldova. Materialized in the so-called "near abroad" policy, contemporary Russian intelligence active measures have methodological patterns whose results develop into a complex hybrid warfare. The analysis of the phases and particularities of actions within active measures in different regions can bring a valuable forecast potential in preventing and countering these actions.

71. Pausch, M. (2016). Citizenship Education in Times of Crisis. *Foro De Educacion*, *14*(20), 3-9. **https://doi.org/10.14516/fde.2016.014.020.001**

The European Union (EU) faces a deep crisis. Under the impression of economic troubles, wars in and around Europe (Ukraine, Syria) and an unprecedented immigration of refugees, political leaders try to muddle through the difficult times, while political extremists and anti-European forces suggest alleged solutions and divide the Union. In view of the crisis, citizenship education is often neglected, although it is a crucial measure for long-term stability, European integration and wealth. The education of young generations needs to be considered as a core challenge for the EU. It should provide political knowledge of history, institutions, actors and procedures of democracy in the nation states and the EU, democratic values and behaviour, skills to participate in a communicational public sphere. It should enable citizens to understand how democratic politics functions, what the core values of democracy are, how interests can be articulated and promoted in a European multi-level system and how political claims or projects can gain broader attention.

72. Pavlyshyn, M. (2016). Literary history as provocation of national identity, national identity as provocation of literary history: The case of Ukraine. *Thesis Eleven*, *136*(1), 74-89. **https://doi.org/10.1177/0725513616667657**

Empirical research into political sentiments gives force to the proposition that, in the context of the 2013-14 Euromaidan and subsequent war, Ukrainian national identity, for most of its history predominantly ethno-cultural, has undergone changes justifying its qualification as civic'. In this article I discuss the ethno-cultural orientation, conventional during the 19th and 20th centuries, of Ukrainian literary history, a scholarly genre that has a tradition of promoting the cause of Ukrainian nation-building; I identify contemporary examples of discourses in the literary sphere - literary works themselves, literary anthologies and the public

statements and debates of writers - that embody or applaud civic identities akin to those in evidence on the Euromaidan; and I reflect upon the values, inclusive and multicultural, that a Ukrainian national literary history rhetorically in harmony with post-Euromaidan sentiment would evince.

73. Podgorean, R. (2016). Countering Hybrid Warfare. The Need for a Comprehensive Approach. *Countering Hybrid Threats: Lessons Learned from Ukraine*, *128*, 21-24. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-651-4-21

Hybrid warfare is not new: I am sure that the events in Ukraine in March 2014 and how they developed leading to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea were of no surprise to intelligence and security experts. However, the employment of hybrid warfare by Russia against Ukraine last year, as well as its manifestation in other forms as put forward by terrorist organizations like ISIL/Daesh across the Middle East, raises a number of issues when it comes to countering it, especially in an Allied setting and in a complex, interconnected world as we have today.

74. Portnov, A. (2016). Exclusion from One's Own Country The Donbass from the Point of View of Ukrainian Intellectuals. *Osteuropa*, *66*(6-7), 171-+.

The Ukrainian discussion on the Donbass was never free of stereotypes. After the annexation of the Crimea and the war, opinions have hardened. West Ukrainian intellectuals characterise the people of the Donbass as "others" and "strangers". This is supposed to legitimise exclusion and serve their own identity formation. The "inner orientalisation" of the Donbass does not do justice to the region's socio-political plurality and dynamism. The irony is that even an author like Yury Andrukhovych represents this attitude, a man who has also made a name himself with his nostalgia for the lost cultural and ethnic diversity of Austria-Hungary. The debate in Ukraine touches a universal question: What makes a citizen a citizen? His belonging to the state or to an ethno-nation?

75. Prikhod'ko, I. G. (2016). KIEV SCHOOL OF MEDIA LINGUISTICS. *Cuadernos De Rusistica Espanola*, *12*, 33-43.

The extension of mediaspace, increase of speech production and number of participants in it, mediatization of modern society, global information wars and use of massmedia as an instrument of these wars, growth of manipulative speech influence in the mediatexts promote the development of medialinguistics as a scientific discipline and introduction mediaeducation into the syllabus of training linguists. Interest in this area is growing in different countries, formed the research schools. In Ukraine, the study of the processes of language development of mass communication is associated with Kiev school of medialinguistics, representatives of which focused on a comprehensive study of the political media texts. The paradigm of medialinguistics examines current practices of political, mass media, sport and leisure media discourses. The article discusses the main research areas of research of the mass media communication space of Ukraine for 2003-2015 years.

76. Rauta, V. (2016). Proxy agents, auxiliary forces, and sovereign defection: assessing the outcomes of using non-state actors in civil conflicts. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, *16*(1), 91-111. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2016.1148416

This article interrogates the role of non-state armed actors in the Ukrainian civil conflict. The aim of this article is twofold. First, it seeks to identify the differences between the patterns of military intervention in Crimea (direct, covert intervention), and those in the South-East (mixed direct and indirect - proxy - intervention). It does so by assessing the extent of Russian troop involvement and that of external sponsorship to non-state actors. Second, it puts forward a tentative theoretical framework that allows distinguishing between the different outcomes the two patterns of intervention generate. Here, the focus is on the role of non-state actors in the two interventionist scenarios. The core argument is that the use of non-state actors is aimed at sovereign defection. The article introduces the concept of sovereign defection and defines it as a break-away from an existing state. To capture the differences between the outcomes of the interventions in Crimea and South-East, sovereign defection is classified into two categories: inward and outward. Outward sovereign defection is equated to the territorial seizure of the Crimean Peninsula by Russian Special Forces, aided by existing criminal gangs acting in an auxiliary capacity. Inward sovereign defection refers to the external sponsorship of the secessionist rebels in South-East Ukraine and their use as proxy forces with the purpose of creating a political buffer-zone in the shape of a frozen conflict. To demonstrate these claims, the article analyses the configuration of the dynamics of violence in both regions. It effectively argues that, in pursuing sovereign defection, the auxiliary and proxy forces operate under two competing dynamics of violence, delegative and non-delegative, with distinct implications to the course and future of the conflict.

77. Rechitsky, R. (2016). Global Migration and Extraterritorial Controls: The Case of International Refugee Policy in Ukraine. *International Journal of Sociology*, *46*(3), 169-188. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207659.2016.1163990

Countries of immigration-old and new-have developed a range of methods to control the arrival of potential refugees on their territory. Migration scholars have paid increasing attention to the extraterritorial control of migration by Global North countries beyond their borders, while refugee scholars have investigated the ways in which United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) policies may reproduce the

exclusion in camps within the Global South. However, studies of humanitarian affairs rarely converge with studies of migration control. Using an institutional ethnography of an European Union-led refugee integration initiatives in Ukraine, this case study seeks to bridge this gap, exploring the consequences of the securitization of migration in this recent destination and gateway to Europe. The findings identify the ways in which local nongovernmental organizations and international humanitarian agencies may inadvertently reinforce social exclusion and extraterritorial control through refugee integration policies transposed from Global North to Global South. The article concludes with suggestions for studying the link between securitization and refugee studies, pointing to a sociospatial definition of the Global South.

78. Riabchuk, M. (2016). Ukrainians as Russia's negative 'other': History comes full circle. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, *49*(1), 75-85. **https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2015.12.003**

The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, euphemistically called the "Ukraine crisis," draws attention to its ideological underpinnings that include a historically informed Russian hegemonic view of Ukrainians as "younger brothers" who should be both patronized and censured for improper behavior. The paper examines a particular aspect of this superior attitude as embedded in ethnic stereotypes - both "vernacular", primarily in folklore, and ideologically constructed, in both cultural and political discourses. In both cases, the structure of stereotypes reflects the dominant position of one group and subjugated position of the other within a more general paradigm of relations between Robinson Crusoe and Friday. A peculiar dialectics implies that a "good" Friday can be civilized and assimilated and become almost equal to Crusoe - "almost the same people", in a popular Russian parlance about Ukrainians. Yet, a "bad" ("wrong") Friday should be strongly reviled and thoroughly demonized as a complete evil, manipulated allegedly by hostile ("Western") Robinsons. The paper argues that the Russo-Ukrainian relations cannot be normalized until Russians learn to see Ukrainians as neither "good" nor "bad" but just different - as all the people around. (C) 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The Regents of the University of California.

79. Rieker, P., & Gjerde, K. L. (2016). The EU, Russia and the potential for dialogue - different readings of the crisis in Ukraine. *European Security*, 25(3), 304-325. **https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2016.1186013**

Recent developments in European security have shown the growing need for a better understanding of the security dynamics on the European continent. This article presents an analysis of differing Russian and European perceptions of European security in general, and concerning the crisis in Ukraine in particular. As much of the literature on these issues has been normatively driven, we aim to provide an impartial presentation and analysis of the dominant Russian and EU discourses. This we see as essential for investigating the potential for constructive dialogue between Russia and the EU. If simplistic assumptions about the motivations and intentions of other actors take hold in the public debate and policy analyses, the main actors may be drawn into a logic that is ultimately dangerous or counterproductive. With this article we offer a modest contribution towards discouraging such a development in Russia-EU relations. After presenting an analysis of the differing EU and Russian perceptions, we discuss the potential for dialogue between such different worldviews, and reflect on potential implications for European security. As the article shows, there are tendencies of a certain adjustment in the Union's approach that may make a partial rapprochement between the two sides more likely.

80. Romaniuk, M., & Smutchak, Z. (2016). MIGRATORY THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY OF UKRAINE: CURRENT CHALLENGES AND WAYS OF REGULATION. *Baltic Journal of Economic Studies*, *2*(3), 107-112.

The purpose of the article is to disclose the migratory threats which are connected with external and mass internal inter-regional migrations, which are caused by the annexation of the Crimea and military aggression in Donbas by Russia. Methodological and practical aspects of improving the management of intensive interstate and inter-regional migratory processes, negative consequences of which threaten national security of the country because of hybrid war in Donbas, illegal migration, worsening of the demographic situation, departure of scientists and specialists abroad are described in the article too. The main strategic objective, which consists of maintenance of state sovereignty, territorial integrity of Ukraine, and also integration in European and migratory space, ensuring close to the world standards of quality and length of life, realization of rights and freedoms of citizens, is formulated. Actions and tasks of the state migratory policy, ways and methods of regulation of external migrations of the population are considered. Principal reasons of external migrations of population are identified and analysed. The inwardly-regional, interregional and intergovernmental migrations of population of Ukraine in the years of its state independence (19912014) are analyzed in details. The results of analysis showed that migratory activity goes down on inwardly-regional and interregional levels. Also intensity of exchange of population went down between the regions of country. At the same time Ukraine for years state independence through depopulation processes lost 6,5 million persons, and in the external migratory moving of population of loss made over 1 million persons. The problem of illegal external labour migration is considered. It is noted that illegal migration from Ukraine to the threats to national security in the Law of Ukraine "On the National Security of Ukraine" is not included, and a threat to national security posed by illegal migration from Ukraine state authorities and management of both central

and local underestimated. Attention is accented on that adjusting of migratory processes at the macrolevel must become to the ponderable component of socio-economic policy of the state, and the measures of migratory policy consist of that to obtain organization of migratory space of country and take under effective state control those migratory processes that take place in it. Proposals concerning perspective and effective actions of the state migratory policy of Ukraine in regulating migratory movement of the population from the positions of national priorities and regional peculiarities, and also personal needs of migrants and prevention of migratory threats to national security of Ukraine are formulated. It is determined that the decisive role in the regulation of labour migration processes, as a whole in Ukraine and its regions, belonging to the management of social-economic factors, such as living conditions and employment of people who can change as a result of redistribution of the state budget, wage-fund, public forms of consumption.

81. Rushchenko, J. (2016). FAR BEHIND THE FRONTLINE: HYBRID WARFARE AND TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT. *Criminal Justice and Security in Central and Eastern Europe: Safety, Security, and Social Control in Local Communities*, 292-299.

Purpose: Russia's aggression in Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia has recently sparked many debates regarding geopolitical norms, security threats in Eastern Europe, and techniques of non-linear warfare that include disruption of electronic systems. Besides foreign state-sponsored terrorism in Ukraine carried out by the irregular non-state groups in the conflict zone, one should take into consideration other techniques of hybrid warfare such as attacks outside the frontline. Methods: In this paper the author analyses 99 incidents that took place in Ukraine from February 2014 to May 2016 focusing on the following aspects: time, location, target, weapon and the level of casualties. Findings: The author argues that the "low-intensity" terrorist attacks were aimed at spreading chaos, cracking down on the volunteer movement and destabilizing the political situation in southeast Ukraine. Research limitations: Not all information was available in the mass media about the terrorist attacks that took place from February 2014 to May 2016. Furthermore, this study did not take into consideration the attempted attacks. Future research will aim at examining police reports, including attempted terrorist attacks. Originality: The analysis demonstrates how terrorist attacks could be used as a weapon of non-linear warfare alongside other methods of irregular political influence.

82. Schmidt-Felzmann, A. (2016). After the war in Ukraine: peace building and reconciliation in spite of the external aggressor. *International Crisis Management: Nato, Eu, Osce and Civil Society: Collected Essays on Best Practices and Lessons Learned*, *127*, 151-161. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-641-5-151

The obstacles to sustainable peace building in Ukraine are enormous. The conflict scenario is problematic as it combines elements of traditional interstate warfare with an intra-state conflict, while at the same time complex domestic challenges have to be overcome. This contribution discusses how and under what conditions conflict transformation and lasting peace in Ukraine can be achieved. It focuses on the challenges posed by asymmetric cyber and information warfare, and on the difficulties of promoting change under conditions of occupation and armed aggression. Divisions within society, both in Ukraine and within the international community, weaken the capacities of domestic and international actors to promote peace in Ukraine in spite of the external aggressor.

83. Schneckener, U. (2016). Hybrid war in times of geopolitics? On the interpretation and characterization of the Donbass conflict. *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, *57*(4), 586-613. https://doi.org/10.5771/0032-3470-2016-4-586

The interpretation of the Donbass conflict is highly controversial not only in Ukraine, but also among external observers. Two theses are represented particularly prominent: First, the conflict is characterized as a prime example of a "hybrid war"; secondly, based on the perspective of geopolitics, the war is interpreted as the result of competitive, hegemonic claims of the West and Russia. However, both theories operate with a steering and control imperative which reduces the role of local actors and their agendas to dependent variables of great powers. By contrast, the article advocates for a conflict-sociological approach which clearly shows that external actors to a much greater extent are driven by local conflict dynamics than both theses would admit.

84. Shapiro, J. (2016). Russian Hybrid Warfare: Not New, Well-Accomplished, and Limited in Scope. *Countering Hybrid Threats: Lessons Learned from Ukraine*, *128*, 166-174. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-651-4-166

Hybrid warfare is actually nothing new, despite the fact that observers were initially surprised at the coordinated and disciplined political-military approach that encompassed Russia's forays in Crimea in 2014. The year before, General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, noted in an article that, "Methods used in struggle are increasingly changing in favor of political, economic, information, humanitarian and other non-military means, including the use of the protest potential of the population." Russia's "hybrid" warfare is thus a mixture of unconventional acts (initially) short of war, secret operations backed by military force, and a major information warfare campaign, that also includes a cyber-warfare aspect. This approach will only work well in specific areas of the near abroad where ethnic Russians,

or possible proxies, live. It also worked best in specific Ukrainian conditions (a new, paralyzed and confused government without a clear mandate) that will likely not be reproduced elsewhere. The Baltic States and the EU are quite aware of the danger as is NATO, which is constantly exercising in the Baltics. A key issue is how would NATO recognize an ambiguous "hybrid" attack that would require an Article V response? Russia continues to wage a massive propaganda and information warfare campaign with the ultimate goal of undermining NATO and the EU by creating a pro-Russian narrative and even political change. This the part of hybrid warfare that will not easily disappear: it has been part of Russian thinking for over 40 years.

85. Socor, V. (2016). Conserved Conflict: Russia's Pattern in Ukraine's East. *Countering Hybrid Threats: Lessons Learned from Ukraine*, *128*, 187-192. **https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-651-4-187**

Mr. Vladimir Socor, Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, participated to the NATO Advanced Research Workshop, Countering Hybrid Threats: Lessons Learned from Ukraine, organized in Bucharest on September 2819, 2015, approaching in his speach the characteristics and the major political and military innovations of Russia's military intervention in Ukraine's East. In his spech he challenged the importance of non-military and unconventional means by arguing that Russia achieved its significant gains in Ukraine only by the application of large-scale, old-style military force. He concluded that Russia's conflict undertaking in Ukraine's East fits within patterns familiar from other post-Soviet conflicts, initiated by Russia and conserved on Russian terms with international assistance. However, Russia's war in Ukraine's East involves a number of major political and military innovations in terms of conflict-conservation. His ideas were translated into a written paper and the first form was puplished on-line in the article Conserved Conflict: Russia's Pattern in Ukraine's East 2 from 'Eurasia Daily Monitor'.

86. Strasheim, J. (2016). Power-sharing, commitment problems, and armed conflict in Ukraine. *Civil Wars*, *18*(1), 25-44. **https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2016.1144494**

Why did the Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution initiate a peaceful democratic transition, while the 2014 protests were followed by violent conflict? This article complements previous studies on Russia's role in Ukraine by focusing on domestic explanations of the recent violence. It shows that structural factors were already conducive to violence in 2004, making it fruitful to analyse the role of agency to explain the 2014 conflict. It demonstrates that while the 2004 transition introduced power-sharing guarantees that mitigated commitment problems for the relevant parties, the 2014 transition saw no such guarantees, making violence a rational strategy for the pro-Russian separatists.

87. Sweet, J. (2016). Political Invasions into Collective Memories: Russia. *International Journal of Communication*, *10*, 4512-4531.

This article analyzes the political manipulations of Vladimir Putin's regime using the collective memory of World War II to undermine protest potential within Russian society in 2013-2015. In light of the unfolding Ukrainian protests against former president Viktor Yanukovych's rule, Putin's government has launched a massive propaganda campaign presenting the Ukrainian political resistance as a neofascist initiative. Given the close relationship between Russia and Ukraine and Putin's low rating at the beginning of 2013, the political changes in Ukraine could provoke a similar public response and inspire anti-Putin insurgencies. The Russian media has established a strong correlation between fascist war crimes committed during World War II and the activities of protesters, thus trying to manipulate the Russian collective memory. Emphasizing the negative experience while repressing positive memories, media outlets have selectively presented historical events and facts in order to establish a negative image of the situation in modern Ukraine. Whereas propaganda associates Putin with war winners and the Soviet legacy, Ukrainian protesters are depicted as the ancestors of the defeated Nazi regime.

88. Teodor, M., & Teodor, B. A. (2016). Cyber Threats in Hybrid Warfare: the Ukrainian Case. *Countering Hybrid Threats: Lessons Learned from Ukraine*, *128*, 148-153.   **https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-651-4-148**

October is the European Cyber Security Month (ECSM), a European Union advocacy campaign which aims to promote cyber security among citizens, to change their perception of cyber-threats and provide up to date security information, through education and sharing good practices. In this respect we may contribute to the EU's campaign with a research paper on cyber threats. The year 2014 has brought big news, significant changes and remarkable successes in the cyber-threat landscape. Experts and media correspondents have stated that the crisis in Ukraine was the largest cyber-war battlefield since Russia's cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008. The aim of this study is to analyze the use of cyber threats in the wider context of hybrid warfare, with focus on the Ukrainian case, in order to emphasize the lessons learned and the importance of cooperation in cyber security and defence area.

89. Troncota, M. (2016). THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE 'NEW WAR' FROM ITS EASTERN BORDERS. *Eastern Partnership under Strain - Time for a Rethink? (Eurint 2016)*, **54-78.**

There is enough evidence to claim that since 2014 a new type of war is waged in Ukraine, which is novel in terms of methods, strategies, tactics, and level of human sacrifice. It is an ongoing discussion between experts, scholars and policy makers whether the Ukrainian crisis showed the limits of the European Union's (EU) approach to conflict resolution, or, on the contrary, it served as a chance to redesign its approach towards its neighbourhoods and refine its instruments in order to more efficiently contain conflicts under the leadership of Federica Mogherini. The aim of the article is to identify the characteristics of the 'New War' paradigm in the context of recent political developments after the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing open conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The purpose of this paper is to reveal both the conceptual clarity of this theoretical paradigm, against its critics, but also to emphasise its policy importance for strengthening EU conflict resolution strategies. The article also points to the fact that after the wide process of reviewing the European Security Strategy conducted between 2015 and 2016, the EEAS finally launched a new approach in dealing with EU troubled neighbourhoods, which contains numerous elements borrowed from the 'new war' paradigm and the concept of human security.

90. Tuohy, E. (2016). NATO and its Conflict Management Toolbox. *International Crisis Management: Nato, Eu, Osce and Civil Society: Collected Essays on Best Practices and Lessons Learned, 127,* **54-65. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-641-5-54**

Originally designed as a strictly defensive military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's role has evolved and broadened in the years since the Cold War. This chapter first reviews the history of NATO's understanding of conflict resolution and conflict management (CR/M), analyzing how the Alliance's strategic conception of its non-collective-defense functions has evolved from a vague awareness of the threats arising from phenomena such as state collapse into a fully comprehensive doctrine. It then discusses the items in NATO's expansive conflict management toolbox, one that includes a comprehensive range of political, civilian, and military measures as well as effective coordination procedures. Finally, it focuses on Ukraine as an example of what NATO can - and cannot - do during the different phases of the modern conflict cycle, reviews the Alliance's contributions to Ukrainian security sector reform, and concludes that political will is the essential ingredient in any successful CR/M effort.

91. Tyushka, A. (2016). *FROM A 'HYBRID WAR' TO A 'HYBRID PEACE'? IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIAN IRREGULAR WARFARE IN UKRAINE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.*

Concluded anew on 11 February 2015 to lay an end to the so far greatest challenge for the post-cold war European security order, the Minsk accord ('Minsk II') has showed, with its very initial stage of a rather non-committed implementation, that the solution to a problem, which itself has not been properly defined, may well breed hybrid and ambiguous effects in the end. Deployment and extension, since March 2014, of the specter of 'hybrid warfare' methods in Ukraine not only provides for tactical success of Russian foreign policy in this realm, but also proves lacking readiness of the European and international communities to respond to a security threat that considerably extends beyond the borders of the Ukrainian nation-state. Since the annexation of Crimea, these threats are encapsulated by essentially dishonesty and distrust, insecurity and uncertainty that prevail in European and international security perceptions. What becomes certain, however, is the understanding that hybrid warfare can hardly end with anything but a hybrid outcome – a 'hybrid peace'. Hybrid peace presents an idea that is not really new to the world that has survived the 'cold peace' and 'cold war' eras, but it challenges the current order in a far more brutal, miserable, complicated and 'sophisticated' way.

92. Wilson, A. (2016). The Donbas in 2014: Explaining Civil Conflict Perhaps, but not Civil War. *Europe-Asia Studies, 68*(4), **631-652. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1176994**

This essay argues that historical and identity factors, economic fears and alienation from the new government in Kyiv were only part of the reason for the rise of the separatist movement in the Donbas, Ukraine, in the spring of 2014. They set a baseline, but one not high enough to account for the creation of two mini-Republics' and a prolonged war, without considering the effect of Russian sponsorship and the role of local elites, mainly from the literal and metaphorical Family' of former President Viktor Yanukovych.

2017

1. Allison, R. (2017). Russia and the post-2014 international legal order: revisionism and realpolitik. *International Affairs, 93*(3), **519-+. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix061**

Russia's annexation of Crimea and military intervention in eastern Ukraine, as well as Moscow's claims around these acts, challenge the post-Cold War territorial settlement and its underlying international legal principles. Unlike previous controversies over western-led interventions, a major power has used force to expand its territorial sphere. Russia's actions contradict its traditional focus on UN Charter principles and sovereignty in the wider international system. This article questions whether Russia has a serious agenda to

gain support for revised understandings of international law, at least as applied to what it views as a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region of entitlements. Or is Russia driven more by realpolitik, whereby legal discourse contributes to a strategic effort to force changes in the European territorial order, in the first instance in its direct neighbourhood? These uncertainties are contrasted to Russia's single-minded narrative on the threat of regime change. Moscow uses the spectre of `colour revolutions' to influence a variety of states in the wider international system. Overall, so far Russia has failed to shift legal understandings in its favour over Crimea/Ukraine. Yet it continues to view the CIS states as only partly sovereign, as located in a zone of exception. Moscow seems intent on changing the European security and territorial order in its favour, regardless of the language of legal principles it deploys in its wider international diplomacy.

2. Altman, D. (2017). By Fait Accompli, Not Coercion: How States Wrest Territory from Their Adversaries. *International Studies Quarterly*, *61*(4), 881-891. **https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx049**

In February 2014, Russia decided to wrest the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine. Moscow could have threatened to attack Ukraine if Kiev failed to relinquish Crimea. However, Russia did not attempt coercion. Russia unilaterally occupied and annexed the territory, gambling that it could take Crimea without provoking war. This alternative strategy-the fait accompli-receives little scholarly attention. At issue is a fundamental question of statecraft in international politics: How do states make gains? By coercion or by fait accompli? Territorial acquisitions offer the best single-issue domain within which to address this question. Using new data on all "land grabs" since 1918, this research note documents a stark discrepancy. From 1918 to 2016, 112 land grabs seized territory by fait accompli. In that same span, only thirteen publicly declared coercive threats elicited cessions of territory. This fact suggests that the fait accompli deserves a larger role in the field's thinking about strategy and statecraft on the brink of war. It carries with it important implications for canonical theories of war that rely on assumptions about coercive bargaining during crises.

3. Anna, Z. (2017). China's Stance on the Ukrainian Crisis in the International Arena. *2017 2nd Ssr International Conference on Social Sciences and Information (Ssr-Ssi 2017)*, *17*, 3-9. **https://doi.org/10.26602/asbs.2017.17.3**

As one of the most serious geopolitical crises since the end of the Cold War, the Ukrainian crisis has an impact on many countries. Being the world leader, China's position in this problem is quite significant. So, in this study I intend to analyze China's relations with Russia, the West (the USA and Europe) and mostly Ukraine, taking into consideration the stragetic benefits that China can acquire. This study also underlines China's position in the Ukrainian << Euromaidan >> crisis, Crimea and war in the South-Eastern part of Ukraine. Crisis in Ukraine brought new dynamics into China's relations with Russia, and as it occupied a special place in China's foreign policy for many years, I aim to answer the question, whether Chinese leaders are recalibrating their strategy to support Vladimir Putin's approach in Ukrainian conflict or not. Having direct influence in the international arena, China also became one of the pieces of this complex puzzle, so it is important to understand China's stance in Ukrainian crisis.

4. Bagno-Moldavski, O. (2017). Media, politics, and Jewish migration from East Europe amid the military crisis in Ukraine, 2014-2015. *East European Jewish Affairs*, *47*(2-3), 255-274. **https://doi.org/10.1080/13501674.2017.1403184**

Over the course of the ongoing war in Ukraine, the identity of the global Russian-speaking Jewish community was put to the test. The conflict in Ukraine marked the first time in the history of Russian-speaking Jews that every expression, blog or Twitter post, and opinion article were recorded on the World Wide Web. This readily available data enables us to reconstruct the information climate that surrounded Russian-speaking Jews. The present article explores the sway of this climate on the political discourse of Jewish elites in Ukraine, Russia, and Jewish Russian-speaking diasporas between 2014 and 2015. Our findings suggest that identities of these groups are multilayered, but not hierarchical. Moreover, the elites' common ethno-cultural Jewish identity coexists with distinct political affiliations. The allegiance of minorities to host societies is a well-known phenomenon. However, its mechanisms have yet to command sufficient research interest. Is it fear, prudence, genuine attachment to the country of residence, or other factors that stand behind the minorities' commitment? This paper fuses thematic maps with content analysis to show that the infosphere is a key to understanding the position of Jews toward host regimes and their co-ethnics in other nation-states.

5. Bingol, O. (2017). Hybrid War and Its Strategic Implications to Turkey. *Gazi Akademik Bakis-Gazi Academic View*, *11*(21), 107-132.

Discussions on the hybrid threats and hybrid wars have begun to gain interest among the security communities around the world since 2000s, and exponentially increased after Russian-Ukraine conflict in 2014. The political and military conflict between Russia and Turkey since November 2015 has carried the discussion to Turkey. Now it is believed that Turkey is in fact in a multi-front hybrid war with some of its neighbors but not just Russia. In this article it is aimed to fully explore hybrid war concept and its strategic implications to Turkey. The definitions of hybrid threat, hybrid conflict and hybrid war is considered in the first section. Then Russian hybrid war concept is discussed. Next, features and consequences of hybrid war are

applied to Turkey in order to identify the strategic implications. Finally, recommendations are made as to a way ahead for Turkish decision makers with respect to fighting hybrid war.

6. Boyd-Barrett, O. (2017). Ukraine, Mainstream Media and Conflict Propaganda. *Journalism Studies*, *18*(8), 1016-1034. **https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670x.2015.1099461**

In several recent cases of actual or attempted regime change, Western governments alleged their opponents' possession of weapons of mass destruction as pretexts for war. Many such allegations are now known to have been false or exaggerated. The Ukraine crisis (since 2013) is arguably of a different order of concern, since it has invoked the participation, in one sense or another, of the United States, the European Union and Russia, each of which possesses abundant nuclear weapons capacity. Can Western consumers of mainstream media news, potentially now more informed of the failures of mainstream media to exercise due caution in the face of their own governments' propaganda, reasonably expect superior future performance? This paper finds little basis for optimism. Drawing from a broader work that monitors mainstream and alternative media, the study identifies 10 key narratives that together forge the battlefield for information warfare between nuclear powers and, with particular respect to mainstream, Western media coverage, the problematic beliefs, assumptions and presumptions that these media invite their audiences to ingest. One of the narratives is considered in detail: the events that took place in Crimea, Odessa and Eastern Ukraine between February and October 2014.

7. Boyte, K. J. (2017). A Comparative Analysis of the Cyberattacks Against Estonia, the United States, and Ukraine: Exemplifying the Evolution of Internet-Supported Warfare. *International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism*, *7*(2), 54-69. **https://doi.org/10.4018/ijcwt.2017040104**

This comparative international case study of cyber warfare provides a context for considering the evolution of cyber technologies as elements of hybrid warfare capable of creating confusion, disrupting communications, and impacting physical infrastructure (such as power grids and satellite-based communications and weapons systems). Expanding an unpublished paper recognized by the ASIS Foundation in its 2012 international student writing competition concerning global security, which compared the cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007 and the United States in 2012, this study re-examines and updates the original data in a broader analysis that primarily includes the cyberattacks against Ukraine during the 2013-2015 conflict, but also considers other incidents on the timeline of digitization. The study shows how cyber warfare, first reported in the 1990s, has become an integral component of war today for both state and non-state actors who use zombies and robot armies to penetrate national boundaries and firewalls via satellites.

8. Carlsson, A., Gustavsson, R., & Ieee. (2017). The Art of War in the Cyber World. *2017 4th International Scientific-Practical Conference Problems of Infocommunications-Science and Technology (Pic S&T)*, 42-44.

The paper focus on cyber weapons used in Advanced Persistent Threat (ATP) attacks in present and future cyber warfare. The combined use of propaganda and cyber warfare supports military operations on the ground and is exemplified with the ongoing Russian hybrid warfare in Ukraine. New models and methods to develop future trustworthy critical infrastructures in our societies are presented. Some mitigation ideas to meet the challenges of future hybrid warfare are also discussed.

9. Chaisty, P., & Whitefield, S. (2017). Citizens' Attitudes towards Institutional Change in Contexts of Political Turbulence: Support for Regional Decentralisation in Ukraine. *Political Studies*, *65*(4), 824-843. **https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321716684845**

Most studies of public opinion regarding constitutional change focus on winners' and losers' in consolidated democracies, but in comparative terms most institutional change takes place in unstable political contexts. We contend that mass preferences towards institutional choices are likely to differ significantly in turbulent contexts as compared to stable polities. In this article, we consider the issue of public preferences towards proposals for regional decentralisation in the context of post-Soviet Ukraine, a society that has been in the throes of political change for the last decade. Using surveys conducted in war-torn Ukraine in 2014, we find that under conditions of political uncertainty, the institutional preferences of citizens are connected to group identities and ideological orientations rather than instrumental concerns.

10. Cheberyako, O. V., & Varnalii, Z. S. (2017). FINANCIAL PREREQUISITES AND ASSESSMENT OF DEFENSE UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN HYBRID WAR. *Scientific Bulletin of Polissia*(4), 143-149. **https://doi.org/10.25140/2410-9576-2017-1-4(12)-143-149**

Urgency of the research. Today, humanity faces the challenge of hybrid wars - not only military aggression, but also the confrontation of financial systems. Russia's aggression against Ukraine is a starting point for the formation of the hybrid universe and violates the financial and territorial stability, causing devastating consequences for the economy. Target setting. On the eve of the developmen of the hybrid war, Ukraine was on the brink of a deep economic crisis, and defense financing was carried out on the principle of

minimum sufficiency. Actual scientific researches and issues analysis. In general, studies of "hybrid wars", or as they are also called "transformational wars", "mixed wars", "multidimensional wars", "unconventional wars", "non-standard wars", were engaged by such Ukrainian and foreign scholars as Antonov A., Gilov A. ("multidimensional or hybrid war"), Glen R. ("hybrid conflict", "hybrid war"), Golovchenko V., Gorbulin V., Doroshko M., Illarionov A. ("unconventional war ","non-standard war"), Klymenko S., Kreveld M., Magda E. ("transformational war "), Surkov V. ("nonlinear war"), Hoffman F. ("mixed war") and others. Selection of unexplored parts of the general problem. The essence of the modern interstate confrontation, its financial prerequisite for achievement of the corresponding political and economic goals goals is insufficiently research. The research objective. Temporal occupation by Russia of part of the territory of Ukraine and the destruction of the system of world and regional security, the principles of the international law, led to the revision and clarification of the doctrinal provisions regarding to the formation and implementation of the national security policy of Ukraine and the amount of defense financing in accordance with the new Military Doctrine.. The statement of basic materials. The necessity of a rapid increase in defense expenditures through the Russian hybrid war against Ukraine in order to maintain real independence and not to become a de facto Russian satellite. Conclusions. The state of the national economy is one of the determining factors on which the amount of defense financing depends. The lack of readiness of the Armed Forces in the beginning of the hybrid war to resist the enemy is a result of chronic underfunding for decades.

11. Chkhaidze, E. K. (2017). SOVIET SPLINTERS: NATIONAL DISCOURSE AND ITS ROLE IN POST-SOVIET "DECOLONIZATION". *Imagologiya I Komparativistika-Imagology and Comparative Studies*(8), 190-213. **https://doi.org/10.17223/24099554/8/10**

Soviet cultural and political space was represented as a mosaic fastened with ideology of "friendship of peoples". In the period of Glasnost' the mosaic broke against the freedom of speech. The double ideological standards existing in the Soviet time and covered with a mask of "friendship of peoples" were opened. In the last years of the Soviet Union there appeared texts that were a clear demonstration of the broken-up "harmony". During the first post-Soviet decade national discourse became main in the Russian literature. The most discussed were questions which had not been discussed earlier, or reflections in books had other forms, for example: the national question or the topic of Others (A. Bitov, V. Astaf'ev, N. Boyko, Yu. Khabibulin, E. Odinokova, V. Morozov, V. Peredelskiy, O. Larin, N. Pchelin). In the article the author researches two fields of reflection in contemporary Russian literature: (1) reflection on the friendly relations between the peoples of the former USSR and (2) the tendency of release / "decolonization" from the models of international relations imposed by the Soviet ideology of "friendship of peoples". Reflection of a negative attitude towards people of other nationalities served as the release and formation of a new sovereign. It is important that not only the "periphery" aspired to independence, but the "metropolis" also wanted to be freed from its past roles. The Russian writers describe post-Soviet wars and anti-Russian demonstrations in Ukraine, Georgia and in the Baltic states. Conversely, they describe cases of aggressive attitude to non-Russians in Russia. Thus is formed the new image of the enemy: for Russians it is the former peoples of the USSR, and for non-Russians it is Russians. The author has identified some ways of "decolonization" / release from the old relations: criticism because of historical injustice, criticism of not knowing the language, criticism because of external differences. Examples of texts are given for each of the ways. The analysis of the new texts has helped to track two post-Soviet tendencies in Russian literature: the theme of nationalism and the theme of confusion between the memories of old friendship and the reality of the new time.

12. Cimbala, S. J. (2017). Putin and Russia in retro and forward: the nuclear dimension. *Defence and Security Analysis*, *33*(1), 57-67. **https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2017.1289636**

Deterioration in security relations as between NATO and Russia reached boiling point in the aftermath of Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its subsequent destabilization of Eastern Ukraine. As a result, some voices in the West look forward to the departure of Vladimir Putin from power, and others to the possible disintegration of Russia as a unitary state. However, both the departure of Putin and the collapse of Russia have a nuclear dimension. Putin has issued pointed reminders of Russia's status as a nuclear great power, and Russian military doctrine allows for nuclear first use in the event of a conventional war with extremely high stakes. Beyond Putin, a breakup of Russia would leave political chaos in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and elsewhere, inviting ambiguous command and control over formerly Russian nuclear forces.

13. Cimbala, S. J., & Forster, P. K. (2017). The US NATO and military burden sharing: post-Cold War accomplishments and future prospects. *Defence and Security Analysis*, *33*(2), 115-130. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2017.1302575

NATO burden sharing has become an especially timely issue in the past several years as a result of a number of factors, including Russian annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine in 2014. This article argues that alliance unity among the great democracies of Europe and North America is indispensable to peace and stability on the Eurasian continent. A fractured NATO, and especially, a large divide in purposes or commitments as between the United States and its European security partners, invites aggression and the possibility of inadvertent escalation. Past successes and failures in US-involved

multinational peace and stability operations, within and outside of Europe, show that mission accomplishment requires give and take, including the occasional acceptance of unequal costs and benefits among the members, in order to achieve peace and security objectives.

14. Darden, K. A. (2017). Russian Revanche: External Threats & Regime Reactions. *Daedalus*, *146*(2), 128-141. https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00440

Has the development of post-Soviet Russia in an international system dominated by a democracy-promoting United States bred an authoritarian reaction in Russia as a response to perceived threats from the West? Beginning with the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, Russian elites have increasingly seen the United States as a distinctively threatening power, one with a strategy to exploit civic organizations, ethnic groups, and other forms of domestic pluralism as fifth columns in an effort to overthrow unfriendly regimes. With each new crisis in U.S.-Russian relations - Ukraine 2004, Georgia 2008, Ukraine 2014 - the Russian leadership has tightened controls over society, the press, and the state. The result is that the United States' muscular promotion of democracy abroad has produced the opposite of its intended effect on Russia, leading successive Russian governments to balance the perceived threat from the United States by pursuing greater military and intelligence capacity to intervene abroad, and by tightening internal authoritarian controls at home to prevent foreign exploitation of the nascent internal pluralism that emerged in the wake of Communism.

15. Dembinski, M., & Spanger, H. J. (2017). Plural Peace Guiding Principles for a New Russia Policy. *Osteuropa*, *67*(3-4), 87-+.

Since the annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine, relations between Russia and the West have been deeply confrontational. New approaches must be taken in order to avoid a military escalation and guarantee security in Europe. The West should abandon its strategy of "liberal peace", which since 1990 has focused on an adaptation by Russia to the liberal norms of the West and its integration into Western institutions. Instead, we promote the guiding principle of "plural peace". We see the way forward as being peace through dissociation. The normative differences with Russia should be acknowledged. A clear delineation is a precondition for creating a new basis for stable cooperation. This entails providing Russia with plausible assurance that Ukraine and other states in the region will not be allowed to join the EU or NATO.

16. Duke, S., & Gebhard, C. (2017). The EU and NATO's dilemmas with Russia and the prospects for deconfliction. *European Security*, *26*(3), 379-397. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2017.1352577

Events in Ukraine have rekindled discussions about NATO's post-Cold War purpose and the way it relates to the EU. Through EU sanctions and a traditional military response from NATO, the West has manoeuvred itself into a paradoxical situation where every step it takes to reassure its Eastern allies increases rather than diffuses tensions with Russia. On the one hand, it seems that decades of carefully crafted strategic narratives of de-escalation are now in limbo. On the other, it might have indeed been the sustained attempt to create a liberal post-Cold War order that produced an "integration dilemma", and ultimately drove Russia to the defensive realist logic of a Waltzian "security dilemma". We argue that NATO's reaction might have been based on a stylised threat and historical resentments rather than on a carefully calculated risk. Looking beyond the EU and NATO's recent strategic choices, we argue that the situation can only be resolved by re-engaging Russia in a renewed de-escalatory dialogue that involves both the EU and NATO with a greater emphasis on the nuanced, but important, distinctions between the integration and security dilemmas.

17. Edenborg, E. (2017). Creativity, geopolitics and ontological security: satire on Russia and the war in Ukraine. *Postcolonial Studies*, *20*(3), 294-316. https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790.2017.1378086

Some states create geographical imaginaries that envision the homeland as coherent and good, and the spaces of Others as disordered, dangerous and therefore legitimate objects of violence. Such 'violent cartographies' serve not only to justify policy actions, but constitute bordering practices aiming to provide stability, integrity and continuity to the Self, sometimes referred to as 'ontological security'. This article examines the role of creativity and artistic imagination in challenging dominant geopolitical narratives. It examines satire on the Russian-language internet, which played upon the Russian state's geopolitical narrative about the war in Ukraine 2014-15. Three themes within this dominant narrative - (1) the imperialist idea of Russia as a modernising force, (2) the gendering of Ukraine as feminine and Europe as homosexual and (3) the idea that the current war was a re-enactment of Russia's historical battle against fascism - all became the object of fun-making in satire. I argue that satire, by appropriating, repeating but slightly displacing official rhetoric in ways that make it appear ridiculous, may destabilise dominant narratives of ontological security and challenge their strive towards closure. Satire may expose the silences of dominant narratives and undermine the essentialism and binarism upon which they rely, opening up for estrangement and disidentification.

18. Elsner, R. (2017). Restricted power resource The Russian Orthodox Church in Russia's foreign policy. *Osteuropa*, *67*(9-10), 205-+.

Since Russia's political leadership performed a nationalist-patriotic U-turn in 2012, the Russian Orthodox Church appears to have gained influence as a power factor. References to "traditional values" and religious rhetoric are used by the leadership to mobilise the population and legitimise its hold on power. However, with regard to foreign policy, the Church is of limited use as a power resource. The multinational nature of the Church, the plurality in Orthodoxy and its specific international interests are not identical with the goals of Russian foreign policy. This is reflected in the separate course taken by the Russian Orthodox Church in relation to Ukraine since the Russian annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine.

19. Ennker, B. (2017). Russia's new foreign policy, The Internal preconditions, 2011-2013. *Osteuropa*, *67*(9-10), 89-+.

The annexation of Crimea and the war against Ukraine are an indication that Russia's political leadership is pursuing imperialist power politics. Politically, this has been in the making for some time. Paradoxically, the change of course began while Medvedev was president, when Putin, then Prime Minister, introduced a different strategy. As a result of the realignment of competences, the appointment of anti liberal forces to positions of power and the promotion of national-imperialist and power state worldviews, he undermined the "liberal experiment" even while it was officially still being pursued. Instead of socio-economic modernisation of the country with the aid of the West, the militarisation of the economy and society turned against the West and the "liberal world". This changed power relationship within the Russian elite is one of the main reasons for the change of course in domestic and foreign policy.

20. Faraldo, J. M. (2017). Ukraine, Russia and the "Maidan Revolution": The historical myth of antifascism. *Ayer*(106), 309-321.

This article explains some aspects of the origin of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict since 2014 by concentrating" on the characteristics of the political identity of the Soviet anti-fascism, and its persistence and reuse by the Russian Federation and certain groups in East Ukraine. It shows how key elements of Soviet historical memory were marshaled to endorse the outbreak of war, and also examines the transformation of Ukrainian historical myths in the wake of the Russian intervention.

21. del Cid, A. T. G. (2017). The Keys to the Conflict between Russia and the West after Crimea and the Conflict with Ukraine. *Foro Internacional*, *57*(2), 356-+.

At the start of 2013 a process was observed indicating a wide-ranging geopolitical change in direction in Europe that began with the repositioning of Russia as a regional power, and with the weakening of the presence of the United States on the continent, having been immersed in military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq since the early 2000s. In addition, Germany had moved closer to Russia. This new strategy on the part of Russia has changed the traditional Cold War geopolitics in Europe, moving it closer to Germany on the basis of German consumption of Russian energy, meaning that it is increasingly evident that the unipolar order of global power is giving way to a multi-polar order. This process, however, cannot take place without conflict, since the appearance of new international actors deprives the established powers of agency, which are accustomed to unconditional leadership. The events currently taking place in Ukraine are inscribed within this geopolitical standpoint.

22. Gebauer, F., Raab, M. H., & Carbon, C. C. (2017). Imagine All the Forces The Impact of Threatening News Coverage on the Willingness to Militarily Engage in the Resurgence of the East Versus West Conflict. *Journal of Media Psychology-Theories Methods and Applications*, *29*(2), 102-108. https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-1105/a000180

A world divided into East versus West: The so-called Ukraine crisis has once more summoned outdated patterns of political thinking. Simultaneously, media discourses have flared up debating diplomatic and military solutions as possible policy responses. A majority of Germans, however, have remained hesitant to advocate any escalation of military conflict. We were interested in how far reputable journalism concerning the Ukraine crisis might activate a disposition toward military engagement. To evaluate the supposed impact of actual news coverage, we used explicit existential threats (mortality salience; MS) as a comparative measure. Typical effects of MS were derived from terror management theory (TMT), which predicts that the awareness of existential threats amplifies the efforts to defend one's own culture, even by military means. We used a 2 x 2 factorial design (N = 112) with the factors article (original bellicose vs. neutral, nonmilitant depiction) and salience condition (MS vs. control). Results revealed a strong impact of the original, bellicose article, with increased willingness to deploy German forces at the Russian border, independently of the salience condition. Additional existential threats did not add further effects, as values for willingness were already very high. Classic effects regarding TMT were observed when people had read the Non-Militant article. Here, the willingness to deploy forces only increased after a confrontation with existential threats. We conclude that threatening news coverage on the Ukraine crisis has the ability to alter willingness for first-step military action at the Russian border by inducing effects that are - at least in their outcome - comparable to explicit existential threats.

23. German, T. (2017). NATO and the enlargement debate: enhancing Euro-Atlantic security or inciting confrontation? *International Affairs*, *93*(2), 291-+. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix017

The enlargements of the post-Cold War era have undermined NATO's stated objectives vis-a-vis the purpose of incorporating new members and exposed tensions within the alliance over the twin pillars of the 1967 Harmel Report, namely deterrence and dialogue. NATO's stance on enlargement has not only undermined Euro-Atlantic security and triggered new divisions between East and West, it has also exposed aspirant states, particularly those in the post-Soviet space, to sustained pressure and coercion from Moscow. This article examines the rationale for NATO enlargement in the post-Cold War era, focusing on the two post-Soviet aspirant states, Georgia and Ukraine. While these two states contribute, as partners, to the alliance's efforts to advance cooperative security, the issue of their prospective membership threatens to undermine alliance security and cohesion, and their ambitions are therefore unlikely to be realized in the foreseeable future. With Russia taking an increasingly assertive stance on the global stage and uncertainty surrounding the direction of US foreign policy under the presidency of Donald Trump, the issue of NATO enlargement is unlikely to be a priority for the alliance over the next few years. If NATO ultimately rejects any prospect of membership for states in the post-Soviet space, they could be abandoned to Russian influence, indicating that Moscow has a de facto veto over membership of the alliance and conceding spheres of influence to Russia.

24. Gotz, E. (2017). Putin, the State, and War: The Causes of Russia's Near Abroad Assertion Revisited. *International Studies Review*, *19*(2), 228-253. https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viw009

Moscow's annexation of Crimea and meddling in eastern Ukraine are the latest signs of Russia's increasingly assertive behavior in the post-Soviet space. Not surprisingly, Moscow's actions have become the source of much debate. This article maps the fast-growing literature on the subject and assesses four types of explanations: (1) decision-maker explanations focusing on Putin's personality traits and worldviews; (2) domestic political accounts emphasizing the Kremlin's efforts to deflect attention from internal failures; (3) ideational accounts explaining Russia's near abroad assertion with reference to its national identity and desire for international status; and (4) geopolitical accounts highlighting power and security considerations. The article shows that each approach offers some valuable insights but fails to provide a convincing stand-alone explanation. It is argued that to overcome the identified shortcomings, scholars need to devote more attention to building synthetic accounts. A theoretical model is outlined that specifies how geopolitical pressures, ideas, domestic political conditions, and decision-maker influences interact in shaping Russia's near abroad policy.

25. Huterer, M. (2017). Security with and against Russia Comments on a current debate. *Osteuropa*, *67*(9-10), 109-+.

Since Russia's annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine, relations between the West and Russia have been in deep crisis. The dual strategy of "as much containment and deterrence as necessary, as much cooperation and dialogue as possible" offers an orientation for future policy towards Russia. NATO and the EU need security with and against Russia. The goal must be to again obligate Russia to comply with a rules-based security policy and conventional and nuclear disarmament. The West should be prepared to conduct a dialogue on a cooperative security policy and conventional and nuclear disarmament in order to generate trust and prevent an uncontrollable escalation dynamic. One key issue remains how security and stability should be organised in the region between the EU and Russia. Providing formal assurance to Moscow that there is no intention of absorbing Ukraine and the other states in the region into the EU or. NATO would send a false signal. A normalisation of the relationship with Russia will not be possible without a clear deescalation of the Ukraine-Russia conflict.

26. Ilchuka, Y. (2017). Hearing the voice of Donbas: art and literature as forms of cultural protest during war. *Nationalities Papers-the Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, *45*(2), 256-273. https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1249835

This paper analyzes literary, visual, and street art works of writers and artists from Eastern Ukraine produced during 2014. Two Donetsk artists, Serhii Zakharov and Anzhela Dzherikh, and two Luhansk writers, Serhii Zhadan and Olena Stepova, play with the myth of the proletarian Donbas, on the one hand, and debunk the popular perception of Donbas people as being in consent with the politics of the selfproclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, on the other. They explore familiar tropes and images of Donbas and use guerrilla tactics (shock effects, provocativeness, and deception) to initiate public reaction to the war. Their works are united by their search for a shared communication space and direct access to the audience on occupied territories. These artists challenge the accepted perception of Donbas as a free but uncivilized space and participate in the creation of a new Donbas text. The interaction between politics, art, and activism makes their voices and vision powerful and infectious and can help achieve civic consolidation in Donbas.

27. Irvin-Erickson, D. (2017). Genocide Discourses: American and Russian Strategic Narratives of Conflict in Iraq and Ukraine. *Politics and Governance*, 5(3), 130-145. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i3.1015

This paper presents the concept of "genocide discourses", defined as a type of strategic narrative that shapes the way individuals and groups position themselves and others and act, playing a critical role in the production of violence and efforts to reduce it. Genocide discourses tend to present genocide as fundamentally a-political, and hold that genocidal systems are dislodged only when they are swept away through external violence. Secondly, genocide discourses are built on an assumption that the victims of genocide are necessarily moral innocents, not parties in conflict. These two factors make genocide discourses highly effective in conferring moral capital upon certain actors in a conflict. The two principles converge to produce strategic narratives that direct political and military actions in certain ways in the context of contentious conflicts and political violence, motivating humanitarian responses in defense of certain groups, or sustaining popular support for foreign wars. The paper illustrates the argument by examining two case studies between 2014 and 2017: the debates in the United States over Islamic State genocides, and the conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

28. Juntunen, T. (2017). Helsinki Syndrome: The Parachronistic Renaissance of Finlandization in International Politics. *New Perspectives*, 25(1), 55-83.

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has produced a number of commentaries that have tried to grasp the crisis through the comforting lens of historical analogies. One of the most perplexing of these has been the revival of Finlandization, or the idea of the "Finnish model" as a possible solution to the Ukraine crisis. In this article I interrogate these arguments, firstly, by historicising the original process of Finlandization during the Cold War. Secondly, I argue that the renaissance of Finlandization is based on parachronistic reasoning. In other words, the Finlandization analogy has been applied to modern-day Ukraine in such a way that the alien elements of the past context are, to paraphrase Quentin Skinner, "dissolved into an apparent but misleading familiarity" in the present re-appropriation of the idea and its contextual prerequisites. Indeed, the reappearance of Finlandization in the context of the Ukraine crisis reinforces the idea that the real drivers of international affairs can be reduced to the axioms derived from the transhistorical logic of international anarchy and the iron laws of great power politics. Thus, this article makes a novel contribution to the theoretical discussion on the role of analogies and myths in International Relations.

29. Jurcak, V., & Turac, J. (2017). HYBRID MOVEMENT IN CONTEXT OF PRESENT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. *International Relations 2017: Current Issues of World Economy and Politics*, 453-463.

Hybrid war is currently a phenomenon, especially in connection with the conflict in the East of Ukraine. This conflict has disrupted international relations with the Russian Federation, which has greatly destabilized the security environment. The role of the International Crisis Management Organizations is to resolve the situation in Ukraine in a peaceful way so as to restore peace and security in Europe. The hybrid war, its characteristic features, the way of this implementation makes it impossible to resolve the conflict and continues to exacerbate the situation in Ukraine and the eastern border of the Alliance.

30. Khomenko, I., Shapovalov, V., Tsema, I., Makarov, G., Palytsia, R., Zavodovskyi, I., . . . Mishalov, V. (2017). Hydrodynamic rupture of liver in combat patient: a case of successful application of "damage control" tactic in area of the hybrid war in East Ukraine. *Surgical Case Reports*, 3, Article 88. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40792-017-0363-6

Background: The hybrid war of Russia against Ukraine has been started in certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts within the Donbas area in 2014. Case presentation: We report a clinical case of a combat patient who was injured after the multiple launcher rocket system "Grad" shelling, diagnosed with hydrodynamic liver rupture followed by medical management with application of damage control (DC) tactic in conditions of hybrid war. The patient underwent relaparatomy, liver resection, endoscopic papillosphincterotomy, endoscopic retrograde cholecystopancreatography, stenting of the common bile duct, and VAC-therapy. Applied treatment modalities were effective; the patient was discharged on the 49th day after injury. Conclusions: To our best knowledge, this is the first report describing a successful application of DC tactic in the hybrid war in East Ukraine. From this case, we suggest that application of DC tactic at all levels of combat medical care could save more lives.

31. Kostyuchenko, Y. V., Yuschenko, M., Movchan, D., & Kopachevsky, I. (2017, Sep 12-14). Analysis of economic values of land use and land cover changes in crisis territories by satellite data: models of socio-economy and population dynamics in war. *Proceedings of SPIE* [Earth resources and environmental remote sensing/gis applications viii]. 17th SPIE Conference on Earth Resources and Environmental Remote Sensing/GIS Applications, Warsaw, POLAND.

Problem of remote sensing data harnessing for decision making in conflict territories is considered. Approach for analysis of socio-economic and demographic parameters with a limited set of data and deep uncertainty is described. Number of interlinked techniques to estimate a population and economy in crisis territories are proposed. Stochastic method to assessment of population dynamics using multi-source data

using remote sensing data is proposed. Adaptive Markov's chain based method to study of land-use changes using satellite data is proposed. Proposed approach is applied to analysis of socio-economic situation in Donbas (East Ukraine) territory of conflict in 2014-2015. Land-use and land-cover patterns for different periods were analyzed using the Landsat and MODIS data. The land-use classification scheme includes the following categories: (1) urban or built-up land, (2) barren land, (3) cropland, (4) horticulture farms, (5) livestock farms, (6) forest, and (7) water. It was demonstrated, that during the period 2014-2015 was not detected drastic changes in land-use structure of study area. Heterogeneously distributed decreasing of horticulture farms (4-6%), livestock farms (5-6%), croplands (3-4%), and increasing of barren land (6-7%) have been observed. Way to analyze land-cover productivity variations using satellite data is proposed. Algorithm is based on analysis of time-series of NDVI and NDWI distributions. Drastic changes of crop area and its productivity were detected. Set of indirect indicators, such as night light intensity, is also considered. Using the approach proposed, using the data utilized, the local and regional GDP, local population, and its dynamics are estimated.

32. Krashchenko, Y., Sorokina, H., & Degtyarova, I. (2017). The Conditions of Adaptation of "Internally Displaced Persons" to University Environment by Means of Students' Self-Government. *Studia Warminskie*(54), 385-393.

The article deals with the problem of adaptation of "internally displaced people" (for example, refugees from war zones in eastern Ukraine) to the university environment by means of students' self-government. According to the survey among IDP students who were transferred from other higher education institutions, it was found that the most favourable field for the development of constructive relations between displaced students and "domestic" students of the academic community of the university could be created by a system of students' self-government. The organizational and pedagogical conditions of adaptation of IDP students to the university environment were defined. The paper proves that students' self-government in a variety of forms and organizational levels can ensure successful adaptation of displaced students at a new place of study.

33. Machnikowski, R. M. (2017). RUSSIAN - UKRAINIAN CONFLICT REVISITED: TOWARDS REGIME CHANGE IN RUSSIA? *Europolity-Continuity and Change in European Governance*, 11(2), 169-186.

The "Ukraine crisis", as it is widely known, or more correctly, Ukraine - Russia war, started in 2013 - 2014, brought potentially devastating consequences for Central and Eastern Europe security and prospective functions of NATO military alliance. Previous Russian aggression, be it in Moldova or Georgia, went unpunished fact that created an impression that Russia had a "blank card" to do whatever it wanted within its "sphere of interests" (i.e. the territory of the former Soviet Union). Fortunately for the countries of NATO's "Eastern flank" and Scandinavian neighbours of Russia, the West ultimately responded to Moscow's military actions in the east of Ukraine. Economic and financial sanctions combined with the collapse of fossil fuels price have hit Russian economy and stopped Russia's involvement in this conflict. For the first time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kremlin has been paying heavy price for its geopolitical manoeuvres. In this article I claim that as a result of Russian actions in Ukraine, this country is approaching "regime change", though the form of it remains unclear. The West should be prepared for the possible period of uncertainty in Russia, in order to minimize its possible negative consequences: period of social unrest and unknown profile and aims of future rulers of Russia.

34. Makhortykh, M., & Sydorova, M. (2017). Social media and visual framing of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. *Media War and Conflict*, 10(3), 359-381. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635217702539

This article investigates the use of social media for visual framing of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Using a large set of visual data from a popular social networking site, Vkontakte, the authors employ content analysis to examine how the conflict was represented and interpreted in pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian online communities during the peak of violence in summer 2014. The findings point to the existence of profound differences in framing the conflict among pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian online communities. The former tended to interpret the conflict as a limited military action against local insurgents, whereas the latter presented it as an all-out war against the Russian population of Eastern Ukraine. The article suggests that framing the conflict through social media facilitated the propagation of mutually exclusive views on the conflict and led to the formation of divergent expectations in Ukraine and Russia concerning the outcome of the war in Donbas.

35. Mares, M. (2017). Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: Risk Analysis from the Point of View of NATO. *Not Only Syria?: the Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters in a Comparative Perspective*, 134, 31-39. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-757-3-31

This contribution deals with the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Ukraine. The author analyses risks and threats to the security of NATO countries connected with the activities of such fighters on the territory of Ukraine (including the separatist republics) and their return to their home countries. The development of the foreign fighter issue during the so-called Ukrainian crisis is described. Significant risks and threats connected

with their engagement in the conflict and return home (i.e., propaganda, involvement in paramilitary units, threatening political opponents, etc.) are identified and assessed.

36. Marin, V. G. (2017). Russia's resurgence in Central Asia after the Ukrainian crisis. *Debating Globalization. Identity, Nation and Dialogue: History, Political Sciences, International Relations*, **480-486.**

Over the last decade, China has been challenging Russia's role as the main trade partner of Central Asia. As a result, Russia's influence in Central Asia was slowly, but surely diminishing before the crisis in Ukraine. In this paper, I will argue that on short-term, after the annexation of Crimea, Russia's influence in Central Asia was reinforced. Although Russia is the former colonial power, in the last years its geopolitical influence in the region was fading. Therefore, the events in Ukraine have given Russia the opportunity to regain its ability to shape the region's strategic orientation. In the aftermath of Crimea's referendum, all the five Central-Asian countries have taken a pro-Russian stance unlike during the Georgian war. Nevertheless, the developments in Ukraine have stirred anxiety among the leaders of the Central Asian republics as there is a significant Russian minority living in Central Asia and labor migrants with dual citizenship. Also, the issue of borders has been a delicate subject in the region due to the many border disputes between these states. This paper discusses the role of Russia in Central Asia before and after the crisis in Ukraine. In doing so, I will make an analysis from a geostrategic stand point of the consequences of the Ukrainian crisis for the regimes in Central Asia.

37. Mastriano, D. (2017). Putin - the masked nemesis of the strategy of ambiguity. *Defence and Security Analysis*, *33*(1), 68-76. **https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2016.1272175**

Recent events demonstrate the complex and adaptive approach employed by Russia to reassert influence in Europe. The changing face of Russia's strategy commenced in 2007 when it launched a crippling cyber-attack against Estonia. This was followed by a large Russian conventional attack against Georgia in 2008, occupying two large areas of the nation. 2014 witnessed the Russian annexation of Crimea where in just a week, Russia seized control of Crimea "without firing a shot." The annexation of Crimea was rapidly followed by a Russian inspired and led subversive war in eastern Ukraine. The common thread among these diverse Russian operations is its use of ambiguity to confound and confuse decision makers in the West.

38. Melnyk, T. M., & Kasianok, K. G. (2017). Problems of attraction and use of international investments in Ukraine economy. *Marketing and Management of Innovations*(1), 253-270. **https://doi.org/10.21272/mmi.2017.1-23**

The aim of the article. In modern conditions Ukraine, likewise to the majority of developing countries is not able to provide social and economic development by their own financial resources and needs foreign capital inflows. Respectively, the purpose of this article is to determine the main factors that affect the attraction of foreign direct investments and their effective use in the national economy and develop a model to assess their impact on the FDI volume. The results of the analysis. By empirically examining, having built a mathematical model in the form of linear regression, it was found a significant correlation between the net international investment position and internal and external factors of the national economy. Furthermore, internal factors play key role in the fluctuation of the FDI amount attracted to the Ukraine's economy in the studied period (2000-2014 years). This fact expands the range of instruments of state regulation and creation a competitive market environment for attracting foreign investments. To study the nature of internal and external factors impact, and, hence, to identify areas of state influence on attracting foreign investment, there were examined determinants of independent variables in the regression model. Taking into account the statistical data and experts opinions, we can surmise that the main restraining factor for FDI attraction is not the war in the East and social tension in the whole country, however economic factors: the lack of development of private property institution and stock market; washout of capital and profits from domestic companies in favor of the related foreign companies; high interest rates on loans, etc. All of this points to the fact that in the current circumstances first and foremost, it is advisable to strengthen protection of private property in Ukraine. According to the experience of leading countries, government should provide adequate compensation to foreign investors in case of nationalization of assets and continue to reform the government branches, especially the judiciary and law enforcement in terms of fighting corruption and power abusing. Secondly, in the area of fiscal management public administration should be focused on transparency and simplicity of the tax basis calculation, taking into consideration experience of countries with the most favorable in the world tax systems for doing business. Thirdly, it is necessary to develop national stock market in order to both: effectively reallocate national income among different sectors of the economy, and to attract additional financial resources from the world capital markets. Conclusions and directions of further researches. All in all, it is clear, that current economic situation in the country requires that the suggested measures are to be implemented systematically, comprehensively and as soon as possible, in order not to let business to adapt to new conditions and develop new schemes to come over the laws.

39. Molchanov, M. A. (2017). *Media Uses in Ukraine's War with Itself.*

The media war in Ukraine and about Ukraine has been quite evident since the early days of the Maidan – a popular campaign of civil disobedience in the center of Kiev that turned violent and led to the

eventual ouster of the pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014. It has also been noted that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict started soon after and that Russia's annexation of Crimea was precipitated by intense media campaigns in both countries. These media wars then spread to the West and morphed into a series of confrontations between Ukraine and Russia, Russia and the West, and Ukraine together with the West against Russia and its allies, including Russia-sympathetic analysts in the West. Heated narratives targeted all sides of the conflict and made the search for a compromise nearly impossible.

40. Natorski, M., & Pomorska, K. (2017). Trust and Decision-making in Times of Crisis: The EU's Response to the Events in Ukraine. *Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies*, *55*(1), 54-70. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12445

It is a common assumption that through decades of co-operation there has been an emergence of trust between the Member States of the European Union. Yet, we have little evidence about the nature of trust and its implications for decision-making, in particular in times of crisis. Hence, our article's central question: how does trust matter in the process of decision-making during crisis? Our argument is that uncertainty during the crisis enabled trust-building between the actors: Member States and European institutions. In the case of the Ukrainian crisis, this happened in parallel to the decreasing levels of trust in EU-Russia relations. Consequently, the EU was able to agree and implement the instruments of coercive power. To illustrate our argument, we look at the adoption of EU sanctions in reaction to the annexation of Crimea, the downing of the Malaysian Airlines MH17 plane and the war in Donbass.

41. Naumescu, V. (2017). The Clash of Discourses Regarding Relations with Russia: New Fault Lines in the European Union? *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, *17*(2), 72-88.

Following the annexation of Crimea and the secession war in Eastern Ukraine, the topic of European security has returned as a major benchmark for a number of EU and non-EU countries. For a couple of years, in 2014-2015, the discourse of condemnation and international sanctions against the Russian regime dominated the agenda of the European-Russian relations. Nevertheless, the economic considerations and the ascension of right-wing or left-wing populism(s) in the European Union acted as a drag on European unity and solidarity. Thereby a series of political leaders in the EU and its Eastern Neighbourhood began to ask for economic rapprochement with Russia, while others remained very cautious. Based on a comparative qualitative method, this paper explores the clashing discourses about relations with Russia, in light of the discourse theory. The dynamics of divergent positioning regarding Russia after 2016 led to the question of possible new fault lines in the European Union. Inconsistencies on this topic can be seen between West and East, between post-communist countries on the Eastern Flank with Poland, Romania and the Baltic States, on one side, and Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic on the other side, and between Western chancelleries with rather different views such as Berlin, London or Rome. The aim of this article is to explore the increasing differences and clarify whether conflicting approaches regarding relations with Russia could create real cleavages between EU Member States and threaten European unity.

42. Nazarovets, S. A. (2017). WAR AND PEACE: THE PECULIARITIES OF UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION DYNAMICS AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF RUSSIAN MILITARY AGGRESSION IN UKRAINE, IN 2014-2016. *Science and Innovation*, *13*(5), 37-41. https://doi.org/10.15407/scine13.05.037

The paper presents the results of bibliometric analysis of publications co-written by authors affiliated with Ukrainian and Russian institutions in 2007-2016, based on Scopus data. The survey results have shown that Ukrainian and Russian researchers continue carrying out joint research in major international projects. However, a decrease in the number of works published by Ukrainian and Russian research institutions in 2016 has testified to an adverse impact of Russia's military aggression on cooperation in the field of science. The findings are important for preparing the science development programs in Ukraine.

43. Nidzvetska, S., Rodriguez-Llanes, J. M., Aujoulat, I., Cuesta, J. G., Tappis, H., van Loenhout, J. A. F., & Guha-Sapir, D. (2017). Maternal and Child Health of Internally Displaced Persons in Ukraine: A Qualitative Study. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, *14*(1), Article 54. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph14010054

Due to the conflict that started in spring 2014 in Eastern Ukraine, a total of 1.75 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) fled the area and have been registered in government-controlled areas of the country. This paper explores perceived health, barriers to access to healthcare, caring practices, food security, and overall financial situation of mothers and young children displaced by the conflict in Ukraine. This is a qualitative study, which collected data through semi-structured in-depth interviews with nine IDP mothers via Skype and Viber with a convenience sample of participants selected through snowball technique. Contrary to the expectations, the perceived physical health of mothers and their children was found not to be affected by conflict and displacement, while psychological distress was often reported. A weak healthcare system, Ukraine's proneness to informal payments, and heavy bureaucracy to register as an IDP were reported in our

study. *A precarious social safety net to IDP mothers in Ukraine, poor dietary diversity, and a generalized rupture of vaccine stocks, with halted or delayed vaccinations in children were identified. Increasing social allowances and their timely delivery to IDP mothers might be the most efficient policy measure to improve health and nutrition security. Reestablishment and sustainability of vaccine stocks in Ukraine is urgent to avoid the risks of a public health crisis. Offering psychological support for IDP mothers is recommended.*

44. Nowacki, A. (2017). REVOLUTION OF DIGNITY AND RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN UKRAINE: POLISH RECEPTION. *Roczniki Humanistyczne*, *65*(7), 103-121. https://doi.org/10.18290/rh2017.65.7-7

This paper is devoted to the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity, also known as Euromaidan, and Russian aggression in Ukraine. The subject of the research are Polish Ukrainian relations after 1991, the Polish perception of the eastern neighbour and the reception of events related to the latest Ukrainian social protest as well as Russian aggression by Polish public opinion, Polish academic communities and Polish journalists. This work focuses only on book publishing and deliberately omits press publications. The paper pointed out that since the moment of independence in Ukraine in 1991, the interest in the Ukrainian issue has been constantly growing in Poland, with a significant increase in attention observed since 2004, namely since the Orange Revolution. Euro 2012 and events related to Euromaidan from 2013 also influenced Polish public opinion. On the basis of the analysed material it was found that the authors of Polish texts devoted to this issue are well versed in the complexities of Ukrainian internal politics and Ukrainian history. In their numerous texts, they paid particular attention to the complicated Ukrainian-Russian relations, patronizing treatment of Ukraine by the "elder brother" and Russian ruthlessness towards the "brotherly nation". Among the described problems there is also the issue of oligarchisation of the Ukrainian economy, widespread corruption and inefficiency of subsequent governmental teams. Above all, however, the fact of ending the process of forming a civic society in Ukraine and the increase of national consciousness and unambiguous condemnation of the "hybrid war", unlawful annexation of Crimea or aggression in Donbass are emphasized.

45. Oguz, S. (2017). THE FUTURE OF EUROPE'S DEFENSE: NATO OR AN EU ARMY? *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, *16*(1), 59-68.

For some time, Europeans have been dreaming of developing their own security and defense policy, backed up by a European military independent from the US, which Western Europe had to rely on during the Cold War. Europe did succeed in developing the Common Defense and Security Policy (CDSP), which focused on crisis management and peace operations based on soft power (although not as effective globally as expected), simultaneously enhancing Europe's military capabilities. However, Russian military activities in Ukraine - in particular Crimea - and its use of hybrid warfare tactics, altered the security paradigm in Europe. NATO, with robust US presence and influence, emerged as the core asset in countering and challenging the Russian threat once again. As a result, the vision of a European military has been deferred indefinitely.

46. Ojala, M., & Pantti, M. (2017). Naturalising the new cold war: The geopolitics of framing the Ukrainian conflict in four European newspapers. *Global Media and Communication*, *13*(1), 41-56. https://doi.org/10.1177/1742766517694472

The conflict in Ukraine has prompted analyses about the return of cold war divisions to Europe. This study focusses on the role the news media plays in the conflict by examining how the visual and textual practices of news framing help constitute geopolitical rationality and legitimise foreign policy. We analyse how the framing of the conflict in Die Welt, Dagens Nyheter, Helsingin Sanomat and The Guardian developed through four key events between February 2014 and February 2015. The analysis indicates that by promoting particular news frames the newspapers contributed to the legitimation of European Union policies, which are premised upon supporting the Ukrainian government in its military campaign in eastern Ukraine and placing responsibility for the conflict onto Russia. Hence, we argue that the news framing eventually contributed to the naturalisation of the 'new cold war' as a geopolitical rationality, orienting and legitimising foreign policy in Europe.

47. Ojala, M., Pantti, M., & Kangas, J. (2017). Whose War, Whose Fault? Visual Framing of the Ukraine Conflict in Western European Newspapers. *International Journal of Communication*, *11*, 474-498.

Images play a key role in modern mediatized conflicts, promoting particular ways of understanding those conflicts, what they are about, and who drives them. This article examines the visual coverage of the Ukraine conflict in The Guardian, Die Welt, Dagens Nyheter, and Helsingin Sanomat in terms of three dominant frames: the Ukraine conflict as national power struggle, as Russian intervention, and as geopolitical conflict. Focusing on four key events in the conflict between February 2014 and February 2015, and combining quantitative and qualitative methods, the framing analysis highlights the need to examine news images' textual content and layout and broader cultural and political contexts. We argue that the interplay between visual and textual devices is central to the production of hegemonic meanings, particularly when shaping public perceptions of key actors and their roles in international conflicts.

48. Pond, E. (2017). War in Ukraine: Is This the Way It Ends? *Survival*, *59*(6), 143-156. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1399732

Russia, Ukraine and the West may finally be groping for a way to dial down the violence in Ukraine's eastern tip that has claimed more than 10,000 Ukrainian lives and generated some 1.5 million displaced persons in the past 46 months. If it succeeds, the modus vivendi will be messy, brought about by a convergence of Russian failure to reclaim Catherine the Great's 'Novorossiya' from Ukraine, Moscow's budget squeeze from economic stagnation and Western sanctions, the implausibility of any Ukrainian military reconquest of insurgent-held territory in the east and the restabilisation of the old Ukrainian oligarchy.

49. Pryshchepa, G. (2017). "HATE SPEECH" AS A LINGUISTIC MARKER OF A HYBRID WAR. *Psycholinguistics,* *22*(2), 98-112. **https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1069546**

The following material is an attempt to prove linguistic and psychological influence of new media on the consciousness of the audience by changing the nature of the information and the language of its transmission, to explain the phenomenon of hybrid war from the point of view of functioning in the language system, study of the causes of occurrence and use hate speech in new media in a comprehensive manner in the context of the Ukrainian-Russian war, to explain "hate speech" is a kind of "soft power" of "hybrid warfare". In addition temporarily displaced persons have experienced considerable discrimination, in particular through the "hate speech" usage towards ethnical, race, social, cultural and religious groups, against the background of the events occurred in the East of Ukraine and on the occupied territory of the Crimea. Against the background of the events occurred in the East of Ukraine and on the occupied territory of the Crimea hybrid war acquires consecutive signs and diffuseness. Hate speech" is precisely aimed at replacing the basic fragments of national world pictures of public members with the conceptual structures of the aggressor country. The important discursive changes have occurred since the occupation of the Crimea and the beginning of the war in the Donbas region. The events of 2014 year have changed psycholinguistic, linguocultural paradigm of "hate speech". This had an impact both on the media topics and on the content and usage of hostile expressions, provocations etc. "Hate speech" has become one of the technologies and a linguistic marker of so-called "hybrid war", when the opponent's image is deprived of human traits and is vested with absolutely non-human behavior; ways of personal identity according to social group are destroyed, that leads to self-identification change. The image of moral inferiority, criminality and negative impact on society is created; a certain linguistic and cultural, cognitive and pragmatic attitudes are formed, being aimed at denigration of opponent's culture and ideals.

50. Pysmenskyy, Y. (2017). The Phenomenon of Journalism-related Crimes Under the Circumstances of Hybrid War in Ukraine. *Croatian International Relations Review,* *23*(80), 155-185. **https://doi.org/10.1515/cirr-2017-0024**

The article covers journalism-related crimes as a relatively distinct category of offences. The importance and purpose of isolating the concept of journalistic criminality under conditions of globalization in the modern theory of legal thought, the rapid development of the information society, and the embodied increase of the role of information and knowledge in human life are emphasized. Attention is paid to the factors affecting the dynamics and development of crimes in the area of professional activities of journalists, which primarily includes the environment of hybrid war. The destructive impact of the social consequences of journalistic crimes on society is evident in the case of Ukraine, which has suffered in the past and to this day experiences the latest information manifestations of hybrid war. The proposition to criminalize the intentional spreading of false information in the media by journalists is discussed. The reasons, basis and conditions for such criminalization are analysed. The existence of criminalization grounds for such an offence is substantiated in the article. However, conclusions are drawn on the inappropriateness of such criminalization due to its non-correspondence with certain conditions associated with difficulties in adjudication and with the problem of proving this type of behaviour. Other means of counteracting the deliberate dissemination of false information are considered.

51. Roman, N., Wanta, W., & Buniak, I. (2017). Information wars: Eastern Ukraine military conflict coverage in the Russian, Ukrainian and US newscasts. *International Communication Gazette,* *79*(4), 357-378. **https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048516682138**

The war in Eastern Ukraine is happening on the battlefield as well as in the informational realm. The two sides of this military conflict, Russia and Ukraine, are trying to shape public opinion in their own countries as well as abroad. Depending on the leaning of a media outlet, its audiences see very different pictures of this crisis. This study examined a year's worth of coverage dealing with the Eastern Ukraine military conflict in major Russian, Ukrainian, and American newscasts. The analysis revealed significant differences in the choice of on-camera sources, reporting of civilian and military fatalities, and framing of the different sides of this conflict in these media.

52. Sakwa, R. (2017). The Ukraine Syndrome and Europe: Between Norms and Space. *Soviet and Post Soviet Review,* *44*(1), 9-31. **https://doi.org/10.1163/18763324-04401003**

It is no accident that the Euromaidan revolution from November 2013 was triggered by President Viktor Yanukovych's decision to postpone signing the Association Agreement with the European Union. This

paper traces the connection between a certain type of Ukrainian state building, here labelled as monist, and the larger context of European institution building based on the EU, which from the pan-European perspective is also monist. These two monist projects, which fail systemically to allow for alternatives and pluralistic diversity, feed off and mutually reinforce each other. Neither in structural terms can imagine alternatives existing outside of themselves. Both are deeply plural internally, but claim certain hegemonic privileges. By contrast, projects for the constitutional incorporation of pluralistic diversity in Ukraine offer the perspective of national reconciliation, and this would be facilitated by the advancement of some sort of greater European pluralism that would obviate the need to choose between alternative integration projects. The Ukraine syndrome is part of the broader failure in the post-Cold War years to create an inclusive European political order.

53. Sauer, T. (2017). The Origins of the Ukraine Crisis and the Need for Collective Security between Russia and the West. *Global Policy*, *8*(1), 82-91. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12374

The relationship between major powers in the world determines the level of global stability. Two constellations are imaginable: balance of power and collective security. The end of major (world or cold) wars offers possibilities for change from one constellation to another. This article tries to explain the origins of the Ukraine crisis. It posits that the crisis in Ukraine is only a symptom of a wider conflict between two major powers (or power blocs), whose origins can only be understood by assessing the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. Instead of having integrated Russia in a collective security organization on an equal level, the West kept NATO alive and by doing so deteriorated the relationship with Russia. Despite different warnings from Moscow, NATO invited Ukraine to become member, and the EU offered Trade and Association Agreement talks to Ukraine. As a result, the relationship glided back towards a classic balance of power relation with spheres of influences. To prevent similar conflicts in the future, Russia should be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Ideally, the existing collective defence organization (NATO) should be transformed into a collective security organization with the inclusion of both Russia and Ukraine.

54. Simionov, L. M., & Pascariu, G. C. (2017). The EU and Russia Shifting Away from the Economic Logic of Interdependence - an Explanation through the Complex Interdependence Theory. *European Integration Studies*(11), 120-137. https://doi.org/10.5755/j01.eis.0.11.18501

In the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, the ongoing debate concerning the best course of action that the West should take in order to better handle Russia still sparks the academia and the decision-makers. Thus, the European continent is once again divided, bringing back chills from the Cold War era. Although the current adopted measures, namely the economic sanctions on Russia's energy and financial sectors, have undoubtedly exerted considerable pressure on the Russian economy, isolating it from the Western world, they have not changed, at least for now, President Putin's overall strategic vision. Within this context, the current paper offers a comprehensive analysis of the nature of the EU and Russia relations, in order to shed some light over the current deadlock. Overall, the research aims, through an interdisciplinary approach to analyse the complex relations between the two actors, based on an evaluation of their economic interdependence and culminating with the exploration of its significance for their international political ties, considering the current economic and political context.

55. Slobodchikoff, M. O. (2017). Challenging US Hegemony: The Ukrainian Crisis and Russian Regional Order. *Soviet and Post Soviet Review*, *44*(1), 76-95. https://doi.org/10.1163/18763324-04401006

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was reduced from the role of a global hegemon to that of a regional hegemon. As the regional hegemon, Russia was responsible for creating a regional order that was nested within the global order. However, since the Soviet Union had collapsed, it could not be assumed that Russia would create a regional order that was compatible with the global order. Would Russia create a regional order that was incompatible with the global order, and further, would Russia be a dissatisfied state that would challenge US hegemony? Using network analysis, I discover that Russia created a regional order that was compatible with the global order. In other words, Russia did not directly challenge the global order. More specifically, Russia accepted the global order that existed at the end of the Cold War. Providing that the global order remained static, Russia would not challenge that order. However, US actions following the collapse of the Soviet Union such as the expansion of NATO and the withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty are interpreted by Russia as a dynamic change in the global order. The Ukrainian crisis further exacerbated the wedge that had developed between the United States and Russia. It has further isolated Russia, destroyed the regional order nested within the global order, and ensured that Russia fully became a dissatisfied state looking to challenge US hegemony. Russia will now turn to China to try to challenge US hegemony.

56. Sperling, J., & Webber, M. (2017). NATO and the Ukraine crisis: Collective securitisation. *European Journal of International Security*, *2*(1), 19-46. https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2016.17

In securitisation theory (ST) little attention has been paid to how actors undertake securitisation collectively. The empirical focus of that theory has also, paradoxically, neglected the military-strategic sector and with it regional security organisations like NATO. Such an oversight is worth correcting for three reasons. First, NATO is constantly engaged in securitisation across a range of issues, a process that reflects an underappreciated recursive interaction between the Alliance and its member states. Second, the Ukraine crisis has resulted in Russia being explicitly identified as a source of threat and so has triggered a successful collective (re)securitisation by the Alliance. Third, a framework that demonstrates NATO's standing as a securitising actor has potential relevance to other regional security organisations. This article discusses and amends ST in service of an approach that permits securitisation by actors other than the state, in this case NATO. A model of collective securitisation is presented and then applied empirically to the post-Cold War desecuritisation of Russia and its subsequent resecuritisation following the annexation of Crimea. The implications of resecuritisation for the emergence of a self-reinforcing security dilemma in NATO-Russia relations are also considered.

57. Sytnyk, O. (2017). THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR 2014 - 2017. *Skhidnoievropeiskyi Istorychnyi Visnyk-East European Historical Bulletin*(2), 71-81.

The article attempts to identify and analyze the historical origins of the Russian-Ukrainian war 2014 - 2017. At the same time, special attention is paid to the historical and historiosophical the prerequisites of this war. It is proved that the basis of the modem Russian-Ukrainian war, like all the previous ones were manifestations of Russian Imperial chauvinism.

58. Tkachenko, V. M. (2017). Ukraine: "Time of War and Time of Peace". *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*(1), 135-156.

We need to live and to create in view of the fact that there is a "time for war and a time for peace". In nowadays, the time be-came to realize, that Russian Federation is a constant challenge to Ukraine that requires of continually searching of appropriate answer and formulate the Ukrainian national identity as an equivalent factor of national security.

59. Veebel, V. (2017). Russia's neo-imperial dependence model: Experiences of former Soviet republics. *Romanian Journal of Political Science*, *17*(1), 4-34.

The Russian aggression against Georgia in 2008, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, constant pressure on Belarus and political ambitions in Moldova have brought Russia's geopolitical ambitions in the former Soviet republics to the spotlight and pushed them into facing a difficult dilemma between a growing partnership with the EU or further cooperation with Russia and the Eurasian Union. The article assesses potential threats for four post-Soviet republics (Armenia, Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine) which may result from Russia's imperialistic ambitions. The study is based on the common features of two recent conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine and relevant economic and ethnic data. Based on the assumption that a common neo-imperial pattern exists in Russia's initiatives outside its nearest borders, the current research focuses on the key elements of Russia's neo-imperial dependence model, the current stage of the dependence-cycle and the pre-conditions for the target state to escape the dependence.

60. Veljovski, G., Taneski, N., & Dojchinovski, M. (2017). The danger of "hybrid warfare" from a sophisticated adversary: the Russian "hybridity" in the Ukrainian conflict. *Defence and Security Analysis*, *33*(4), 292-307. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2017.1377883

The term "hybrid warfare" is a new one that the West began to use to explain its failure to cope with asymmetric threats. Focusing on the war on global terrorism, the West temporarily withdrew its attention from traditional adversaries, such as Russia, which has used this gap and has audaciously returned to the stage as a global actor. Until the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and inflaming the Ukrainian crisis, most Western authors attributed "hybrid threats" mostly to non-state actors. But the Ukrainian scenario showed the true face of "hybridity" in the modern battlefield when practised by a powerful state actor. Russian "hybrid warfare" in Ukraine has already been seen as a combination of conventional and unconventional methods, that have been complemented with other instruments of national power - diplomatic, economic and information. The purpose of this article is, through an analysis of the Ukrainian scenario, to demonstrate that although the term "hybrid" is new, the concept itself is old and is a continuation of already seen doctrine from the Cold War era. Although "hybrid threats" can come both from state and non-state actors, the Russian interference in Ukraine is proof that they are especially dangerous for the West if, or when, they are initiated from a traditional, sophisticated adversary that has the capacity to use all forms of warfare.

61. Voigt, K. D. (2017). Change behaviour, forge trust Moscow, Peace and Security in Europe. *Osteuropa*, *67*(3-4), 97-+.

Russia has destroyed trust. The annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine has exacerbated the sense of threat among its neighbour states. Some German peace research circles recommend, that in order to forge trust in Europe, the EU should declare that it will forego inviting Ukraine to become a member. This is the wrong approach. Such a stance would create a negative precedent. Other states in Eastern Europe

would interpret it as offering a right of veto to Russia, and as evidence that a "Concert of Europe" is again taking place beyond their sphere of influence. This cannot be in the interest of Germany or the EU. A cooperative security policy with Russia may never be pursued at a cost to other states. A precondition for the revival of trust is a change in policy by Russia.

62. Volodarska, N., & Chornopyska, O. (2017). CHANGING LIFE PERSPECTIVES AND STRATEGIES OF ATO PARTICIPANTS' FAMILIES IN CRISIS SITUATIONS. *Science and Education* **(3), 51-57. https://doi.org/10.24195/2414-4665-2017-3-10**

The fighting in Eastern Ukraine (the armed conflict in the Donbass Region of Ukraine (2014 -present)), that is a real war today, has provoked a great number of problems in psychosocial adaptation of soldiers and today the issue of the military men's psychological rehabilitation is considered to be one of the most urgent and relevant problems. The paper aims to determine particularities of changing life prospects and strategies of ATO participants' families in crisis situations after the implementation of the designed trainings. The survey involved the carrying out of psychological support for couples (38 persons) who were receiving treatment in the rehabilitation center "Khyriv-Rent-Invest" Khyriv city. The empirical survey included projective techniques: drawings "Island of my dream" and "Our House". Psychological support involved individual counseling, group sessions with discussing life situations of both - men and their wives - and the art therapy. The carried out analysis has shown the peculiarities of life perspectives of ATO participants' families. Thus, in crisis situations the way of solving everyday problems by men and women changes. These alterations concern building life perspectives, goals and means of their achieving. The psychological support of a couple in crisis situation involves family therapy, counseling, individual and group sessions. In this way life perspectives (recovery of time-spatial representations of the past, present and future) of men and women can be corrected. Psychological personality support of ATO participants' families in crisis situations is aimed at harmonization of their life perspectives and activation of self-identity process.

63. Voronova, L. (2017). Gender politics of the 'war of narratives': Russian TV-news in the times of conflict in Ukraine. *Catalan Journal of Communication & Cultural Studies*, **9(2), 217-235. https://doi.org/10.1386/cjcs.9.2.217_1**

This article focuses on the gender politics of the news broadcast on the Russian state-controlled TV channels - Channel One (Pervyj kanal), Russia-1 (Rossiya-1), Russia-24 (Rossiya-24), NTV and RT (formerly Russia Today) - from January to September 2015, a period when the TV news closely followed the conflict in Ukraine and the growing tensions between Russia and Europe. The study shows that the news on the state-controlled TV channels interpret the state politics in only one possible way - ascribing the most traditional and essentialist characteristics to the country, prioritizing male actors and military activities and suggesting no alternatives to '(re) masculinization' of the image of Russia in the situation of the conflict on the territory of another state, despite the alleged disengagement of the country in it. The article concludes that the state-controlled TV channels use essentialist gendering as a part of nation-branding and nation-building strategies, with an aim to construct the gendered and intersectionalized ideology of the 'Russian world' that would target both internal and external audiences and go beyond the borders of the Russian Federation.

64. Watanabe, K. (2017). Measuring news bias: Russia's official news agency ITAR-TASS' coverage of the Ukraine crisis. *European Journal of Communication*, **32(3), 224-241. https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323117695735**

Objectivity in news reporting is one of the most widely discussed topics in journalism, and a number of studies on bias in news have been conducted, but there is little agreement on how to define or measure news bias. Aiming to settle the theoretical and methodological disagreement, the author redefined news bias and applied a new methodology to detect the Russian government's influence on ITAR-TASS during the Ukraine crisis. A longitudinal content analysis of over 35,000 English-language newswires on the Ukraine crisis published by ITAR-TASS and Interfax clearly showed that ITAR-TASS' framing of Ukraine was reflecting desirability of pivotal events in the crisis to the Russian government. This result reveals Russia's strategic use of the state-owned news agency for international propaganda in its hybrid war', demonstrating the effectiveness of the new approach to news bias.

65. Wehner, M. (2017). Hackers, Propaganda, Electoral Manipulation Moscow's Information War in the West. *Osteuropa*, **67(3-4), 3-+.**

For a long time, there has been a failure in the political and the public spheres in Germany and the EU to recognise both the degree of influence of Moscow through propaganda and disinformation and the risk of cyber attacks originating from Russia. It was not until the cyber attack on the German Bundestag, the "Lisa case", and the hacking scandal during the American election, that the full realisation dawned that Moscow is interfering in the domestic politics of western countries on a massive scale. There is no reason to dramatise the situation. However, at a time of profound alienation between Russia and the West following the annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine, the Russian leadership is set on a path of confrontation. In order to divide the West, it has adopted a targeted, and at the same time flexible, approach. There is no cause for complacency.

2018

1. Audinet, M. (2018). RIVAL PUBLIC DIPLOMACIES IN THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS: RT AND UKRAINE TODAY. *Revue D Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest*, *49*(2), 171-+.

The Ukrainian crisis has brought to light the key role played by new international networks as instruments of public diplomacy in time of war. Focusing on RT and Ukraine Today in the asymmetrical conflict between Russia and Ukraine, this article analyzes the operation and strategies of diffusion of these two media, and inquires into their antagonistic narratives and political rationales. This case study focuses on this conflict's two dimensions of storytelling and news that several actors and observers have described as a "war of information".

2. Blidaru, S. (2018). ZERO-SUM GAMES AND MIXED-MOTIVE GAMES IN THE FIGHT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION WITH THE WEST FOR UKRAINE. *Europolity-Continuity and Change in European Governance*, *12*(2), 37-66. https://doi.org/10.25019/europolity.2018.12.2.02

Researchers' attention for the Game Theory increased during the Cold War, and even more after this moment, therefore nowadays it is being used in multiple domains. This evolution led, inevitably, to the overuse of different concepts and/or elements, an eloquent example being what happened during the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 and after it. The main purpose of this paper is to examine the "race" for Ukraine between the Russian Federation and the West, analysed through the concepts of zero-sum games and mixed-motive games. The research will focus on the Russian state. The conclusions of my endeavour are that the zero sum-games are too simplistic and are not the appropriate tool to use to understand the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, whereas the mixed-motives games are more suited for this kind of process.

3. Bodziany, M., & Kocon, P. (2018). IVAN AT THE GATES! - ARMED CONFLICT IN UKRAINE AND THE MORAL PANIC IN POLAND? *Trames-Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences*, *22*(2), 137-157. https://doi.org/10.3176/tr.2018.2.03

The authors describe the issue of moral panic in the context of the armed conflict in Ukraine and the way it is reflected in the behavior, opinions, fears, approaches and beliefs of the respondents. The notion is described through the perspective of the moral panic features, enumerated by Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, such as concerns, disproportionality and volatility. Such approach allows to analyze the cumulated data on people's reaction in the face of the potential threat they perceive as highly probable. The authors ask what implications moral panic brings for the safety of the country neighboring the area of the conflict.

4. Boller, F. (2018). "Guardian of the international order"? NATO's contested identity, the discourses of Secretaries General, and the Ukraine crisis. *East European Politics*, *34*(2), 217-237. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2018.1458616

This article examines the role of NATO Secretaries General within the transatlantic security community in the wake of the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Drawing on a social constructivist perspective, the comparative discourse analysis of Rasmussen and Stoltenberg offers important insights regarding the role of a non-governmental actor in transatlantic relations. So far, research on transatlantic relations rarely investigated the discourses of NATO Secretaries General. The analysis shows that despite increased attention toward collective defence, both Secretaries General argued for an alliance, which is engaged not only in regional but also global affairs. As Eastern European NATO allies, especially Poland and the Baltic states, embrace divisive notions of the alliance's self and perceived threats, the security community's collective identity remains contested.

5. Bruno, V. A., & Finzi, G. (2018). LEADING THROUGH A DECADE OF CRISIS-NOT BAD, AFTER ALL Germany's Leadership Demand and Followership Inclusion, 2008-2018. *German Politics and Society*, *36*(4), 50-77. https://doi.org/10.3167/gps.2018.360403

The decade following the great economic and financial crisis of 2008 saw the European Union demanding regional leadership. The EU has also suffered a number of other existential crises, such as the ongoing refugee crisis, the Ukraine-Russia military confrontation, the revival of nationalism and radical right-wing populism, alongside the "trade war" between the United States and the EU. The article develops a novel theoretical framework structuring leadership as a peculiar typology of power, characterized by the capacity of both including "followership" countries' interests and providing crisis management. Our central argument is that Germany responded strategically to leadership demand in Europe through a positive power role, exhibiting the inclusion of followership and multilateral leadership rather than hegemonic, together with crisis management skills based on solid influence over regional outcomes. Conclusions are drawn from five key case studies drawn from different policy areas.

6. Bumws, M. J., & Gnad, O. (2018). Between 'muddling through' and 'grand design': Regaining political initiative - The role of strategic foresight. *Futures*, *97*, 6-17. **https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2017.06.002**

After the end of the Cold War, Western intellectuals depicted a future world that would follow Western values and adopt the liberal-democratic order. These Grand Designs proved to be misleading and even became obstacles in adapting to a world that is polycentric in design and increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous in nature. Ideological myopia was not the only factor that delayed a timely adaptation to a changing geopolitical environment; bureaucratic obstacles and psychological factors also came into play. This was the backdrop for what in Europe was perceived as strategic surprises (Arabellion, Ukraine/Crimean, Syria, IS) or as disruptive political developments (Brexit, US Presidential election). Addressing Europe's five most important partner regions (Russia/Ukraine, MENA, Turkey, USA, China), the Dahrendorf Foresight Process was initiated as a pilot project to improve the EU's foresight capabilities. It applied a four-step methodological approach to question current strategic thinking and to develop narratives of alternatively plausible futures in the EU's relationship with these regions. In stressing the importance of an early warning (indicator-based) system to make strategic foresight applicable for day-to-day politics and administrative processes, reference is being made to the 'Global Trends 2030' report of the US National Intelligence Committee (NIC).

7. Chaisty, P., & Whitefield, S. (2018). Critical election or frozen cleavages? How voters chose parties in the 2014 Ukrainian parliamentary election. *Electoral Studies*, *56*, **158-169. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2018.08.009**

Ukraine's 2014 parliamentary election, which took place in the aftermath of the Maidan revolution of February 2014 and at the height of war in the East of the country, appeared to produce significant party political realignment. In particular, support for parties that had represented the Russian element of the ethnolinguistic/geo-political cleavage that had dominated electoral competition in Ukraine since independence collapsed. The paper considers whether 2014 was a 'critical' or 'realigning' election for Ukraine. Our argument is that the 2014 election lacked the conditions that critical elections theory posits as necessary and that, on the contrary, there are strong theoretical reasons to expect cleavage stability in these volatile electoral circumstances. We offer evidence for this continuity drawn from surveys undertaken among Ukrainian voters from 1995 to 2014.

8. Chyzh, O. V., & Labzina, E. (2018). Bankrolling Repression? Modeling Third-Party Influence on Protests and Repression. *American Journal of Political Science*, *62*(2), 312-324. **https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12341**

Ukraine's anti-government protests in 2013 2014, and the ensuing removal of President Yanukovich, raised much speculation about Russia's role in the outcome of the crisis, as well as more general questions related to third-party influence on domestic protests and repression. Does third-party assistance to the government increase the level of government repression or deter protesters? Does the leader removal indicate that foreign involvement was a failure? Or can a third party gain from involvement, even if its protege leader is removed from power? We model external influence on the onset of protests and repression as a game between the government, the protesters, and a third party that supports the government. The main finding is that a third party may "bankroll" repression against the protesters, even at the risk of the removal of their protege leader, with the goal of deterring future protests within its sphere of interest.

9. Clem, R. S. (2018). Clearing the Fog of War: public versus official sources and geopolitical storylines in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, *58*(6), 592-612. **https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2018.1424006**

Military action undertaken by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2014 has had enormous geopolitical ramifications. This resulted in what is almost certainly a permanent change in sovereign territory, with the former gaining and the latter losing the strategic Crimean peninsula. But Russia's moves also set in motion a violent conflict in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Although the United States and the NATO alliance have advocated a geopolitical storyline that attributes blame for this to Russia, close scrutiny of the evidence they have adduced in this regard fails to establish this culpability conclusively. However, by utilizing data collected and analyzed in the public realm, it is possible to determine with more certainty that, in certain places and at given times, Russia was indeed the aggressor. The rapidly increasing amount of public-sourced information globally and the growing sophistication of analytical methods by non-governmental groups presages more complete understanding ofsuch conflicts without reliance on official information.

10. Dreyer, N. (2018). Genocide, Holodomor and Holocaust Discourse as Echo of Historical Injury and as Rhetorical Radicalization in the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict of 2013-18. *Journal of Genocide Research*, *20*(4), 545-564. **https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2018.1528740**

The Ukrainian crisis has caused an ongoing political confrontation between Russia and Ukraine since 2013. It has been marked by a rhetoric drawing on differently interpreted memories of World War II, the

Holodomor and the Holocaust. The rhetoric of "genocide" has become a common denominator in the confrontation over the Ukrainian East and the Crimea. Following Russia's aggression vis-a-vis Ukraine since 2014, Russian and pro-Russian Ukranian voices from politics and the media have accused Ukraine of genocide, which aimed to demonize the perceived enemy, mobilize internal support and gain interpretative authority over events. Ukraine has responded by intensifying its historical discourse of genocide, framing Putin's policies as a direct successor to Stalin's policies of destroying Ukraine. The present article analyses the nature of the rhetoric of the Holodomor, the Holocaust, and of genocide more generally, in the present Ukrainian conflict. It also examines the relationship of this rhetoric with the respective discourses of memory in Ukraine and to lesser extent in Russia. The discussion demonstrates how emphatically the traumas of the past reverberate in this post-Soviet conflict, and suggests that such historical resonance may have to do with the proclivity of both Russia and Ukraine to avoid their historical responsibilities.

11. Dzutsati, V., & Souleimanov, E. A. (2018). Horrors without end Russia in the Syrian war. *Osteuropa*, *68*(10-12), 381-+.

Russia has been a participant in the war in Syria since 2015. On entering the war, the Kremlin was pursuing three goals: to stabilise the Assad regime, to deflect attention from its own war in eastern Ukraine, and to change the balance of power in Syria and in the Middle East to suit its own needs. Behind this was the hope that the West might lift sanctions against Russia in exchange for the right to have a say on the direction developments should take there. However, Russia has failed almost entirely to achieve these aims. While the Assad regime may control large swathes of the country in military terms, Russia's estrangement from the West runs deeper than ever. The Syrian war is unpopular at home, yet withdrawal from Syria is a difficult process. The Assad regime is politically unstable, and peace is a far-off prospect. Russia's partial allies, Iran and Turkey, are pursuing interests that conflict with its own. And Russia risks becoming caught up between the two fronts in the conflict between Israel and Iran.

12. Fournier, A. (2018). From Frozen Conflict to Mobile Boundary: Youth Perceptions of Territoriality in War-Time Ukraine. *East European Politics and Societies*, *32*(1), 23-55. https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325417740627

Scholarly and media sources have often described the conflict in Ukraine's east as a potential frozen conflict similar to other such conflicts in the post-Soviet space. My interviews with young Ukrainian citizens reveal that many imagine not a stalemate but rather a continuous repositioning of the border between Ukraine and Russia. I use the term mobile boundary to describe the widespread belief within my sample that the Ukraine-Russia boundary may move back and forth within Ukrainian territory. Some interviewees express their willingness, at least in theory, to surrender the contested territories of Donetsk and Luhansk, but it is their fear of Russian encroachment beyond those territories that provides the rationalization for continued military defense of the Donbas.

13. Giuliano, E. (2018). Who supported separatism in Donbas? Ethnicity and popular opinion at the start of the Ukraine crisis. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, *34*(2-3), 158-178. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2018.1447769

Donetsk and Luhansk are often labeled pro-Russian regions as a result of the founding of Peoples' Republics there in spring 2014. This article investigates popular opinion in Donbas before armed conflict began, to determine whether the high concentration of ethnic Russians there drove support for separatism. Analysis of a KIIS opinion poll shows that, on the one hand, ethnic Russian respondents were divided on most separatist issues, with a minority backing separatist positions. On the other hand, they supported separatist issues in larger numbers than both ethnic Ukrainians and respondents with hybrid identities. Thus, while ethnic identity does not produce polarized preferences, it is relevant in shaping political attitudes. Also, analysis of an original database of statements made by Donbas residents indicate that they were motivated to support separatism by local concerns exacerbated by a sense of abandonment by Kyiv rather than by Russian language and pro-Russian foreign policy issues.

14. Golovchenko, Y., Hartmann, M., & Adler-Nissen, R. (2018). State, media and civil society in the information warfare over Ukraine: citizen curators of digital disinformation. *International Affairs*, *94*(5), 975-+. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy148

This article explores the dynamics of digital (dis)information in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. International Relations scholars have presented the online debate in terms of 'information warfare'- that is, a number of strategic campaigns to win over local and global public opinion, largely orchestrated by the Kremlin and pro-western authorities. However, this way of describing the online debate reduces civil society to a mere target for manipulation. This article presents a different understanding of the debate. By examining the social media engagement generated by one of the conflict's most important events-the downing of the Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) over Ukraine-we explore how competing claims about the cause of the plane crash are disseminated by the state, media and civil society. By analysing approximately 950,000 tweets, the article demonstrates how individual citizens are more than purveyors of government messages; they are the most active drivers of both disinformation and attempts to counter such information. These citizen curators actively shape competing narratives about why MH17 crashed and citizens, as a group, are four times

more likely to be retweeted than any other type of user. Our findings challenge conceptualizations of a state-orchestrated information war over Ukraine, and point to the importance of citizen activity in the struggle over truths during international conflicts.

15. Gonchar, M., & Chubyk, A. (2018). *WAR OF HYBRID TYPE "MADE IN RUSSIA" (THE EXAMPLE OF AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE).*

An aggression of hybrid type (abridged - hybression) is a complex of diverse influences on an enemy of regulated magnitude and combined character, which are used according to a variant algorithm, where military means are not dominant, their application is carefully masked and denied, and the act of aggression generates uncertainty that complicate its identification.

16. Hale, H. E., Shevel, O., & Onuch, O. (2018). Believing Facts in the Fog of War: Identity, Media and Hot Cognition in Ukraine's 2014 Odesa Tragedy. *Geopolitics*, *23*(4), 851-881. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2018.1465044

How do people form beliefs about the factual content of major events when established geopolitical orders are violently challenged? Here, we address the tragic events of 2 May 2014, in Odesa, Ukraine. There, Euromaidan protest movement supporters and opponents clashed following Russia's annexation of Crimea and the onset of the Donbas conflict, culminating in the worst civilian death toll the city had seen since World War II. Shortly after, we surveyed Ukraine's population about who they thought had actually perpetrated the killings and relate people's answers to alternative narratives (frames) that an original content analysis finds were available to Ukrainian citizens through different media. We find evidence, consistent with theories of hot cognition and motivated reasoning, that the Odesa violence triggered emotional responses linked to ethnic, regional, and partisan identity, which then activated attitudes associated with these identities that, in turn, led people to adopt very different (sometimes highly improbable) beliefs about who carried out the killings. Ethnic identity in particular is found to have strongly moderated the effects of television, with Ukrainian television greatly influencing Ukrainians but backfiring among Russians, and Russian television mainly impacting non-Ukrainians. Education and local information are found to reduce susceptibility to televised factual narratives.

17. Hoffman, M., & Hofmann, M. O. (2018). Challenges and Opportunities in Gray Zone "Combat". *Advances in Cross-Cultural Decision Making, (Ahfe 2017)*, *610*, 156-166. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60747-4_15

The Gray Zone lies between peace and war, where and when adversaries increasingly orchestrate campaigns using multiple elements of power to achieve political-security objectives minimizing the risks of engaging in direct kinetic warfare. Actions motivated by a Gray Zone campaign are deliberately ambiguous - sometimes deceptive - to hide the ultimate intent, cloud attribution, or leave the target of the campaign a choice among only acquiescence or escalation. Recent Gray Zone campaigns include the Russian occupation in the Ukraine and the expansion of Chinese influence and control in the South China Sea. In this paper we define competition in the Gray Zone, characterize the concurrent interactions between campaigns and counter-campaigns of two adversaries, and provide an Indications and Warnings (I&W) framework for detecting Gray Zone campaigns early. We propose combining bottom-up analysis, such as changes in the intensity and tone of messaging in media, economic investments, and other actions in the Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) spectrum, with top-down analysis of the master narratives of nation states and other actors. We propose that interdiction of a Gray Zone campaign is best structured by analogy to the approach for disrupting the cyber kill chain.

18. Hunter, M. (2018). Crowdsourced War: The Political and Military Implications of Ukraine's Volunteer Battalions 2014-2015. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, *18*(3), 78-124.

This article explores the use of crowdsourced volunteer battalions by the Ukrainian government in response to Russian aggression in the Donbas region. It examines the weakness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, contributions of civil-society, and the creation, development, and combat operations of volunteer battalions. The use of crowdsourcing provided the emergency military force that the Ukrainian Government needed to stabilise the Donbas region in the face of the 2014 Russian-backed separatist offensive. The article concludes by raising concerns that the negative consequences of crowdsourcing war, while mitigated by actions taken by the Ukrainian Government, have the potential to return if the situation in Ukraine deteriorates.

19. Kamusella, T. (2018). Russian: A Monocentric or Pluricentric Language? *Colloquia Humanistica*(7), 153-196. https://doi.org/10.11649/ch.2018.010

All the world's 'big' languages of international communication (for instance, English, French or Spanish) are pluricentric in their character, meaning that official varieties of these languages are standardized differently in those states where the aforesaid languages are in official use. The only exception to this tendency is Russian. Despite the fact that Russian is employed in an official capacity in numerous post-Soviet states and in Israel, it is still construed as a monocentric language whose single and unified standard is (and must be) solely controlled by Russia. From the perspective of sovereignty, this arrangement affords Moscow a degree of influence and even control over culture and language use in the countries where Russian is official. This fact

was consciously noticed and evoked some heated discussions in Ukraine after the Russian annexation of the Ukrainian region of Crimea in 2014. However, thus far, the discussions have not translated into any official recognition of (let alone encouragement for) state-specific varieties of the Russian language.

20. **Karacsonyi, D. (2018). Partition or rise? Ukraine, Europe's "big cake".** *Ter Es Tarsadalom*, *32*(4), 54-83. https://doi.org/10.17649/tet.32.4.3096

Ukraine has been in a permanent social, economic and political crisis since its independence in 1991 and received little public attention in Hungary until 2014 when the so-called "Revolution of Dignity", the Russian annexation of Crimea took place and the war in the Donbas, Ukraine's important heavy industrial region, began. Since then Ukraine has occasionally even taken centre place in global politics. The reason is its pivotal geopolitically importance situation between Russia and the West. In 2014, Ukraine finally saw the post-soviet regional order disintegrate after two decades. Ukraine became important for Hungary because of the increasing geopolitical attention on the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia in the wake of new controversial language and education laws in Ukraine and Russia's increasing intelligence activity in the region. Ukraine's failed economic transition and its deep political crisis during the last two and half decades cannot be explained any more solely by its internal conditions, by the East-West dichotomy, by the structural problems of its economy or by a political system characterised by oligarchs who represent its economic-political power centres. The present paper attempts to explain Ukraine's situation by investigating some external factors. Ukraine has vast resources such as the agricultural land characterised by the highest agro-ecological potential globally and it still has an enormous, if ageing, labour force which has created desires among some smaller geopolitical actors. The Visegrad Group (Poland, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia) view Ukraine as a potential source to cover their own lack of labour which again is caused by outmigration to Western Europe. Germany, the USA and especially China are keenly renting big stretches of Ukraine's arable land. The conflict with Russia in Eastern Ukraine put the coal-based heavy industry in an especially difficult situation. The former production lines collapsed. Ukraine lost a large part o f its coal and steel production potential which in turn heavily affects the mechanical engineering sector (including high-tech fields such as aerospace industries), all aggravated by the trade embargo on Russia. The new free-trade agreement with the European Union could, however, attract new automotive industries to Western Ukraine thus adopting the reindustrialisation model of the Visegrad countries. The future of Ukraine depends also on external factors, particularly on EU-Russian relations. The currently increasing tensions between them are most harmful for Ukraine's future.

21. **Karpenko, O. (2018). MANIPULATIVE INFORMATION OPERATIONS: FACTORS OF INFLUENCE ON THE SOCIAL UNCONSCIOUS AND CULTURAL VALUES.** *National Academy of Managerial Staff of Culture and Arts Herald*(1), 26-29.

The purpose of this article is to reveal the mechanism of penetration of technologies of manipulative influence on the mass consciousness and unconsciousness that are carried out in the modern geopolitical space to change the cultural values of the Ukrainian society. The methodological basis of the research consists in the use of methods of social informatics, in particular social and communicative psychoanalysis, through which the role, possibilities and technology of penetration of manipulative influence on the unconsciousness of society are revealed through mass consciousness of the population. Scientific novelty of the article consists of expanding theoretical ideas about mechanisms of the society control through application of influence on its mass unconsciousness in order to induce necessity for certain subjects to manipulate and change the cultural values. Conclusions. The necessity of using offensive information operations as an effective mechanism for implementing public information policy in the context of hybrid war is described in the article, as directing manipulative influence on the mass consciousness / unconsciousness of the enemy, which disrupts the public administration, threatening the national security of the country, encroaching on its territorial integrity and independence, attempts to affect the historical and cultural values of the Ukrainian society.

22. **Katz, M. N. (2018). Putin's Security Policy and Its Implications for NORAD. In C. Leuprecht, J. J. Sokolsky, & T. Hughes (Eds.),** *North American Strategic Defense in the 21st Century: Security and Sovereignty in an Uncertain World* **(pp. 17-27). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90978-3_2**

Especially since the beginning of his third term as Russia's president in 2012, Vladimir Putin has pursued an increasingly hostile policy toward America and the West. In addition to overseeing Russian military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, Putin has overseen an enormous buildup in Russian nuclear and conventional forces. In addition, Putin has supported nationalist politicians and parties in the West that question or even oppose NATO and the EU in order to undermine Western cohesion. Putin's support for these nationalist forces may be less aimed at seeing them come to (or remain in) power than to disrupt and even discredit Western democracy. Further, Putin is pursuing these aims with a hybrid strategy short of war that relies on disinformation aimed at exploiting existing tensions (including ethnic and racial) within the West. Putin's hostility pose a serious challenge to America and the West, not least because the disinformation campaign in particular takes advantage of the freedom of expression that Western societies value so highly, and hence are loathe to curtail. This chapter discusses the nature of the challenge that Putin's Russia poses, and its implications for America and Canada in particular.

23. King, F. (2018). Greetings from Novorossiya: Eyewitness to the War in Ukraine. *European History Quarterly*, *48*(3), 583-584. https://doi.org/10.1177/0265691418783617u

Polish journalist Pawel Pieniazek was among the first journalists to enter the war-torn region of eastern Ukraine and Greetings from Novorossiya is his vivid firsthand account of the conflict. He was the first reporter to reach the scene when Russian troops in Ukraine accidentally shot down a civilian airliner, killing all 298 people aboard. Unlike Western journalists, his fluency in both Ukrainian and Russian granted him access and the ability to move among all sides in the conflict. With powerful color photos, telling interviews from the local population, and brilliant reportage, Pieniazek's account documents these dramatic events as they transpired. This unique firsthand view of history in the making brings to life the tragedy of Ukraine for a Western audience. Historian Timothy Snyder provides wider context in his superb introduction and explores the significance of this ongoing conflict at the border of East and West.

24. Krasnodebska, M. (2018). The Ukraine Crisis as an Unintended Consequence of the EU's Public Diplomacy: Reception of the EU's Narratives in Ukraine. *Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, *13*(3), 345-365. https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191x-13020050

International relations (IR) scholars studying public diplomacy expect that if a foreign public accepts and responds favourably to the narrative disseminated by a public diplomacy actor, this actor is more likely to achieve its desired policy objectives in the country. So how can we explain that pro-European elites in Ukraine employed the European Union's narratives during the Maidan protests, leading to regime change in Ukraine and a separatist war involving Russia - situations the European Union had wanted to avoid? Drawing on Gadamer's theory on the transformation of meaning in communication processes, this article seeks to explain how local activists pick up, transform and employ narratives disseminated by an international actor. Arguing that public diplomacy narratives can be reinterpreted by the receptor, thus leading to unintended effects, the article calls for further attention on the role of narratives and their reception by local actors in the study of IR.

25. Krylova-Grek, Y. (2018). Psycholinguistic Aspects of the Semantic Field of the Concept "War" in Modern Media Space. *Psycholinguistics*, *23*(1), 175-188. https://doi.org/10.5781/zenodo.1211561

This paper presents modern trends in the change of the semantic field of the concept "war". Based on the analysis of mass media in Russia, Ukraine and the USA, we demonstrated the regularities and interdependences of the mass media content and changes in the conceptual worldview of the people that consume information. We underlined the link between the changes in the forms of international conflicts and the increase of the units contributing to the semantic field of the concept "war". We analised how the information and communicative space effects the change of the conceptual (mental, cognitive) worldview of the public. Analysis of the semantic compatibility of the features of the concept "war" in mass media has revealed that apart from the military and armament themes, it contains the semantic units related to informational and psychological tools of influence. In the result of the systematic application of the concept "war" in relation to such semantic units as "informational", "psychological", "cyber", "hybrid", "fake news", "sanctions", etc. there takes place a fixation of compatibility of new semantic units with the concept "war". The broadening of the extent of the concept occurred due to the addition of two objects: "informational virtual component" comprising informational and psychological spheres of influence as well as a "technological component", on which the informational security of the state is based. Thus, the modern extent and intent of the concept "war" includes not only academic dictionary definitions, but also the definitions that refer to the involvement of tools and techniques aimed at the securing an armless victory in the confrontation. The findings of the research also demonstrated a certain difference in the development of the concept in Ukrainian, western and pro-Russian mass media. While "war" in the pro-Russian mass media is covered in connection with an open aggression accompanied by the use of weapons, this concept in Ukrainian and western mass media is used in relation to psychological and information influence. Thus, at the current stage, the broadening of the extent of the concept "war" has taken place, which is interrelated with the expansion of the semantic field, and is reflected in the change in the conceptual picture of the world within this concept.

26. Kuzio, T. (2018). Euromaidan revolution, Crimea and Russia-Ukraine war: why it is time for a review of Ukrainian-Russian studies. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, *59*(3-4), 529-553. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2019.1571428

This review article seeks to launch a debate on the state of Ukrainian-Russian studies which have become quite active among Western scholars since the 2014 crisis unfolded. Through discussion around two recently published books by Richard Sakwa and Anna Matveeva, the review investigates five common themes found in Western scholarship about the crisis and Russia-Ukraine war. These include blaming the West for the crisis, downplaying Russian military involvement, justifying Russian annexation of the Crimea, describing the conflict as a civil war and minimizing Russian nationalism while exaggerating Ukrainian nationalism. The review points to serious scholarly flaws in all five areas and calls for a thorough review of Western scholarship on Ukrainian-Russian studies.

27. Lebedev, A. C. (2018). FROM ONE WAR TO THE NEXT: VETERANS OF AFGHANISTAN IN THE ARMED CONFLICT IN THE DONBAS. *Revue D Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest*, *49*(2), 65-+.

What impact does the war in the Donbas have on the Ukranian veterans of the Soviet war in Afghanistan? How does a group legitimated by its experience in time of war face this new war several decades later? After a description of how these veterans have been integrated in Ukrainian society, answers are sought to three questions: Do these veterans have a specific place in the Donbas war? Has the war altered the veterans' network of solidarity? How deep are the social cleavages wrought by the war?

28. Malyarenko, T., & Wolff, S. (2018). The logic of competitive influence-seeking: Russia, Ukraine, and the conflict in Donbas. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, *34*(4), 191-212. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2018.1425083

The crisis in Ukraine since late 2013 has seen four successive internationally mediated agreements that have been at best partially implemented. Drawing on extensive fieldwork and 42 key informant interviews sides, we explain this outcome with reference to the logic of competitive influence-seeking: Russia is currently unable to achieve a friendly and stable regime in Kyiv and thus hedges against the consolidation of an unfriendly pro-Western and stable regime by maintaining its control over parts of eastern Ukraine and solidifying the dependence of local regimes there on Russian support. This gives Russia the opportunity to maintain the current status quo or settle for re-integration terms through which Russia can sustain long-term influence over Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy. We conclude by reflecting on the consequences of competitive influence-seeking in the post-Soviet space: the likely persistence of low-intensity conflict in Ukraine; the further consolidation of territorial divisions in other post-Soviet conflicts; and the need for policy-makers in Russia and the West to prioritize the management of the consequent instability.

29. Matsiyevsky, Y. V. (2018). TRAPPED IN HYBRIDITY: UKRAINE'S REGIME TRANSFORMATIONS AFTER THE 2014 REVOLUTION. *Polis-Politicheskiye Issledovaniya*(1), 96-115. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2018.01.07

Has the Ukraine's regime changed since the 2014 revolution? What effects does a revolution have on stability or change of a hybrid regime? To answer these questions the article deals with the changes in formal and informal institutions and the quantitative and qualitative composition of elites after the change of power in 2014. The author argues that despite the quantitative renewal of elites, greater in scope than in the "post-orange period", there has been no qualitative renewal of elites. Meanwhile, the old operational code of elites' political culture, composed of corruption, clientelism and informal deals, still persists. The lack of renewal of elites and the dominance of informal rules over formal procedures are the factors that keep the institutional core of Ukraine's hybrid regime unchanged. Moreover, the case of Ukraine proves that these institutions possess a considerable adaptive capacity. Ineffective institutional equilibrium - institutional trap that evolved in Ukraine in the mid-1990s, demonstrates the ability to persist even under extreme challenges posed by revolution and war. Ukraine will hardly be able to change its trajectory until the qualitative renewal of elites takes place. Elites' rotation and/or quasi-replacement do not produce genuine renewal. Since internal (economic decline and the threat of protests) and external (the war in the East) threats were unable to change the elites' rent-seeking behavior, it can be stated that hybridization, rather than democratization or resurgence of authoritarianism, should be considered a defining trend of the post-revolutionary dynamics in Ukraine.

30. Matsuzato, K. (2018). The Donbas War and politics in cities on the front: Mariupol and Kramatorsk. *Nationalities Papers-the Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, *46*(6), 1008-1027. https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2018.1480598

This paper compares politics in two cities, Mariupol and Kramatorsk, located near the frontline between Ukraine-controlled Donetsk Oblast and the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR). The DPR controlled these cities in the spring of 2014, but Ukraine recaptured them. Both cities are company towns, in which owners/managers of dominant factories, nicknamed job-givers, have a decisive voice in the city's decision-making. This paper compares how leaders of the two cities reacted to the expansion of Rinat Akhmetov's business empire before the Donbas War, and to DPR paramilitaries during the war. The two cities diverged decisively in the post-war reconstruction because Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko succeeded in splitting two major companies and making one of them pro-presidential in Kramatorsk. As a result, electoral politics in Kramatorsk became highly competitive, while one-party dominance of the Opposition Bloc (former Party of Regions) continues in Mariupol.

31. Mikheieva, O. (2018). VOLUNTEER COMBATANTS IN THE DONBAS WAR. MOTIVATIONS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE FRONT LINE. *Revue D Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest*, *49*(2), 21-+.

From the accounts of pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian volunteers, the sociological portrait is drawn of these combatants with a focus on the similarities and differences of their backgrounds. Attention is paid to the feelings of belonging that characterize these two groups; a deep attachment to Ukraine for the first, and a vague, regional sense of identity for the second. Light is shed on the perceptions of the conflict that motivated the decision to volunteer. Whereas the pro-Ukrainian combatants share the perception of Russia as an

aggressor, the pro-Russian combatants see the war in geopolitical terms as a global confrontation with the West, in which Russia was "forced" to intervene in Ukraine. The members of both groups tend to describe their participation as the accomplishment of a patriotic duty in a purely idealistic sense, but they disqualify however the participation of their fellow combatants, and even more that of members of the "enemy" group who are dehumanized and presented as being blinded by propaganda, and tend to attribute their participation to primarily economic motives.

32. Nation, R. C. (2018). Modern Warfare in Former Yugoslavia and Ukraine. *Southeastern Europe*, *42*(3), 305-326. https://doi.org/10.1163/18763332-04203002

The wars in former Yugoslavia from 1991-2001, and Ukraine from 2014 to the present, provide revealing examples of the ways in which contemporary armed conflict is evolving. Their origins lay in domestic rather than inter-state disputes, and they emerged as civil wars born of state failure. The belligerent factions were diverse, including established states, new national polities, and radicalized non-state actors. Operationally the wars were liquid conflicts where adversaries, lacking decisive combat power, often shunned conventional military objectives in favor of attacks on populations, terroristic posturing, and symbolic gestures. The conflicts were internationalized, with powerful external actors at odds over responsibility and preferred outcomes. They were European wars, with European and Euro-Atlantic institutions directly engaged in conflict management, peace enforcement, and post-conflict peace building. The conflicts have contributed to the break down of cooperative security in 21st century Europe and the re-opening of an East-West divide running through the heart of the continent. Managing and containing such clashes is and will remain a major strategic challenge.

33. Ojala, M., Pantti, M., & Kangas, J. (2018). Professional role enactment amid information warfare: War correspondents tweeting on the Ukraine conflict. *Journalism*, *19*(3), 297-313. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884916671158

War correspondents work within a networked media environment characterised not only by an explosion of information but also a wide range of actors producing competing narratives and viewpoints. This study examines the ways in which war correspondents enact their professional roles when tweeting from within a conflict zone. The analysis sheds light on the conditions of modern information warfare in the context of reporting from within the Ukraine conflict. It also identifies the emerging social media practices of war correspondents and the different role categories that journalists are adopting on Twitter.

34. Onuch, O., & Hale, H. E. (2018). Capturing ethnicity: the case of Ukraine. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, *34*(2-3), 84-106. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2018.1452247

Building on past survey-based studies of ethnic identity, we employ the case of Ukraine to demonstrate the importance of taking seriously the multidimensionality of ethnicity, even in a country that is regarded as deeply divided. Drawing on relational theory, we identify four dimensions of ethnicity that are each important in distinctive ways in Ukraine: individual language preference, language embeddedness, ethnolinguistic identity, and nationality. Using original survey data collected in May 2014, we show that the choice of one over the other can be highly consequential for the conclusions one draws about ethnicity's role in shaping attitudes (e.g. to NATO membership), actions (e.g. participation in the Euromaidan protests), and the anticipation of outgroups' behavior (e.g. expectations of a Russian invasion). Moreover, we call attention to the importance of including the right control variables for precisely interpreting any posited effects of ethnicity, making specific recommendations for future survey research on ethnic identity in Ukraine.

35. Sasse, G., & Lackner, A. (2018). War and identity: the case of the Donbas in Ukraine. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, *34*(2-3), 139-157. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2018.1452209

The study of identities struggles to capture the moments and dynamics of identity change. A crisis moment provides a rare insight into such processes. This paper traces the political identities of the inhabitants of a region at war - the Donbas - on the basis of original survey data that cover the four parts of the population that once made up this region: the population of the Kyiv-controlled Donbas, the population of the self-declared Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic, the internally displaced, and those who fled to the Russian Federation. The survey data map the parallel processes of a self-reported polarization of identities and the preservation or strengthening of civic identities. Language categories matter for current self-identification, but they are not cast in narrow ethnolinguistic terms, and feeling more Ukrainian and Ukrainian citizenship include mono- and bilingual conceptions of native language (i.e. Ukrainian and Russian).

36. Sayapin, S. (2018). A Curious Aggression Trial in Ukraine: Some Reflections on the Alexandrov and Yerofeyev Case. *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, *16*(5), 1093-1104. https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqy050

The trial of Russian military servicemen Alexander Alexandrov and Yevgeny Yerofeyev, which took place from 2015 until 2016 in Ukraine and concerned charges, among other things, of waging a war of aggression, has been overlooked in the discourse on international criminal law. Despite the contentious nature of the verdict with respect to its interpretation of the crime of aggression, the judgment should be recorded in

the history of international criminal law for reviving the crime from decades-long dormancy. It is likely this is the first domestic criminal trial on charges of aggression to result in a conviction. The article analyses the key conclusions of the judgment, from the points of view of domestic criminal law in Ukraine and international criminal law, and makes a number of policy recommendations.

37. Shklovski, I., Wulf, V., & Acm. (2018). The Use of Private Mobile Phones at War: Accounts From the Donbas Conflict. *Proceedings of the 2018 Chi Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (Chi 2018).* **https://doi.org/10.1145/3173574.3173960**

Studying technology use in unstable and life-threatening conditions can help highlight assumptions of use built into technologies and foreground contradictions in the design of devices and services. This paper provides an account of how soldiers, volunteers, and civilians use mobile technologies in wartime, reporting on fieldwork conducted in Western Russia and Eastern Ukraine with people close to or participating directly in the armed conflict in the Donbas region. We document how private mobile phones and computers became a crucial but ambiguous infrastructure despite their lack of durability in extreme conditions of a military conflict, and their government and military surveillance potential. Our participants rely on a combination of myths and significant technical knowledge to negotiate the possibilities mobile technologies offer and the life threatening reality of enemy surveillance they engender. We consider the problems of always-on always-connected devices under conditions of war and surveillance and our responsibilities as HCI practitioners in the design of social technologies.

38. Smith, N. R. (2018). The re-emergence of a 'mirror image' in West-Russia relations? *International Politics*, **55(5), 575-594. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0095-z**

This paper examines whether Cold War-style anxiety and paranoia have emerged in the West-Russia relationship since the onset of the Ukraine crisis in 2013. Although the idea that a New Cold War is emerging is repudiated, the possibility that anxiety and paranoia are developing in Eastern Europe is deemed worthy of examination. Using Bronfenbrenner's 'mirror image' theory from the Cold War, the contemporary West-Russia relationship is evaluated through examining the foreign policy discourses of both sides. The evaluation demonstrates that anxiety and paranoia are evident in the relationship which, as during the Cold War, reduces the opportunity for compromise (over Ukraine and Syria) and potentially moves the relationship towards greater competition and conflict.

39. Suzen, H. (2018). The Rise of Political Warfare: Russian New Way of War against the West and the Western Counteractions. *Otoritas-Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan*, **8(2), 98-109. https://doi.org/10.26618/ojip.v8i2.1314**

Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the world has observed a comprehensive Russian political warfare, which has had destabilising consequences and as well as wide-ranging implications for international security, in particular for Europe. On the other hand, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the West mostly focus on public diplomacy and strategic communication rather than political warfare. This change creates a gap in all features of political warfare and makes the West weak to political warfare waged by particularly one-man ruled states. In this respect, firstly, I will define political warfare in the continuum of peace and war. Then, I will develop a new conceptual framework which provides an interdisciplinary approach to understand the specifics of political warfare against the West and its counteractions. To explore how and why the West has failed in countering and undermining political warfare employed by especially one-man ruled states, I will explain the origin and evolution of Russian political warfare and particularly highlight the Ukraine Crisis as a turning point of Russian political warfare which has been evolving since the 1900s. Finally, I will propose ways and means to explain how to counter political warfare using hybrid tactics in the future.

40. Szostek, J. (2018). Nothing Is True? The Credibility of News and Conflicting Narratives during "Information War" in Ukraine. *International Journal of Press-Politics*, **23(1), 116-135. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161217743258**

In international politics, the strategic narratives of different governments compete for public attention and support. The Russian government's narrative has prompted western concern due to fears that it exerts a destabilizing effect on societies in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. However, the behavior and thought processes of news consumers targeted by contradictory strategic narratives are rarely subjected to analysis. This paper examines how Ukrainian news consumers decide where to get their news and what to believe in a media environment where propaganda and disinformation are regarded as major threats to national security. Evidence comes from thirty audio-diaries and in-depth interviews conducted in 2016 among adult residents of Odesa Region. Through qualitative analysis of the diary and interview transcripts, the paper reveals how participants judged the credibility of news and narratives based on their priorities (what they considered important), not just facts (what they believed had happened). The attribution of importance to different foreign policy issues was associated, in turn, with varying personal experiences, memories, and individual cross-border relationships.

41. Tipaldou, S., & Casula, P. (2018). Populist justifications for war? The Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine. *Revista Cidob D Afers Internationals*(119), 135-159. https://doi.org/10.24241/rcai.2018.119.2.135

In the context of the war between Ukraine and Russia in the Donbass and the earlier crisis over Crimea, this paper examines four speeches by Vladimir Putin to identify and map populist elements in his discursive and formal strategies of justifying and creating a specific form of conflict. The analysis shows how this populism goes beyond the people/ establishment dichotomy and is based on complex notions of enmity and alliance, a very broad definition of the Russian nation, a new division of the political space, and the introduction of new symbols of unity and the reaffirmation of old ones beyond the borders of today's Russia. This casts a new shadow over Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet space. Clarity is sought on questions about the Ukrainian conflict, but it is also hoped new elements will be brought to the existing literature on populism.

42. Unver, H. A. (2018). The fog of leadership: How Turkish and Russian presidents manage information constraints and uncertainty in crisis decision-making. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, *18*(3), 325-344. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2018.1510207

Leaders choose to mislead their domestic peers when the political risk and cost associated with a particular foreign policy decision is too great and when the structure of the political system in question is too leader-centric to afford these costs being incurred by the leader. This article argues that risk, uncertainty and imperfect information are not necessarily external, unwanted, or unforeseen factors in foreign policy decisions. In certain cases, they too are instrumentalized and adopted consciously into decision-making systems in order to diffuse the political costs of high-risk choices with expected low utility by insulating the leader from audience costs. This dynamic can be best observed in leader-centric and strong personality cult systems where the leader's consent or at least tacit approval is required for all policies to be realized. This article uses two important case studies that effectively illustrate the use of deliberate uncertainty in decision-making in leader-centric systems: post-2014 Russia (War in Donbass and the annexation of Crimea), and Turkey (ending of the Kurdish peace process and the change in policy towards Syria).

43. Vushko, I. (2018). Historians at War: History, Politics and Memory in Ukraine. *Contemporary European History*, *27*(1), 112-124. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0960777317000431

The on-going military conflict in eastern Ukraine has revitalised historical discussion and history battles in the country rendering history more relevant than ever before. Since 2014 different sides in the conflict have used historical references, specifically to the Second World War, to validate their actions. Moscow most notably claimed to be protecting the population of eastern Ukraine from Ukrainian 'fascists': the story of a three-year Russian boy allegedly crucified by Ukrainian nationalists on Russian state television was enhanced by references to atrocities that Ukrainian nationalists allegedly perpetrated during the Second World War. It is not, of course, the first time a regime has used history as a justification for military aggression or territorial annexation. Across Europe in the twentieth century, history has been used to defend political goals, and politics has been used to write history. The bellicose politicisation of history became the norm in Ukraine in 2014.

44. Wittke, C. (2018). "Test the West": Reimagining Sovereignties in the Post-Soviet Space. *Review of Central and East European Law*, *43*(1), 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1163/15730352-04301005

With the incorporation of the Crimean Peninsula into Russian territory, the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the temporary formation of the confederation of Novorossiia (New Russia), the international community of states has been witness to complex processes of reimagining territories, boundaries, citizenship, and fragmented sovereignties in the post-Soviet space. In its foreign policy agenda, Russia conceptualizes all former Soviet republics as the 'Near Abroad', a special sphere of its interests and influence. This paper explores Russia's use of the vocabulary of international law to legitimize its interventions in the Near Abroad, which is connected to the 'Russkii Mir' (Russian World), another foreign policy concept that resonates with ideas of Neo-Eurasianism and the Fourth Political Theory and with the creation of a Eurasian space as a counter-concept to the West. Russia and its conceptualized antagonist, the West, take positions on public international (legal) front lines, evoking counter-narratives concerning their understandings of the meaning of the vocabulary of international law and politics, the regulation of international relations, and the foundations of world order. These clashes leave observers wondering: Russia may instrumentalize and manipulate the vocabulary of geopolitics, international law, and politics, but what if these clashes are also rooted in different imaginaries of international law and politics? Against this background, this article aims to develop conceptual approaches to further investigate and gain a better understanding of the complex dimensions of the clashes between Russian and Western counter-narratives and discourses concerning the meanings and functions of basic principles of international law and politics as powerful societal regulative imaginaries.

2019

1. Aliyev, H. (2019). The Logic of Ethnic Responsibility and Progovernment Mobilization in East Ukraine Conflict. *Comparative Political Studies*, *52*(8), 1200-1231. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414019830730

The extant theory of ethnic defection rests on the importance of ethnic identity shift and loyalism toward the regime, which were thus far presented as key explanations of side switching in ethnic conflicts. This article challenges the validity of these claims and proposes an alternative theoretical argument. This study argues that individuals mobilize against their coethnics on the side of government that explicitly challenges and opposes ethnonationalist aspirations of their own ethnic group due to perceived obligation of ethnic responsibility to protect their ethnic values. Ethnic defection is likely to occur when and if the rebels are suspected by their coethnics of violating or disregarding sociocultural, ideological, or religious values of their ethnic group. Third-party prorebel intervention is likely to further aggravate or even trigger ethnic defection. This argument is examined empirically in the case of progovernment mobilization during East Ukraine conflict in 2014 to 2015. Microlevel interview data from Ukraine demonstrate that Ukrainian Russian speakers mobilized for the government side, driven by the strong sense of ethnic responsibility, engendered in the perception that separatists misrepresent ethnic values of Ukraine's Russian speakers.

2. Baev, P. K. (2019). THE EVOLVING RUSSIAN CHALLENGE TO EU ENERGY SECURITY. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, *18*(2), 41-48.

The intensity of Russian threat to the EU energy security has diminished in terms of major supply interruptions but evolved in forms of indirect attacks, primarily on the integrity of policy-making by using "hybrid warfare" means. The immediate aim of Russia's heavy investments in the construction of new pipelines is to minimize gas transit through Ukraine, which has a potential to result in a disruptive "gas war" by 2020. China is not supportive of Russia 's energy intrigues in Europe, and Turkey seeks to reduce dependency upon Russian gas import. Mid-term prospects in the European gas market are not favorable for Russia, but in the short-term, Moscow's propensity to energy securitization or "weaponization" may be restrained.

3. Bowen, A. S. (2019). Coercive diplomacy and the Donbas: Explaining Russian strategy in Eastern Ukraine. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, *42*(3-4), 312-343. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1413550

What were Russia's objectives in Eastern Ukraine, and why was it seemingly unable to achieve a successful or decisive outcome? In contrast to Russia's seizure of Crimea, the uprising in Eastern Ukraine was marked by disorganization and chaos. Using proxy and surrogate actors, along with military exercises and the injection of Russian troops, Russia sought to institutionalize a political entity inside Ukraine to influence its domestic politics. In this article, I analyze the mechanisms by which Russia attempted to implement, and later salvage, its strategy. The article contributes to clearer theoretical and practical understanding of limited force in coercive diplomacy, signaling, and a more rigorous treatment of the role and uses of proxy actors.

4. Bukkvoll, T. (2019). Fighting on behalf of the state-the issue of pro-government militia autonomy in the Donbas war. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, *35*(4), 293-307. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2019.1615810

This study investigates the degree of autonomy the Ukrainian volunteer battalions had from the regular forces during the war in Donbas. The findings indicate that the degree of autonomy was high and that in particular, three initial conditions were decisive for this outcome: (1) the relative level of militia military strength in the initial states of conflict; (2) the degree of agenda overlap; (3) the degree of bottom-up organization. The empirical evidence further suggests that the three factors produced the identified outcome through the mechanisms of "institutional lock-in," "performance interdependence," and "entitlement." Consequently, the Ukrainian state and regular forces ended up accepting a higher degree of autonomy, in terms of command and control, on the part of the volunteer battalions than they otherwise probably would have preferred. This outcome contributed significantly to saving the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state in 2014-2015, but may also have created conditions for challenges to the same state further down the road.

5. Bulyk, M., & Gridina, I. (2019). Shades of Gray in the War in Eastern Ukraine: 'Neither War nor Peace' Existence Zones, 'Neither Truth nor Lie' Silence Zones. *Baltic Journal of European Studies*, *9*(3), 166-187. https://doi.org/10.1515/bjes-2019-0028

The concepts of 'gray zone conflict', as one of the new phenomena in the theory of international relations, are given considerable attention in modern strategic researches of analysts, in particular American ones (Hel Brands, Adam Elkus, etc.). The definition of 'gray zone conflict' by American political scientists coincides with the definitions of domestic scholars in outlining the hybrid war in general, and Russian Federation's war against Ukraine in particular. At the same time, qualifying the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the war in Eastern Ukraine as the sole concept of 'gray zone 'shall be considered not to be entirely correct, since the scales tend to favor the definition of civil war, which is so advantageous to Vladimir Putin. On the other hand, the war in Eastern Ukraine has many shades of gray,

which gives grounds to the use of the concept of 'gray zone conflict' on specific examples of the existence of real and imaginary gray zones (realities of existence and zones of silence) and to investigate their quantitative and qualitative characteristics, to determine the degree of the viral use of the gray zone of conflict by the state (as an object of aggression), which complicates its establishment. The possibilities/unacceptability of solving gray zone conflicts by "gray" methods are being outlined as well.

6. Coynash, H., & Charron, A. (2019). Russian-occupied Crimea and the state of exception: repression, persecution, and human rights violations. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, *60*(1), 28-53. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2019.1625279

Since annexing Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula in 2014, Russian authorities there have introduced harsh repressive measures to silence opposition to the ongoing occupation, chiefly targeting the indigenous Crimean Tatars and others pro-Ukrainian individuals. From the legally subversive methods it employed to orchestrate the annexation to the rhetoric of anti-extremism with which it has continually justified its occupation, the Kremlin has inaugurated a new "state of exception" in Crimea, invoking the prerogative to circumvent normative legal and juridical procedures in response to a perceived emergency. While Crimea's state of exception resembles those initiated elsewhere by some Western states and Russia itself as part of the global War on Terror, the state of exception has provided the pretext for a particularly severe degree of repression, persecution, and human rights violations in occupied Crimea. In conjunction with the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, this article discusses the theoretical groundings of the state of exception, its broader applications within the Russian Federation, and its troubling repercussions for residents of Crimea. Casting the Kremlin's actions as belonging to a state of exception helps draw attention to its alarming human rights violations, and may bolster resistance to the creeping normalization of the Russian occupation of Crimea.

7. D'Anieri, P. (2019). Magical realism: assumptions, evidence and prescriptions in the Ukraine conflict. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, *60*(1), 97-117. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2019.1627231

The term "realism" has been invoked often in discussions of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, both to explain what happened and to evaluate potential policy options for the West. This article examines the application of realist international relations theory to the conflict, focusing on two crucial issues. First, before one can apply realist theory to any topic, one must specify what version of the theory one is applying. Whether one adopts "offensive" or "defensive" realism is potentially decisive in determining what policy prescriptions result. If one adopts offensive realism, trying to strike a bargain with Russia makes no sense. If one adopts defensive realism, a deal with Russia is at least theoretically possible. Second, if one adopts defensive realism the key question is whether Russia is a "status quo" or revisionist power. Only if one adopts defensive realism, and if one finds Russia to be a status quo power, does accommodating Russia's demands follow from realist theory.

8. D'Anieri, P. (2019). War, state and society in Ukraine. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, *60*(6), 647-655. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2019.1703200

This collection of papers examines the impact of revolution and war on the development of the Ukrainian state and its sovereignty since 2014. Comparative literature on the state shows that aspects of statehood and sovereignty are shaped by war, and that domestic and international dimensions of statehood do not necessarily covary. The four papers in this collection examine these issues in detail. They show that Ukrainian statehood is strengthening internally and that the European Union is providing substantial external help in building the institutions of the Ukrainian state. However, the breakaway territories in Donetsk and Luhansk are also beginning to build some internal aspects of statehood, to go with the massive support they receive from Russia. These competing statehoods may make the impasse in eastern Ukraine even harder to solve.

9. D'Anieri, P., & Danieri, P. (2019). *Conclusion: Ukraine, Russia, and the West - from Cold War to Cold War*.

Russia's incursions into Ukraine shattered any remaining illusions about order in post-Cold War Europe, leaving Ukraine and the West struggling to respond while Russia reveled in its fait accompli and started to come to grips with its isolation. What caused the conflict? The summary stresses that multiple factors interacted. From the outset, the actors' goals were incompatible, even if that was obscured by the euphoria that accompanied the fall of communism. Viewing the situation as one of conflicting goals in a classic security dilemma not only revises our understanding of what happened, but changes our thinking on what the future might look like. While many choices could have been made differently, the grounds for conflict were deeply rooted, and the actors were much more constrained, both internationally and domestically, than the literature focused on blame would have us believe. The implication is that neither schemes to make Ukraine a neutral country nor waiting for Vladimir Putin to pass from the scene is likely to resolve the conflict.

10. D'Anieri, P., & Danieri, P. (2019). *From Revolution to War, 2013-2015*.

The delay of the Association Agreement spurred protests, and violent repression caused them to grow. Yanukovych's ouster outraged Putin, who again saw a revolution thwart Russia's position in Ukraine. He saw an irresistible opportunity to respond. Seizing Crimea regained a territory Russia had always wanted; it showed that Russia could defy the West; it boosted Putin's domestic popularity; and it hamstrung Ukraine's

new government. The conflict then spread to eastern Ukraine, where the shooting down of a passenger aircraft dramatically increased international outrage at Russia's actions. The West enacted sanctions, while the conflict itself stabilized territorially in the February 2015 Minsk-2 agreement.

11. D'Anieri, P., & Kuzio, T. (2019). Ukraine after five years of conflict. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, *60*(1), 1-5. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2019.1635512

The Euromaidan revolution, Russia's annexation of Crimea, and the proxy war in eastern Ukraine through Europe and the West's relations with Russia into crisis in 2014. Five years later, while the domestic scene has stabilized to some extent and Russia's control of Crimea seems unassailable, the war in eastern Ukraine drags on, the status of Crimea is contested, and Ukrainians roundly rejected the government that came to power after the revolution. The papers in this special issue of the journal consider several outstanding issues in Ukraine and in its relations with Russia and the West.

12. Danieri, P. (2019). *Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War*. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108657044

D'Anieri explores the dynamics within Ukraine, between Ukraine and Russia, and between Russia and the West, that emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union and eventually led to war in 2014. Proceeding chronologically, this book shows how Ukraine's separation from Russia in 1991, at the time called a 'civilized divorce', led to what many are now calling 'a new Cold War'. He argues that the conflict has worsened because of three underlying factors - the security dilemma, the impact of democratization on geopolitics, and the incompatible goals of a post-Cold War Europe. Rather than a peaceful situation that was squandered, D'Anieri argues that these were deep-seated pre-existing disagreements that could not be bridged, with concerning implications for the resolution of the Ukraine conflict. The book also shows how this war fits into broader patterns of contemporary international conflict and should therefore appeal to researchers working on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia's relations with the West, and conflict and geopolitics more generally.

13. Dubsky, Z., & Havlova, R. (2019). Strategic Culture of the OSCE and Its Reflection in the Effort to De-escalate and Resolve the Conflict in Ukraine. *Insight Turkey*, *21*(3), 195-215. https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2018ev.03

The OSCE has until now been the only security organization which directly participated in the effort to de-escalate the war in Eastern Ukraine. As cultural approaches to strategic studies can be also applied to international organizations, this study argues that the OSCE was involved in the attempt to stabilize and resolve the situation partly due to its specific strategic culture. We identify the specific features of the strategic culture of the OSCE as an example of regional security governance between 'non-allies' based on the discursive analysis of OSCE documents and demonstrate how these identified features were reflected in the activities of the OSCE in the conflict in Ukraine.

14. Durkot, J., Kulyk, V., Miscenko, K., Sasse, G., & Wilson, A. (2019). Man without qualities The election of Volodymyr Zelensky in Ukraine. *Osteuropa*, *69*(3-4),3-+.

The election of Volodymyr Zelensky as the new president of Ukraine marks a watershed. Not only the margin of his victory over the incumbent president Petro Poroshenko on 21 April 2019, but also the circumstances in which it occurred, are striking. The newly elected president conducted his campaign almost solely via social media. Content was replaced by "likes". As a "man without qualities", Zelensky offered the perfect projection screen for a wide range of voters' wishes. The main point was that he was a fresh face. At the same time, traditional elements of political culture and institutional peculiarities in Ukraine continue to have an impact. The implications of Zelensky's presidency for domestic and foreign policy, the question of whether he can develop his own room for manoeuvre in order to bring an end to the war in eastern Ukraine, and the extent of progress with regard to Ukrainian nation-building are analysed by Yuri Durkot, Volodymyr Kulyk, Kateryna Mishchenko, Gwendolyn Sasse and Andrew Wilson.

15. Dzhafarova, M. V., Shevchuk, T. A., Kalinovskaya, Y. O., & Stashchak, A. Y. (2019). ECONOMIC SECURITY OF UKRAINE: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECT. *Financial and Credit Activity-Problems of Theory and Practice*, *3*(30), 78-84. https://doi.org/10.18371/fcaptp.v3i30.179511

It has been noted that the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Operation of the United Forces through military intervention in the Donbass by the Russian Federation have caused a powerful effect on the economic security of our country. It has been concluded that economic security is an important component of the national security, which affects the state of defense of the authority of the country, its sovereignty, territorial integrity, defense capability, public harmony, etc. The authors have studied the existing scientific approaches to the definition of the term of "economic security" and have provided own definition of the concept of "economic security of the state". It has been noted that the state of economic security of the country characterizes the general level of the country's economy, the presence and level of threats for the state, society, and individuals; efficiency of the state policy and state regulation of economy; completeness of realization of state functions. Based on the analysis of the situation in Ukraine, the authors have noted that the fragmentation of the economic and customs space of Ukraine, deprivation of the legitimacy of many economic subjects in certain areas, where state authorities do not exercise their powers, the loss of lands and property

by Ukrainian citizens and business entities. The authors have outlined a number of factors that have a potential threat to the economic security of the country, which include: corruption, shadow economy, economic crime, violation of the integrity of the economic system of Ukraine caused by the annexation of the Crimea and the war in the East of the state, as well as the spread of infectious diseases (in particular, HIV and tuberculosis). The perspective areas of research of legal and economic aspects of economic security have determine the issues of the state of economic security in Ukraine, as well as the forecast and perspective of its protection against external and internal threats.

16. Fedorenko, K. (2019). Recruitment, legitimisation, discreditation The "public relations work" of the battalions in the Donbas. *Osteuropa*, *69*(3-4), 177-+.

In armed conflicts and wars, the media play an important role. This is also true of the war in eastern Ukraine. The conflicting parties are attempting to use the media for their own purposes. They propagate their political and military position, agitate their own population and attempt to discredit their opponents. In so doing, they aim to legitimise their actions, to mobilise ideological and material support and to recruit fighters. Social media outlets are gaining in importance.

17. Fedorenko, K., & Umland, A. (2019). Between the front and parliament Voluntary units and political parties in Ukraine. *Osteuropa*, *69*(3-4), 163-+.

Voluntary units were established in Ukraine in 2014. They supported the army in the fight against the separatist rebels and Russian interventionists in eastern Ukraine. Some of these units were founded by political parties and organisations from the right-wing extremist camp. After the hot phase of the war had passed, several of their commanders took on roles in the parliaments and in the administration. However, they did not become an influential political force. The voluntary units were neither willing nor able to successfully assert their interests in the political arena.

18. Freire, M. R. (2019). The quest for status: how the interplay of power, ideas, and regime security shapes Russia's policy in the post-Soviet space. *International Politics*, *56*(6), 795-809. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0164-y

The aim of this article is to analyze how power, ideas, and domestic factors contribute to Russia's goal of status recognition. The article focuses in particular on Moscow's policies and actions in the post-Soviet area. Toward this end, it looks at recent developments in Russia's policy toward Ukraine, including the developments leading to the annexation of Crimea and events after the signing of the Minsk II agreement. Relatedly, it also addresses the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union. Finally, it looks at Moscow's policy toward Georgia since the 2008 war. In short, the article seeks to understand how Russia's status ambitions-underpinned by power politics, ideas, and domestic factors-shape its foreign policy behavior in the post-Soviet area.

19. Galushko, A. (2019). Political justice in Russia Criminal proceedings against Ukrainian citizens. *Osteuropa*, *69*(3-4), 29-+.

In Russia, numerous Ukrainian citizens have been tried in court since the start of the war against Ukraine. Many of them have been given long prison sentences. The trials make a mockery of any rule of law. They have been marked by arbitrary decisions, presumption of guilt and forced confessions. As was the case during the Soviet era, the unwritten rules and practices of a politicized judicial system override the official constitution.

20. Handl, V. (2019). Alienation and cooperation A paradigm change in Germany's policy towards Russia? *Osteuropa*, *69*(1-2), 53-+.

In Germany, signs are emerging of a change in policy towards Russia. A new generation is entering the political stage, and calls are repeatedly being made to resolve the confrontation. Nevertheless, there is every indication that the policy adopted by Berlin since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and unleashed the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine will remain in place. There is now no hope left for a partnership with a democratic, constitutional Russia. Attempts to maintain or renew contacts are not a reflection of a new perspective on Moscow's policies, but rather a return to the old hope of gradual change in Russia. Only the two parties on the right and left fringes, the AfD and Die Linke, are unconcerned that authoritarian Russia is working against Germany's core interest in maintaining a rule-based international order.

21. Haran, O., Yakovlyev, M., & Zolkina, M. (2019). Identity, war, and peace: public attitudes in the Ukraine-controlled Donbas. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, *60*(6), 684-708. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2019.1667845

Contrary to Russia's expectations, military intervention into Ukraine only strengthened the Ukrainian civic nation. As a number of polls demonstrate, since 2014 there is a growing trend that the vast majority of Ukrainians, also in the government-controlled areas of the Donbas, identify themselves, first and foremost, as Ukrainian citizens. Regional and local identity is not their primary choice anymore and there are clear indicators of a strong civic identity that favors a unitary Ukraine. The lack of progress for a solution of the conflict in the Donbas impacts upon Ukrainian public opinion which, in turn, puts pressure on the Ukrainian authorities: there is a wide acceptance of a diplomatic solution to the conflict and readiness for some compromises but the reintegration of the occupied territories should take place according to pre-war

conditions, without any federalization of Ukraine. Also, without establishing a stable security regime in the Donbas there is little support for an implementation of the political part of the Minsk-2 agreement. However, closer to the frontline, the more Ukrainians are ready for compromises. The promise of peace by new President Volodymyr Zelenskyy puts a question on what compromises his team may accept and justify in the eyes of Ukrainians.

22. Holzer, J., Larys, M., & Mares, M. (2019). *Militant right-wing extremism from the beginning of the Putin era to the war in Ukraine (2000-2018).*

Over recent years, there has been an upsurge in militant right-wing extremist activities in Russia. However, since 2015, right-wing extremist entities have proved unable to attract any significant following. The key reason for this was the war in Ukraine and state repression of militant extremist groups. The war split the right-wing extremist camp into two groups (i.e. those who supported the annexation of Crimea or the war in Donbass and those who sided with Ukraine and faced state repression), which weakened any further right-wing extremist actions. This chapter gives a detailed overview of the development of militant right-wing extremism in Russia from the beginnings of the Putin era until the elimination of the main opposition nationalist organisations in 2017–2018.

23. Hosaka, S. (2019). Welcome to Surkov's Theater: Russian Political Technology in the Donbas War. *Nationalities Papers-the Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, *47*(5), 750-773. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.70

The leaked email accounts of Putin's aide on Ukraine, Vladislav Surkov, are vast primary source collections that shed light on the backstage happenings of the Kremlin's politics in the Donbas war. Surkov is an excellent dramaturg; he writes scripts, casts actors, analyzes their performance and narratives, runs promotions, and puts the repertoire into motion to achieve intended reactions of the target audience. Methods and resources employed against Ukraine have much in common with political technology that helps the Kremlin to manipulate public opinion as well as election systems using pseudo-experts, technical parties, fake civic organizations and youth movement such as Nashi, and covert media techniques. Moscow tactically promoted the myth of "Novorossiya"-later the circumstances forced Surkov to replace it with "Donbas." These tactics gave false credibility to "separatists" who would voice Moscow's objections to any attempts of Ukraine to drift westward, creating an illusion in the domestic and international audience. the separatists are not puppets of Moscow but desperately fight against Kyiv junta for their localized identity, and Russia is just there to offer them a helping hand. The Russian policy toward Ukraine after the 2013 fall is an extension of its "virtual" domestic politics, but not traditional diplomacy at all.

24. Kleinschmidt, J. (2019). Offensive realism, differentiation theory, and the war in Ukraine. *International Politics*, *56*(4), 427-443. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0150-4

In this article, I shall demonstrate that several of the arguments made in favour of an offensive realist explanation of Russian actions in Ukraine as part of a power balancing process are inconsistent both with available empirical knowledge of the conflict in Ukraine and with the structural logic postulated by offensive realist theory itself. Rather than a conflict about power in a material sense, I will argue that the war in Ukraine is better understood as a conflict about the incompatibility of the Russian state structure to cope with the imperatives of functional differentiation as understood by theories of world society.

25. Klymenko, E. (2019). A wartime childhood Artillery bombardment and poverty in eastern Ukraine. *Osteuropa*, *69*(3-4), 185-+.

They are the weakest links in human society. War, the worst form of disruption of this society, causes more suffering among young children than anyone else. In Ukraine, more than 200 children have died in the Donbas as a result of military activity, while 200,000 are living in direct proximity to the front, where shooting still continues five years after the outbreak of the war. There, the supply situation is extremely precarious. The 1.5 million refugees from the region also include a large number of children.

26. Kononov, I. F. (2019). DONBASS: LABORATORY OF THE MODERN WAR AND A PLACE OF SOCIAL DISASTER. *Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniya*(7), 152-163. https://doi.org/10.31857/5013216250005802-5

The article discusses military conflict in the Donbass in the context of evolution of war. The concept and practice of the Trinitarian war was destroyed by atomic weapons, national liberation movements, emergence of transnational terrorist networks and, strange as it may seem, a ban on aggression by a system of international conventions. Wars have become unconventional and most of them have acquired the character of proxy wars, which proceed as low-intensity conflicts. Conflict in the Donbas was a product of international contradictions, of the geopolitical struggle of the Russian Federation and the United States. Residents of the region are the suffering side. The population perceives the chain of events since the spring of 2014 as a catastrophe that no one expected. From the point of view of population, the conflict has become a commercial enterprise for elite groups.

27. Kozachenko, I. (2019). Fighting for the Soviet Union 2.0: Digital nostalgia and national belonging in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, *52*(1), 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2019.01.001

This paper focuses on the use of Soviet-era symbols, myths, and narratives within groups on VKontakte social media site over the initial stage of the Ukraine crisis (2014-2015). The study is based on qualitative content analysis of online discussions, visual materials, and entries by group administrators and commentators. It also applies link-analysis in order to see how groups on social media are interrelated and positioned online. It reveals that these online groups are driven primarily by neo-Soviet myths and hopes for a new version of the USSR to emerge. Over time, the main memory work in these groups shifted from Soviet nostalgia and "pragmatic" discourse to the use of re-constructed World War II memories in order to justify Russian aggression and to undermine national belonging in Ukraine. Reliance on the wartime mythology allowed for the labelling of Euromaidan supporters as "fascists" that should be eliminated "once again." This powerful swirl of re-created Soviet memories allowed effective mobilization on the ground and further escalation of the conflict from street protests to the armed struggle. (C) 2019 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

28. Kravchenko, V. (2019). Kharkiv: The Past Lives On. *Soviet and Post Soviet Review*, *46*(3), 324-351. https://doi.org/10.1163/18763324-04603006

Why was Kharkiv assigned the role of an alternative political capital of Ukraine during the Euromaidan revolution of 2014? Why did this plan fail? In this article the author tries to answer these questions by exploring Kharkiv's role and place in the regional context of ongoing Ukrainian nation-state building in the historical perspective, focusing on the period after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Issues of regional geopolitics on the Ukrainian-Russian border as well as the changing symbolic landscape of the city are explored. The proactive role of the central authorities as well as specific local traditions and identity played their roles in keeping Kharkiv on the sidelines of the "hybrid war" that engulfed the Donbas. The modernization matrix that promoted Kharkiv's growth from a provincial town into a regional leader prevailed over the rhetoric of Russian nationalism employed by Putin's regime during the annexation of the Crimea. At the same time, social apathy and national ambivalence, so typical of a borderland zone, also prevented the local population from falling into political extremes. Kharkiv's cultural space continues to be a battlefield of competing discourses, each of which has been projected into the past and the future.

29. Kuromiya, H. (2019). The War in the Donbas in Historical Perspective. *Soviet and Post Soviet Review*, *46*(3), 245-262. https://doi.org/10.1163/18763324-04603003

Does the Donbas represent the stronghold of Russian separatism? Since Russia's military intervention in the Donbas (following its occupation of the Crimea), this view of the Donbas as un-Ukrainian or anti-Ukrainian has gained wide circulation in and outside Ukraine. Yet it is patently wrong. In the Donbas, there have never been ethnic, linguistic, or religious (sectarian) conflicts to speak of, nor did its population consistently manifest strong pro-Russian or pro-Union sentiments. True, such sentiments existed in the Donbas, like elsewhere in much of Dnieper Ukraine, but they never dominated the political scene of the Donbas. Instead, until the twenty-first century this region always tended to be anti-imperialist and anti-metropolitan. What is remarkable is that in 1991 the Donbas overwhelmingly supported the independence of Ukraine. What followed in the wake of Ukraine's independence was an attempt by the Donbas power holders, in particular Viktor Yanukovych, to take over all of Ukraine. Moscow helped this attempt, which failed ultimately. The "free steppe" of the Donbas undeniably attracted, among others, radical Russian nationalists from outside and provided them with space for action. It is this historical characteristic of the Donbas as the "free steppe" that has colored the popular view of this region as a stronghold of Russian separatism. In the rest of Ukraine, a strong prejudice against the Donbas as a culturally dark region has only helped to boost this popular misconception.

30. Kuzyk, P. (2019). Ukraine's national integration before and after 2014. Shifting 'East-West' polarization line and strengthening political community. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, *60*(6), 709-735. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2019.1703777

This article addresses the question of Ukraine's societal polarization along the East-West line and the state of cohesion and endurance of its political community. In both political and academic discourses, Ukraine is often characterized as a country split between Western and Eastern regional and societal parts belonging to some wider geopolitical and cultural entities. Moreover, the recent upheavals in the life of the country - Euromaidan Revolution, illegal annexation of Crimea and Russian-Ukrainian war in Donbas - have actualized the allegations about Ukraine as a feeble state structure on the brink of disintegration and collapse. The findings in this study challenge both of these claims and it is argued that Ukraine is not a deeply divided or failed state. In practice, the East-West political polarization line is not clearly defined, but to the extent that it does surface in the political and electoral contests, this line has been moving from west to east since the early 1990s. The shifting of the polarization line implies that political and cultural identities in Ukraine are not fixed and, at the same time, reflects a strengthening cohesion of Ukraine's political and cultural space. These

findings are confirmed by the improved and ever-increasing convergence of Ukrainian society following the Euromaidan and Russian military aggression.

31. Lapshyna, I. (2019). Do Diasporas Matter? The Growing Role of the Ukrainian Diaspora in the UK and Poland in the Development of the Homeland in Times of War. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, *8*(1), 51-73. **https://doi.org/10.17467/ceemr.2019.04**

Ukraine has been going through a series o f political and economic crises, notably the Euromaidan revolution and the Russian aggression and subsequent economic downturn. These events triggered fresh transnational diaspora-led activities such as the 'London Euromaidan' and the 'Warsaw Euromaidan'. This paper analyses Ukrainian diaspora volunteerism in the UK and Poland and explores how the Ukrainian diaspora engages and contributes economically, socially, politically and culturally to the development of Ukraine. Drawing on field work in both countries, three main findings were identified. First, due to the events in Ukraine, the Ukrainian diaspora has mobilised, grown stronger and became more united, whilst transforming from a more inward-looking to a more outward-looking community which, as a result, is now more and critically engaging with Ukrainian affairs. Second, the Ukrainian diaspora has the willingness, power and resources to contribute to the development of the home country,claiming to be recognised as an important stakeholder in the development of Ukraine. Thirdly, the Ukrainian government's lack of recognition of the contribution of the Ukrainian diaspora is one of the most significant barriers to more comprehensive diaspora involvement in development.

32. Latkovskyi, P., & Marushchak, A. (2019). PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF DEEPENING EU-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS. *Baltic Journal of Economic Studies*, *5*(2), 96-103. **https://doi.org/10.30525/2256-0742/2019-5-2-96-103**

Three countries: Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have concluded European Union Association Agreements, under similar terms and conditions of European Partnership. Analytical review allowed determining that in their political integrative development, they have similar problems and ways to overcome them. They are distinguished by a relatively high level of democratic freedoms and political pluralism; however, none of them can be considered as a consolidated democracy, these countries have hybrid political regimes. Among the main obstacles occurring on the way of their integration processes, one can distinguish problems associated with ethical, regional, and cultural conflicts; specific features of the formation of constitutional systems; features of the formation of PR technologies of government and society; deep-rooted corruption and influence of oligarchs in party systems and, as a consequence, propensity to use non-constitutional means of political struggle and economic development. Despite these structural problems, favouring European values and norms demonstrated by societies of the three countries holds the promise of consolidating democratic institutions and overcoming problems. The purpose of the article is to determine problems and prospects of deepening relations of the EU with three countries: Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, and to substantiate theses stating that consistent and reinforced integration of the European Union in this region is crucial for further success and development of all actors of this process. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine do not compose a single region (both in a geographical and economic context); however, since 2014 they are developing according to the same scenarios. Their aspiration to integration has provoked problems in relations with Russia and intensified opposition to the policy of Europeanisation within the countries. In Ukraine, the most difficult and severe events took place: it passed through government overthrow, loss of territory, and military actions in Donbas caused by Russia, which continue to this day. For Moldova and Georgia, the choice of democratic imperatives also had grave consequences. In Georgia, they were identified as two long-term wars for the separation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia; ended with the defeat of central authorities and creation of two unrecognized states. Moldova has faced a similar problem in Transnistria in 1992. In all countries, Russian armed forces were important actors who played an important role in determining the results of these conflicts. According to the Democracy Index, Moldova is evaluated as "imperfect democracy"; Georgia - as "hybrid regime"; Ukraine has moved below, from the category of "imperfect democracy" to the lowest"hybrid regime". Over the political pressure of Russia, the EU and Ukraine postpone the provisional application of the DCFTA (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area) to January 1, 2019.There are marked positive consequences of Ukrainian export to the EU, which volume has increased by 30% in 2017. The structure of exports to the EU has shifted towards machines and equipment, fats and oils of vegetable or animal origin, ready-made meals, and products of animal origin. The EU share in Ukrainian exports and imports has also increased due to a significant reduction in trade with Russia. The application of the EU tariff quotas for agricultural production has increased over the 2014-2017 years because Ukrainian producers have gradually overcome the problems with food safety and weak demand for their production. European choice is an extremely important factor for continuous democratization of all these three countries. In spite of competition among European and Eurasian identities, each of them considers itself a European country. The choice to continue the path of association with Europe, made by these countries, despite obvious political risks (especially severe for Ukraine), is the best evidence of their real adherence to European development path.

33. Luxmoore, M. (2019). "Orange Plague": World War II and the Symbolic Politics of Pro-state Mobilization in Putin's Russia. *Nationalities Papers-the Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, *47*(5), 822-839. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2018.48

This article examines the symbolic politics of three pro-state movements that emerged from the "preventive counterrevolution" launched by the Kremlin in response to Ukraine's Orange Revolution. In 2005, youth movement Nashi played upon war memory at its rallies and branded the opposition "fascist"; in 2012, the Anti-Orange Committee countered opposition protests with mass gatherings at Moscow's war commemoration sites; in 2015, Antimaidan brought thousands onto Russia's streets to denounce US-backed regime change and alleged neo-Nazism in Kiev. I show how evocation of the enemy image, through reference to the war experience, played a key role in the symbolism of the preventive counterrevolution. Interviews with activists in these movements discussing their symbolic politics reveal an opposing victim/victor narrative based on an interplay of two World War II myths-the "Great Victory" and the "fascist threat." Moving beyond approaches that view the Soviet and Russian World War II cult as a triumphalist narrative of the Great Victory over fascism, I conclude that its threat component is an understudied element.

34. Mitchnik, I. (2019). Making Donbas, Breaking Donbas: The Impact of Conflict Experience on Identity Shifts in the East of Ukraine. *Ethnopolitics*, *18*(4), 423-443. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2019.1613059

This article adds qualitative insights into research investigating the interrelation of changes in socio-political attitudes and identity of civilian population under circumstances of war by comparing youth attitudes in two cities in the Donbas region of Ukraine. The theoretical lens lies with Bourdieu's thinking tools, Brubaker's triadic nexus, and Fox's/ Miller-Idriss's concept of 'everyday nationhood'. The focus groups indicate that a stronger experience of conflict-related clashes has an impact on how negatively the researched youth groups perceive Russia politically, and the local separatist movement, and on how positively they relate to nationalising trends by the Ukrainian government.

35. Moen-Larsen, N. (2019). "Suitcase - shelling - Russia": narratives about refugees from Ukraine in Russian media. *East European Politics*, *36*(1), 124-142. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2019.1693367

The armed conflict in South-East Ukraine has brought a massive increase in refugees in the Russian Federation. This article examines the meaning-making process surrounding the sudden presence of these refugees, through analysis of narratives in three major national newspapers - Izvestiya, Novaya gazeta and Rossiiskaya gazeta -1 June - 30 September 2014. Three thematic groups of narratives predominated: about war, about refugee reception and aid, and about Russia in international relations. These give meaning to the subject-position "refugees from Ukraine" primarily as war victims and aid recipients.

36. Nikolayenko, O. (2019). Framing and counter-framing a Peace March in Russia: the use of Twitter during a hybrid war. *Social Movement Studies*, *18*(5), 602-621. https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2019.1599852

Framing is vital to the capacity of social movements to enlist popular support and sustain contentious collective action. Using the case of a Peace March held in Moscow on 21 September 2014, the article examines how antiwar activists and their opponents framed a protest against Russia's intervention in Ukraine. The study argues that different interpretations of patriotism underpinned divergent evaluations of the conflict and the construction of opposing identities. An analysis of Twitter posts on the eve of the march shows that peace activists positioned themselves as citizens with high moral standards and a healthy dose of patriotism, criticized the Russian government for military intervention in Ukraine, and called for a peaceful conflict resolution. In turn, opponents of the march considered themselves as real patriots and their adversaries as national traitors, denied Russia's military presence in Ukraine, and fomented an attack on critics of Russian foreign policy. The study contributes to social movement literature by analyzing the framing of antiwar activism on a social media platform in the midst of a hybrid war, marked by a great deal of ambiguity and deception about causes, dynamics, and consequences of military operations by state and non-state actors.

37. Nikolko, M. (2019). THE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA AND CONTINUING INSTABILITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION Dynamics of regional security and new challenges for the Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM). *Shima-the International Journal of Research into Island Cultures*, *13*(1), 27-43. https://doi.org/10.21463/shima.13.1.05

This article provides comprehensive research on sub-regional cooperation between former Soviet Union countries in the Black Sea region. Established in 1997, the Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development in Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova (ODED-GUAM), united four countries in their desire to proceed with sub-regional cooperation and the ambitious goal of challenging the traditional power distribution in the region. In the first part of this article I discuss the rationale for a new sub-regional organisation and the stages of its development. From the very beginning, the ODED-GUAM prioritised democratic and economic development, where security was a secondary factor. With Russia regaining

economic might and strengthening control over the region, the security challenges become a major factor of instability for all members of ODED-GUAM. Starting with Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria conflicts in early nineties, continuing with the Georgian War in 2008 and climaxing with Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the region is experiencing long lasting instability with a growing number of "frozen" and ongoing conflicts.

38. Pantti, M. (2019). THE PERSONALISATION OF CONFLICT REPORTING Visual coverage of the Ukraine crisis on Twitter. *Digital Journalism*, **7(1), 124-145. https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2017.1399807**

This study explores the question of the blurring of traditional boundaries between the personal and the professional in relation to images tweeted during the Ukraine conflict. The study focuses on two Moscow-based correspondents, Shaun Walker and Alec Luhn, and a photojournalist, Paul Hansen, all of whom created parallel conflict narratives on Twitter while reporting on the Ukraine conflict for legacy newspapers. Their use of Twitter is examined here in the context of "personalised reporting" that allows for more opinion and displays of emotion than are typically acceptable in traditional news reporting. The results demonstrate the coexistence of the traditional media's visualisation of conflict with that driven by social media logic.

39. Richardson, T. (2019). The Regional Life of Geopolitical Conflict: The Case of Odes(s)a Oblast. *Soviet and Post Soviet Review*, *46*(3), 263-303. **https://doi.org/10.1163/18763324-04603004**

When the events known as the "Russian Spring" began in the aftermath of Ukraine's Euromaidan Revolution in February 2014, Odessa oblast seemed like it would be particularly vulnerable to separatist activity. This paper offers a tentative explanation for why Odessa oblast escaped war in the 2014-15 phase of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. To do so, it chronicles events in Odessa oblast between fall 2013 and spring 2015 drawing on secondary sources such as news articles, blogs, social media posts, YouTube footage, official statements, and reports. Odessa-based elites' decision to support Ukrainian sovereignty was an important factor hindering the realization of a Donetsk or Luhansk scenario. However, the weak Oblast Administration in the spring of 2014 and the upcoming mayoral elections created a volatile environment that various individuals (oligarchs, politicians, criminal networks) exploited to maintain or enhance their influence in the region. The internationalization of the conflict in the spring of 2014 presented Odessans with stark existential choices which undermined the city's violence-avoiding dispute resolution techniques and culminated in the violence on May 2.

40. Shukan, I. (2019). DEFENDING UKRAINE AT THE REAR OF THE ARMED CONFLICT IN DONBAS: WARTIME VIGILANTISM IN ODESA (2014-2018). *Laboratorium-Russian Review of Social Research*, *11*(3), 71-104. **https://doi.org/10.25285/2078-1938-2019-11-3-71-104**

This article analyzes the phenomenon of vigilantism in Odesa, at the rear of the war in Donbas and in the context of a radical redeployment of the Ukrainian state and a redistribution of violence between state and nonstate actors. This analysis is threefold. The first part provides a sociological account of vigilante groups and their members' social backgrounds. It argues that vigilantism in Odesa has attracted people from four social backgrounds (businessmen, former combatants or security officers, far-right activists, and young people), relies on force-based actions, and implies an intense socialization of vigilantes' bodies into the use of weapons and combat sports. The second part presents the three social rotes of vigilantes-as national community guards, patrolling agents, and justice makers-and explores their associated practices. It shows that an apparently disinterested promotion of public good by vigilantes (security, order, justice) sometimes turns out to be for the benefit of private interests. The third part explores the complex relationship-fluctuating from numerous exchanges of services to a direct confrontation-between vigilante groups and local political and economic elites. Finally, this article argues that the ongoing war has increased the value of vigilantes' paramilitary resources and has provided them with a large measure of social recognition as a necessary and acceptable response to the armed conflict and its hybrid threats. However, this does not exclude public controversies around vigilantism and questions concerning the challenges it represents for the Ukrainian state. This article draws on anthropological approaches to vigilantism, as well as the sociology of violence and crisis situations (political crises, revolutions, intrastate wars); it relies on a combination of primary ethnographic research and secondary materials.

41. Stec, A. (2019). EXTRAORDINARY STATES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER OF UKRAINE - MARTIAL LAW IN 2018. *Przeglad Sejmowy*(5), 53-84. **https://doi.org/10.31268/ps.2019.66**

In this publication, the author analyzes legal norms concerning extraordinary states in the Constitution of Ukraine. The problems are examined based on Ukrainian and foreign constitutional and statutory solutions. In the Constitution, the Ukrainian constitutional legislator specified the fundamental principles of the legal system related to the functioning of the state in extraordinary situations. In the paper, the following are discussed: state of emergency, state of war, state of natural disaster and martial law. Unfortunately, the development of armed conflict techniques and the officially undeclared war of the Russian Federation and its

mercenaries against Ukraine enforce multiple law amendments. Currently, Russian authorities violate multiple human rights in the territory of Ukraine. Particularly noteworthy is the analysis of legal norms and a description of martial law, which was introduced in 2018 in 10 oblasts (provinces) of Ukraine as well as the reasons for its introduction. The discussed problems are a manifestation of the diplomacy crisis. The current manifestations of the destruction of international trust also affect the security of Poland and all of the Central-Eastern Europe.

42. Strelnyk, O. (2019). GENDERED PROTESTS: MOTHERS' CIVIC ACTIVISM AND THE WAR IN UKRAINE. *Laboratorium-Russian Review of Social Research*, *11*(2), 103-124. https://doi.org/10.25285/2078-1938-2019-11-2-103-124

The dramatic events of the Euromaidan protests, from November 2013 to April 2014, and the consequent armed conflict in the east of Ukraine have led to civil society activation, including women's activism. I focus on how ideas and expectations about women's rotes as mothers frame mothers' activism related to war issues and the image of mothers during wartime in general. The structure of the article is as follows: In the first and second sections of the article, I examine the theoretical background and the sociopolitical context of mothers' civic activism in Ukraine. I evaluate how ideas about femininity and motherhood are represented in the form of public gender ideals and expectations and how they were (re)constructed during the Euromaidan protests, which were the immediate precursor to the armed conflict in the east. In the third and fourth sections, I analyze how the activism of soldiers' mothers' groups, as well as discourses and media representations of this activism, constructs ideas about women's rotes as mothers. Applying the concept of gendered social movements developed by Rachel Einwohner, Jocelyn Hollander, and Toska Olson, I evaluate how this activism is gendered. First, it is gendered by common identities as mothers and by maternal images, as in the names of their organizations, all of which include references to "mothers." Second, it is gendered implicitly in its goats and, more specifically, in its reflection of traditional gender stereotypes and expectations about care as women's primary responsibility. Third, it is gendered in its tactics, through the use of slogans highlighting motherhood as the basis for the claim to be active in the public space. Fourth, this activism is gendered by the rhetoric that activists use, with their claims that, for instance, "women are natural peace builders." Finally, this activism is gendered in the ways it is represented and reported in the media. Thus, the images of "good" and "bad" mothers are constructed in the media as related to women's "rotes" during war.

43. Summers, A., Leidman, E., Periquito, I., & Bilukha, O. O. (2019). Serious psychological distress and disability among older persons living in conflict affected areas in eastern Ukraine: a cluster-randomized cross-sectional household survey. *Conflict and Health*, *13*, Article 10. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13031-019-0194-0

BackgroundOlder persons are often unable to leave conflict areas; however, little is known about the mental and physical health among this population. Our objective was to determine the prevalence of and whether there was an association between psychological distress and disability among older persons affected by conflict in eastern Ukraine.MethodsWe conducted a cluster-randomized cross-sectional household survey of persons aged 60years in government and non-government controlled areas (GCA and NGCA) of Donetsk and Luhansk regions in January-March 2016. Psychological distress and dependency (degree of disability) were measured using the Kessler K6 Psychological Distress Scale and Katz Index of Independence in Activities of Daily Living, respectively. Association between psychological distress and dependency was assessed using logistic regression adjusting for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.ResultsFinal sample included 758 and 418 persons in GCA and NGCA, respectively. Prevalence of serious psychological distress was 33.6% (95% Confidence Interval (CI), 28.0-39.7%) in GCA and 42.5% (95%CI, 36.1-49.2%) in NGCA. Overall, 32.2% (95%CI, 27.9-36.7%) of independent persons and 74.0% (95%CI, 65.2-81.2%) of moderately/severely dependent persons reported serious psychological distress (P<.0001). Being dependent, a woman, and having a chronic disease were all significantly associated with psychological distress in a logistic regression model.ConclusionsPrevalence of serious psychological distress was very high compared with rates reported from developed countries and was highly associated with disability. Health services for the disabled, including psychological as well as physical support, could help in reducing the proportion of people needing mental health services not normally identified.

44. Wanner, C. (2019). Commemoration and the New Frontiers of War in Ukraine. *Slavic Review*, *78*(2), 328-+, Article Pii s0037677919000883. https://doi.org/10.1017/slr.2019.88

The war in eastern Ukraine continues to produce casualties and an ever growing number of refugees and displaced persons every day. When urban public space is dedicated to commemorating the dead who have died since the Maidan protests, the frontiers of war become inscribed in the urban landscape and in the everyday life of many Ukrainians. These commemorative spaces are an unrelenting reminder of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine that threatens to remake political borders once again. Commemorative practices articulate new understandings of relatedness as symbolic statements that, once inscribed in public space, have the potential to affect the thinking of locals and far outlive the actual armed conflict that produced them.

45. Wynnyckyj, M. (2019). Ukraine's Maidan, Russia's War: A Chronicle and Analysis of the Revolution of Dignity. In *Ukraine's Maidan, Russia's War: a Chronicle and Analysis of the Revolution of Dignity* **(Vol. 1, pp. 1-423).**

In early 2014, sparked by an assault by their government on peaceful students, Ukrainians rose up against a deeply corrupt, Moscow-backed regime. Initially demonstrating under the banner of EU integration, the Maidan protesters proclaimed their right to a dignified existence; they learned to organize, to act collectively, to become a civil society. Most prominently, they established a new Ukrainian identity: territorial, inclusive, and present—focused with powerful mobilizing symbols.

46. Yakovenko, A. V. (2019). SOCIOLOGIST IN CONTEXT OF ARMED CONFLICT IN DONBASS. *Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniya***(7), 143-151. https://doi.org/10.31857/s013216250005800-3**

Preservation, and in some cases expansion, of armed conflict zones in the world in general and in the post-Soviet territory in particular, confirms relevance of a thorough analysis of the possibilities to conduct qualified sociological research in military confrontation areas. The article provides a summary of a number of the most typical difficulties arising in the preparation of a sample set, establishing a constructive frank dialogue with the respondents. The situation in Donbas, so author, has precedence, both in terms of its vast territory of the conflict, and in the number of people living in the social atmosphere of the war. Special attention is paid to the problem of an unbiased assessment of what is happening. There are pressures on the correctness of academic analysis and research findings, ideologically rich environment, as well as the feasibility of legal responsibility for the use of taboo terms in scholarly texts. Author argues for importance of specialized training of sociologists to work in extreme conditions. It is proposed to intensify initiatives to specify legal base, primarily in terms of international law to ensure the status of sociologists' activities in zones of military conflicts, as well as areas of man-made and natural disasters. Sociological research should be considered one of the procedures to normalize social relations and establish civilized dialogue.

47. Yekelchyk, S. (2019). Regional Identities in the Time of War Guest Editor's Introduction. *Soviet and Post Soviet Review***,** *46***(3), 239-244. https://doi.org/10.1163/18763324-04603002**

The author argues against the widespread Western stereotype of Ukraine as a nation divided into two parts: the pro-Western, nationalistic west and the pro-Russian east. He emphasizes the importance of studying Ukraine's individual regions because their reaction during the 2014 war was determined as much by their diverse historical traditions and cultural identities as by the decisions of the local elites and grassroots political activism on both sides. Even before the conflict, the notion of a united Ukrainian "Southeast" served as a tool of Russian propaganda rather than objective analysis; once the conflict started, it was no longer possible to ignore the profound differences among the provinces usually included in it.

48. Zajaczkowski, J. (2019). Homogeneity and fragmentation The changing nature of voluntary battalions in Ukraine. *Osteuropa***,** *69***(3-4), 81-+.**

The Ukrainian voluntary battalions were created in a historic emergency. During the first phase of the war, these units acted in a highly autonomous way and pursued the same interests as the representatives of the state. However, the Minsk II Agreement fundamentally changed the relationship between the state and the voluntary units. The movement became fragmented. The volunteers find themselves confronted with considerable social and societal problems in their attempt to reintegrate into civilian society. The extent of their political capacity to act is also limited.

2020

1. Alim, E. (2020). An Analysis of the Potential Consequences of Denuclearization with Reference to Ukraine. *Gazi Akademik Bakis-Gazi Academic View***,** *13***(26), 79-112.**

Nuclear weapons reduce the likelihood of war and conflict among nuclear-armed states. States that are in an inferior position in the military balance gain "absolute deterrence", if they possess nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are, therefore, functional devices in calibrating deterrence asymmetry between weak and strong states in favor of the former. In this article's case study, Russia-Ukraine relations, should be understood in this light. As witnessed during the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Russia violated Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity through military incursions into Crimea and Donbas. In the light of Russia's military actions, discussions surrounding Ukraine's elimination of its nuclear arsenal, which took place during the 1990's, have surfaced again. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited the world's third largest nuclear weapons stockpile, which it removed from its soil during a process that was completed in 1996. This work seeks to trace this process and analyze the potential impacts of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament with reference to the 2014 crisis. By way of conclusion, in the context of the 2014 crisis that, denuclearization constitutes a potential national security risk for states (Ukraine) that face formidable nuclear-armed rivals (Russia).

2. Aliyev, H. (2020). Pro-government Anti-government Armed Groups? Toward Theorizing Pro-government "Government Challengers". *Terrorism and Political Violence.* **https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2020.1785877**

This study challenges the presentation of non-state armed groups as divided into anti-government rebels and pro-government proxies and proposes that some pro-government armed groups maintain explicit anti-government rhetoric. It is this anti-government agenda that enables "pro-government" groups to successfully recruit their members and to advance their interests. From Iraq's Shiite militias to Lebanon's Hezbollah and Afghan Uzbek warlords, there are numerous armed groups which, on the one hand, officially maintain pro-government stance and, on the other hand, explicitly criticize, oppose and challenge the state. On a theoretical level, this study seeks to demonstrate that a "pro-government anti-government" group is a distinct category of non-state armed groups that neither directly engages in armed confrontation with the state nor complies with its agenda and policies or fully accepts its legitimacy. On an empirical level, this paper explores why individuals mobilize for pro-government anti-government armed groups. Unique micro-level interview data with members of volunteer militia battalions in Ukraine are employed to provide insights into the functioning of pro-government anti-government militants. Drawing upon its empirical findings, this study proposes that pro-government "government challengers" emerge and persist because these groups are more efficient than the government in the provision of security and in promoting the incumbent's ideology.

3. Atland, K. (2020). Destined for deadlock? Russia, Ukraine, and the unfulfilled Minsk agreements. *Post-Soviet Affairs, 36*(2), 122-139. **https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2020.1720443**

Bringing peace, security, and stability to the war-torn region of Donbas has proven to be a challenging - some would say near-impossible - task. The "Minsk II" agreement, signed in February 2015, was supposed to put an end to the armed hostilities, resolve the underlying political issues, and gradually restore Ukrainian government control of the country's eastern border. None of this has happened. Despite continuous Western support and pressure, progress in the implementation of the peace plan signed in Minsk has been slow, also after the much-anticipated Paris summit of the "Normandy Four" (Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France) in December 2019. This article discusses the underlying causes of the current stalemate, emphasizing factors such as the inherently complex nature of the conflict, the process through which "Minsk II" came into being, the vague and ambiguous language of this and other agreements, practical challenges related to the timing and sequencing of agreed-upon measures, and Russia's persistent non-acknowledgement of its role in the conflict.

4. Averianova, N., & Voropaieva, T. (2020). Transformation of the Collective Identity of Ukrainian Citizens After the Revolution of Dignity (2014-2019). *Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal*(7), 45-71.

In the modern world, there is a growing interest in the problem of forming a person's identity. The category of "identity" despite the diversity of theoretical and empirical research, remains complex. The article is devoted to the study of transformations of the collective identity of Ukrainian citizens after the Revolution of Dignity, in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war in Eastern Ukraine. In the period from 2013 to 2019, there have been radical changes in many spheres of public life in Ukraine. The Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of the Crimea, and the war in the Donbas all led to significant political, legal, and socio-economic and socio-cultural changes that contributed to the processes of the transformation of the collective identity of Ukrainian citizens. The aim of this article is to study the dynamics of the changes in the collective identity of Ukrainian citizens after the Revolution of Dignity through the prism of the integrative approach.

5. Barthel, M., & Buerkner, H. J. (2020). Ukraine and the Big Moral Divide: What Biased Media Coverage Means to East European Borders. *Geopolitics, 25*(3), 633-657. **https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2018.1561437**

Geopolitical shifts and the changing significance of borders in the EU's neighbourhood are usually understood as a matter of international power politics. Factors that accompany geopolitical impact on borders, such as media coverage of geopolitical change, often appear as secondary or irrelevant. However the recent Ukraine conflict revealed the contrary as pro-EU attitudes were strongly supported by 'western' media. Therefore this paper seeks to clarify the role of news media in creating perspectives and attitudes on geopolitical shifts and the significance of European borders. Empirical evidence on the coverage of the evolving Ukraine crisis by German news sources portrays the media as promoters of biased framings and imaginaries which suggest that the EU be a potential conflict party in the newly evolving geostrategic confrontation in its eastern neighbourhood. The findings indicate that during critical periods of the Ukraine crisis media reports combined rising euphoria about Europe and 'the West', as defenders of the 'good cause', with excessive moral polarising and the discursive normalisation of a rhetoric of escalation. Imaginaries of a bipolar world (The West against Russia) and a new Cold War prepared the ground for a new understanding of European borders and neighbourhood relations as being manipulable at will.

6. Bazaluk, O., & Balinchenko, S. (2020). Dynamic Coordination of Internal Displacement: Return and Integration Cases in Ukraine and Georgia. *Sustainability,* *12*(10), Article 4123. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12104123

The conflict-related internal displacement in Ukraine since 2014, after the armed combats with Russian military forces backing the separatist administrations, as well as the occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation have not been state-organized. They imply a range of personal choices depending on civil positions and destinations for resettlement; therefore, the affected persons get involved in the consequent practical discourses and decision-making processes. Based on the legislative acts and the international reports on internal displacement, the internal displacement due to the current hybrid war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine is compared with the first Russia-backed separatist conflicts after the collapse of the USSR-the wars in South Ossetia, in 1992, and in Abkhazia, in 2008. The internal displacement situations have been reviewed through their dynamic coordination patterns, with regard to non-equilibrium transitions, fluctuations, and adaptations triggered on the systemic, community, and personal levels, as well as to the expected durable solutions: integration, return, temporary resettlement. Therefore, we suggest, for further discussion, the patterns of bistability-for the internal displacement due to the Russo-Georgian wars of 1992 and 2008, characterized by an overfocus, in the practical discourses, on the return of the internally displaced persons (IDP), and metastability-for the conflict-related internal displacement in Ukraine, with both the return and local integration solutions creating the quasi-stable system.

7. Beley, O. (2020). UKRAINIAN ANTHROPONYMY IN THE SOCIOPOLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE POST-TOTALITARIAN PERIOD. *Anuari De Filologia-Llengues I Literaturas Modernas*(10), 83-92. https://doi.org/10.1344/aflm2020.10.6

The article is devoted to the distribution of anthroponyms in the Ukrainian language in the post-totalitarian period, which is divided in two subperiods: 1991-2013, 2013 till today (beginning of 2020). The second subperiod is conditioned by the following factors: sociopolitical events connected with the war in the Donbas, the process of Ukraine's European integration, intensification of work migration, growth of consumerism and popularity of the Western standards of living. In the sphere of official anthroponyms, i. e. names and surnames, there are two parallel tendencies of transformation: patriotic domestication and exotic novelization. Whereas in the sphere of unofficial anthroponyms -nicknames - there is a clear reaction to the war in the Donbas.

8. Brusylovska, O., & Glebov, S. (2020). *"Russian World" in the Black Sea Region: The Case of Ukraine*. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24878-9_14

The key research question of this chapter is how the "Russian World" concept influenced the evolution of different national identities in Ukraine and how the concept is used in the hybrid war. The paper hypothesizes that the concept of the Russian World impedes strengthening not only Ukrainian national identity but also threatens regional and global security.

9. Cancio, R., Kuptsevych-Timmer, A., & Omori, M. (2020). Perpetual War with the Brother Nation: An Analysis of Ukrainian Veterans, Cultural Identity and Historical Trauma. *Journal of War & Culture Studies*, *13*(3), 219-236. https://doi.org/10.1080/17526272.2018.1558536

Understanding historical and cultural dimensions of pain is an area relatively understudied by scholars. This is particularly the case for those affected by war, such as combat veterans. Using in-depth interviews, this study analyses interpretations of the pain by Ukrainian combat veterans serving in the current war in the east of Ukraine. Our findings reveal two core themes that shape meanings of pain: Ukrainian cultural identity and historical trauma. Being Ukrainian is a salient construct, shaped by respondents' identities as soldiers, nationality, and the understanding of pain as an integral part of Ukrainian soldiers' identity. Historical trauma is experienced more broadly as a nation and is drawn from shared experiences of pain that transcend through history, as Ukraine has wavered between legitimacy as a sovereign state and colony of a 'brother-nation' to Russia.

10. Driscoll, J., & Steinert-Threlkeld, Z. C. (2020). Social media and Russian territorial irredentism: some facts and a conjecture. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, *36*(2), 101-121. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2019.1701879

After Kremlin policymakers decided to incorporate the territory of Crimea into Russia, updates on public attitudes in Russian-speaking communities elsewhere in Ukraine would have been in high demand. Because social media users produce content in order to communicate ideas to their social networks, online political discourse can provide important clues about the political dispositions of communities. We map the evolution of Russian-speakers' attitudes, expressed on social media, across the course of the conflict as Russian analysts might have observed them at the time. Results suggest that the Russian-Ukrainian interstate border only moved as far as their military could have advanced while incurring no occupation costs - Crimea, and no further.

11. Elizbarashvili, N., Niemets, L. M., Meladze, G., Sehida, K. Y., Lohvynova, M. O., Meladze, M., & Sidamonid, D. (2020). FORCED MIGRATIONS OF GEORGIA AND UKRAINE: REASONS FOR THE EMERGENCE, PROCESS FEATURES, IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTRIES. *Visnyk of V N Karazin Kharkiv National University-Series Geology Geography Ecology* (52), 139-155. https://doi.org/10.26565/2410-7360-2020-52-11**

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the causes, current realities and consequences of forced migrations of Georgia and Ukraine in order to identify key strategies for resolving the socio-economic problems of internally displaced persons and transforming them from a "problem vulnerable group" into an indicator of socio-economic development of the countries. Methodology. The study was conducted using a set of multidisciplinary approaches and methods. The paper was used philosophical, general scientific and concrete scientific research methods. Among them: methods of analysis and synthesis, comparative geographical method, mathematical and statistical, graphical method, problem method and some others. Results. Forced migration in Georgia and Ukraine is associated with armed conflicts, which were supported by the separatist sentiments of the part of the population. The center of the military confrontation in Georgia in 1989-1992 was the Tskhinvali region (South Ossetia), and in 1992-1993-Abkhazia. In 2008, an armed conflict arose between Georgia, Russia and the separatist groups of South Ossetia, referred to as the Russian-Georgian war. In 2014, the Donbass (Donetsk and Luhansk regions) became a center of hostilities in Ukraine. Because of such military conflicts, millions of people have become internally displaced persons-a socially vulnerable category of the population. Analysis of the structural features of the IDPs of Georgia and Ukraine shows the unevenness of their territorial distribution: IDPs are settled in large cities close to their previous homes and almost completely ignore the countryside. Such resettlement speaks about possible intentions to return to their previous places of residence. As a result of the displacement of IDPs, a large burden on the social and economic spheres is observed in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as Kharkiv regions, the city of Kiev. A similar picture is observed in Georgia: IDPs are settled closer to the occupied regions of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, in large cities and districts of Tbilisi, Samegrelo-Zemo, Svaneti and Imereti. IDPs have become a real challenge for both countries, with which the government could not finally cope. Unresolved in both countries are the housing problems of IDPs. In Ukraine, in addition to the housing problem, IDPs face acute problems with determining their status, social benefits, and employment. Ignoring the solution of these problems leads to increased tension in society, conflicts at the local level between the migrants and the local population, and, as a consequence, to repeated internal displacement. Resolving the problems of forced migrants should be the first line of policy with IDPs. Scientific novelty. a comprehensive comparative analysis of forced migration of Georgia and Ukraine related to military conflicts in the paper was carried out for the first time. The methodology of humangeographical research of migration processes, in particular forced migration, has been improved. The application of the joint experience of Georgia and Ukraine in solving the problems of IDPs was further developed. Practical significance. Studying the joint experience of countries in solving the socio-economic problems of IDPs, the features of their integration and adaptation will contribute to a deeper analysis of these processes at all levels of territorial organization, ensuring the erasing of borders between such a category as "migrants" and "ordinary population". This paper is only a part of the comprehensive study of the problems of IDPs, so the next step will be a study of the features of IDP integration in the host communities of Georgia and the implementation of this experience for Ukraine.

12. Gackowski, T., & Brylska, K. (2020). 'Machiavellian Russia' in the Crimean conflict: Clarification of strategic narratives analysis method. *Journalism*, Article 1464884920928157. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884920928157**

The article concerns the strategic narratives concept as a tool of soft power and proposes methods and techniques of analysing strategic narratives. We argue that the best approach should apply a methodological triangulation which combines different methods and techniques while simultaneously addressing gaps in the implementation of theoretical perspectives. We present a theoretical concept of analysis and validate it using the example of a case study of the Crimea conflict in 2014 and 2015. Relying on the following three sources of original data: content analysis of media coverage (press comments over 8 weeks of 2014 and 2015), a cross-sectional survey (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing), and survey and focus group interviewing on the reception of Internet memes; we show that a strategic narrative works both in the media and in the opinions of media recipients. Investigating the 'Machiavellian Russia' strategic narrative, we show that mass-media interpretation of present events seems to depend on historical context and comparisons, which create a specific bubble around recipients of media messages.

13. Gentile, M. (2020). Diabolical Suggestions: Disinformation and the Curious Scale of Nationalism in Ukrainian Geopolitical Fault-line Cities. *Geopolitics*. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2020.1830766**

During the past few years, research on conflict in cities has built valuable intellectual bridges across boundaries into numerous surrounding fields. One such area - the study of the spatiality of (dis/mis-

)information - is an indispensable ingredient in the concept of the geopolitical fault-line city, the empirical solidity of which this article sets out to investigate using the case of two strategically crucial cities in Ukraine: Kharkiv and Dnipro. Two main questions are addressed: (1) Who places the blame for the Russo-Ukrainian war primarily on Russia? (2) Who would be ready to oppose a hypothetical Russian invasion of the city using non-violent methods? Because Russia is the party primarily responsible for the unfolding of armed conflict in Ukraine, the first question implicitly explores who it is that is least influenced by pro-Russian disinformation narratives, whereas the second question explores the central security implication of this particular situation. The article uses data from two sample surveys conducted in the case study cities in 2018 (n = ca. 1250 for each city), and reports its findings in amultivariate setting, aiming to contribute to the general literature on divided and contested cities, as well as to the more specific literature on the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The results show that the categories of "Ukrainian" and "Russian" are of relatively little salience in the case study cities, contrary to the (now slowly fading) narrative of ethnic polarization that has been haunting many academic and especially media portrayals of Ukraine. What matters, instead, is self-identification as "European" or "Soviet", imaginary supranational communities that are geopolitical at heart.

14. Grigoryan, A. (2020). Selective Wilsonianism: Material Interests and the West's Support for Democracy. *International Security*, *44*(4), 158-200. **https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00378**

When a mass movement broke out in 2013 against the corrupt government of Viktor Yanukovich in Ukraine, the United States and its West European allies mobilized to support it. The policy was justified by the Wilsonian logic of promoting democracy and celebrated as such by liberals. Realists for the most part agreed with the liberal argument regarding the motive of that support, but criticized it as delusional and argued that the subsequent civil war in Ukraine was the consequence of that policy. This is a puzzle, because five years prior to the Ukrainian events, a mass movement had rocked Armenia- another post-Soviet state. The West's attitude toward that movement, however, ranged from indifference to hostility, even though the Wilsonian motives for supporting that movement should have been stronger. The difference in the West's response resulted from the different positions of the two movements toward Russia: the Ukrainian movement was intensely hostile toward Russia, whereas the Armenian movement was not. In other words, where Wilsonianism dovetailed with a geopolitical motive, it was triggered; where it diverged, Wilsonianism remained dormant. This is not a deviation from the general pattern either. Contrary to the popular narrative, the West has supported democracy only when that support has been reinforced by material interests, and rarely, if ever, when it has posed a threat to such interests.

15. Halhash, R., Semenenko, I., Ovcharenko, I., & Borova, G. (2020). Innovative Forms of Realization of Regional Social Policy by Organizing Public Dialogue and Communication in Conditions of Post-conflict Transformation in Eastern Ukraine. *European Journal of Sustainable Development*, *9*(2), 391-404. **https://doi.org/10.14207/ejsd_2020.v9n2p391**

The current socio-economic situation in Eastern Ukraine, complex processes of economic recovery, internal displacement cause numerous conflicts between local and displaced population and institutions. In these circumstances the issues of implementation of effective regional social policy instruments, integration of internally displaced persons into local communities, strengthening social cohesion and peacebuilding become important. The purpose of the article is to substantiate innovative forms of implementation of regional social policy by organizing public dialogue and communication in conditions of post-conflict transformation in Eastern Ukraine, which would ensure sustainability of conflict resolution. The article shows the experience of implementing the results of experimental studies on organizational support for interaction of institutions on conflict prevention and resolution in the project "Geoinformation system for monitoring, analysis, assessment and resolution of conflicts in communities". The essence, basic principles, components and tasks of the geoinformation system, which is realized through creation of the online resource and the network of regional experts working under support of the international community, were presented.

16. Hill, F. (2020). 2016: Putin: The one-man show the West doesn't understand. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, *76*(6), 438-442. **https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2020.1847532**

The West is at an inflection point in its relations with Russia; the stakes for having an accurate understanding of its president, Vladimir Putin, have never been higher. A misreading of this man - now one of the most consequential international political figures and challengers to the US-led world order since the end of the Cold War - could have catastrophic consequences. Russia's 8,000 nuclear weapons (and the vehicles to deliver them to any point on the globe) underscore the huge risks of not understanding who Putin is, what he wants, how he thinks, and why. Where do his ideas and conceptions come from? How does Putin look at the outside world? Why did he annex Crimea in 2014 and intervene in Syria in 2015? What does he know about the West? What does he think about the United States? These are all critical questions.

17. Hovorun, C. (2020). War and Autocephaly in Ukraine. *Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal*(7), 1-25.

A series of conflicts that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union culminated in the war in Ukraine waged by Russia in 2014. The international community was taken by surprise, and its reactions to the Russian aggression were often confused and inadequate. Even more confused and inadequate were the responses from global Christianity. Russian propaganda often renders the aggression against Ukraine as a quasi-religious conflict: a "holy war" against the "godless" or "heterodox" West. It would be natural, therefore, for the Christian churches worldwide to loudly condemn both propaganda and aggression. However, in most cases, their response was silence. Such reactions came from most local Orthodox churches, the Roman Catholic church, and international ecumenical organizations such as the World Council of Churches. An exception was the reaction from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which decided to grant autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The article argues that the Tomos for autocephaly was, among other reasons, a reaction to the war in Ukraine. The responses of other local Orthodox churches to the Tomos also indicate their attitude to the war in Ukraine. These reactions have demonstrated a profound crisis in inter-Orthodox solidarity and social ethics.

18. Howlett, M. (2020). Playing Near the Edge: An Analysis of Ukrainian Border Youths' Engagement with the Euromaidan. *Problems of Post-Communism.* **https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2020.1845212**

While citizenries' responses to sociopolitical events are often studied, how youth engage with such happenings remains unclear. This article therefore analyzes 45 texts written by individuals under the age of eighteen in three of Ukraine's regions-Zakarpattia, Volyn, and Chernihiv-following the Euromaidan of 2013-14. The study reveals the ways young Ukrainians absorbed, upheld, and (re)inscribed national narratives and discourses in light of the demonstrations and subsequent war. Though it remains uncertain whether their feelings will be sustained into the future, the paper emphasizes the wide-reaching effects of sociopolitical happenings on a country's entire population.

19. Hranchak, T. (2020). Construction of Historical Memory by Libraries in Non-Government-Controlled Territory of Donbas as a Technology for Regional Identity Transformation. *Storinky Istoriyi-History Pages*(51), 234-257. **https://doi.org/10.20535/2307-5244.51.2020.220188**

The purpose of this paper is to identify the key semantic emphases of the concepts of historical memory that are constructed by the libraries located on the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Lugansks regions in Ukraine as a reflection of the official policy of memory adopted on these territories. Based on the results, the author provides the ways of the transformation of the collective memory and regional identity of the population on these territories. The methodology of the study includes such methods as document analysis, critical discursive analysis, descriptive, comparative, statistical and historical-genetic methods. The usage of the historical-genetic method allowed to identify the changes in the semantic connotations of the socio-cultural discourse provided by the leading libraries on the temporarily uncontrolled territories of Donbass region. As the result of the reserch the author provides the key characteristics of the semantic load, peculiar to the set of ideas and representations through which the libraries, as an actor of the socio-communicative process, participate in the formation of the collective memory. The key ideas of the semantic concept of historical memory emerged as a result of Russian intervention are revealed. It is shown that along with ethnographic, the sociocultural discourse of these libraries consists of Soviet, Russian, imperial, Orthodox and anti- Ukrainian elements. The socio-cultural discourse of the ORDLO's libraries, on the one hand, highlights the importance of the Great Patriotic War and the Great Victory, manifests the nostalgia for the Soviet past and the Great Russia (in the political and in humanitarian aspects), orientation to Russian Orthodoxy and the native Russian language. On the other hand, they promote the ideas of the state creation (as Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics - LPR and DPR) and nurture the idea of the Ukrainian-Donbas war. These meanings quite often overlap and mix, defining the trends of transformations of historical memory and regional identity towards visioning Donbass people as a part of the unified Russian nation, forgetting the shared history with Ukraine and visions of the "Russian Motherland" as the basis for the common future with the Russian Federation, and further ground for conflicts with Ukraine after the possible reintegration of these territories.

20. Hrebeniuk, M., Hrytsiuk, V., & Shchypanskyi, P. (2020). Historical Periodization of the Anti-Terrorist Operation in Eastern Ukraine (April 14, 2014 - April 30, 2018). *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*(4), 176-191.

The purpose of the article is to structure the accumulated factual material on the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The novelty of the material is an attempt to make a brief reconstruction of the event in this segment of the topic and the specified chronological boundaries and on this basis to develop options for historical periodization of the Anti-Terrorist Operation in Eastern Ukraine in 2014-2018 (ATO). The methodology of the study is based on a combination of general scientific, special and interdisciplinary methods of scientific knowledge. The specificity of the topic prompted the use of special methods of military-historical research: historical-systemic, problem-chronological, historical-comparative, historical-genetic. The authors use modern terminology, tested by domestic and foreign military scientists and practitioners. The main results of the study. The processed array of sources and literature makes it possible to reproduce with a high degree of probability the actual course of major events in chronological order and highlight the key milestones of the Russian-Ukrainian armed confrontation at the beginning of the 21th

century. According to the nature of hostilities, military-political results and consequences of the anti-terrorist operation is divided into initial and two main periods within which there are stages that differ qualitatively in purpose, nature and content of combat (special) actions. The authors prove that it was the aggression of Russian Federation that caused the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Ukraine has used the forces of the security and defence sector to repel and deter this aggression. The form of their application from April 14, 2014 to April 30, 2018 was an anti-terrorist operation, and after - the Joint Forces Operation. This provided a basis for further research into the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine to provide a clear understanding of the nature and essence of Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine, to analyse its evolution, and, moreover, to summarize the experience of countering hybrid threats in the military sphere.

21. Ishchuk, N., & Sagan, O. (2020). CONFRONTATION OF ORTHODOX CHURCHES IN MODERN UKRAINE: REASONS, TRENDS AND PROSPECTS OF RECONCILIATION. *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe*, *40*(3), 8-33.

The current canonical and social statuses as well as the relationship of the largest Orthodox churches in Ukraine are considered: the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Orthodox Church of Ukraine emerged on December 15, 2018, as a result of the unification of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and a small number of representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. On January 6, 2019, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, in accordance with the decision of the Synod of the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate, together with the Synodals, signed the Tomos on the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. This Church identifies itself with World Orthodoxy, admits the Constantinopolitan church as its mother church and is recognized by it. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate was formally proclaimed on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union on October 25-27, 1990, on the basis of the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Moscow Patriarchate, which existed before. It has the status of a selfgoverning church within the Russian Orthodox Church, which it recognizes as the mother church, and within which it has been part of various state institutions since the 17th century and up to the present. The civilizational nature of the confrontation between these churches in Ukraine is substantiated. This confrontation goes beyond modern history and concerns the interpretation of almost every event (often ecclesiastical) from the individual or common past of Ukraine and Russia. The confrontation has intensified in connection with efforts by the current Russian authorities to impose a common civilizational future on Ukraine, using and including for this purpose a religious factor. The newly established Orthodox Church of Ukraine supports the Orthodox-Ukrainophile and European integrational aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian citizens. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is focused on cooperation with Russia and upholds the idea of "Eastern European Orthodoxy" as part of the "Orthodox-Moscow civilization component." Among the causes concerning the current stage of confrontation are the following: the fundamentally different attitudes regarding the events of the Revolution of Dignity, the occupation of the Crimea and the war in the eastern part of Ukraine, and Ukraine's geopolitical future. It is reasonable to expect that in the near future, the internal Orthodox confrontation in Ukraine will continue because of the severity of the conflict situation and the unpreparedness for the dialogue of these churches. However, in the long run, the independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the development of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and also changing generations of priesthood and believers of these churches, cooperation and, as a result, reconciliation between them are inevitable.

22. Jarymowycz, C. O. (2020). Guardians and protectors: the volunteer women of the Donbas conflict. *Feminist Review*(126), 106-122. https://doi.org/10.1177/0141778920944373

How does war reconfigure women's social roles and status? This article investigates how women's volunteering during conflict can challenge gendered divisions within society and transform the binary of masculine protector and feminine protected. When the Donbas conflict erupted in Ukraine in 2014, women assumed central roles as civilian volunteers who aided populations affected by violence. They gained a high level of social status in the context of a weak state, distrusted by its populace. Based on ten months of fieldwork and eighty-two interviews with civilian volunteers, this article argues that volunteering became a space of gendered negotiations over women's position alongside wartime binaries of home/front and protector/protected. Ultimately, certain types of wartime volunteering created more opportunities for blurring these gendered divisions, enabling volunteer women to be framed as protectors of both soldiers and civilians. Moreover, age intersected with gender, as volunteer women's life stage influenced their ability to become leaders within volunteer groups and their bodies were interpreted alongside gender roles within the family.

23. Klymenko, L. (2020). Forging Ukrainian national identity through remembrance of World War II. *National Identities*, *22*(2), 133-150. https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2019.1590810

This paper explores how the collective remembrance of a specific historical event shapes the national identity that underpins a state's foreign policy objectives. By drawing on multidisciplinary insights, the paper explains how political actors frame past events in order to promote a certain conceptualization of a national community. Taking Ukraine as a case study, the paper demonstrates how Russia's intervention in Ukraine in

2014-2015 prompted Ukrainian policy-makers to re-define Ukraine's relations with the EU and Russia by re-evaluating the experience of Ukrainians in WWII.

24. Klymenko, L. (2020). Understanding the Donbas War in Terms of World War II: A Metaphor Analysis of the Armed Conflict in Eastern Ukraine. *Ethnopolitics*, *19*(5), 483-500. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2019.1608064

Previous research on the ongoing armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine has largely provided structural explanations for the outbreak of violence in Donbas. In contrast to previous studies, this article takes an interpretive approach and investigates how the Ukrainian political leadership makes sense of the events in Donbas by drawing an analogy between the Donbas War and World War II. Such an approach sheds light on the Ukrainian ruling elites' standpoint on the Donbas conflict and contributes to the scholarly literature on conflict resolution in the region.

25. Kuznetsova, I. (2020). To Help 'Brotherly People'? Russian Policy Towards Ukrainian Refugees. *Europe-Asia Studies*, *72*(3), 505-527. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1719044

The essay focuses on Russian policy towards displaced persons from Ukraine's war-torn territories from 2014 until mid-2019. The privileging of refugees from Ukraine relative to immigrants and refugees from other countries and, later, the granting of Russian citizenship to Ukrainian citizens from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, were interwoven with both influence-seeking in the Russian geopolitical neighbourhood and transborder nationalism and supported via direct presidential control of immigration. Despite a series of decrees and involvement of civil society in providing support, this essay detected a lack of efficient mechanisms for responding to the needs of the displaced.

26. Lewis, C. (2020). Contemporary Russian Messianism under Putin and Russian Foreign Policy in Ukraine and Syria. *Slavonic and East European Review*, *98*(3), 531-+. https://doi.org/10.5699/slaveasteurorev2.98.3.0531

When Vladimir Putin returned to the Russian Presidency in 2012 his mistrust of the West, paranoia towards democracy and fear of the burgeoning liberal-democratic middle class reached new heights. In response, Putin shaped an instrumental and malleable form of contemporary Russian messianism, built upon the four intertwining pillars of messianism, nationalism, Eurasianism and politicized memory. This article seeks to illustrate how the proposed components of contemporary Russian messianism under Putin both interconnect and broaden the reach of Putin's pseudo-ideological turn. It will then examine how this is used in the actions and portrayal of the 2014 Ukraine Crisis and 2015 Syria intervention in order to domestically legitimate Putin as the Russian leader and propose its messy and contradictory nature allow a constantly evolving narrative that adapts to new circumstances and audiences.

27. Lichtenstein, D., & Koerth, K. (2020). Different shows, different stories: How German TV formats challenged the government's framing of the Ukraine crisis. *Media War and Conflict*, Article 1750635220909977. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635220909977

In a complex information environment, the Ukraine crisis became a litmus test for the German government's capacity to legitimate its international crisis management in Ukraine and in confrontations with Russia. This study investigates crisis coverage in the pluralized German television system and how it is shaped by trends of infotainment and globalization. It asks how different TV formats framed the Ukraine crisis and challenged or approved governmental crisis policy. Comparing the framing of the Ukraine crisis between March 2014 and December 2015 in German government communication, public service newscast Tagesschau, Russian foreign broadcaster's newscast Der Fehlende Part (RT Deutsch) and seven infotainment programs (talk shows and satirical shows), the findings reveal essential limitations for the indexing thesis. All TV formats substantially differed in their depiction of the crisis according to their respective format conventions. Whereas public service news mainly reflected governmental frames, the foreign and infotainment formats challenged the legitimacy of German crisis policy.

28. Liu, Z. X. (2020). News framing of the Euromaidan protests in the hybrid regime and the liberal democracy: Comparison of Russian and UK news media. *Media War and Conflict*, Article 1750635220953445. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635220953445

This study examines and compares news framing of the protests in Ukraine from 30 November 2013 to 26 February 2014, encompassing three news sectors in the hybrid regime setting of Russia and the liberal democracy of the UK. Following Godefroidt et al.'s (2016) approach in their article inInternational Communication Gazette78(8), the findings suggest that, while the Russian media used economic consequences and morality frames in the reporting of the protests reflecting the country's political rhetoric on Ukraine, the British media preferred a human-interest frame and delivered a primarily one-sided coverage. The confrontational interpretations of the crisis by the Russian and UK media revealed an illiberal trend in both the hybrid regime and the liberal democracy.

29. Melnyk, O. (2020). From the "Russian Spring" to the Armed Insurrection: Russia, Ukraine and Political Communities in the Donbas and Southern Ukraine. *Soviet and Post Soviet Review*, *47*(1), 3-38. https://doi.org/10.1163/18763324-04603009

The article is a study of anti-government mobilization in the cities of southern and eastern Ukraine in spring 2014. By closely examining the developments that preceded the outbreak of the armed insurrection in the Donbas, the study seeks to elucidate the various factors that precipitated the veritable collapse of the Ukrainian state in parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and its stabilization elsewhere. The article argues that the armed conflict in the Donbas was hardly a predetermined outcome of the Russian government strategy-which was employed also outside the Donbas-but rather a product of a synergetic confluence of several structural and conjunctural factors that were absent or present to a much smaller degree elsewhere. These included the peculiar political and ethno-cultural profile of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts; a higher degree of the legitimacy crisis of the interim government; the destabilizing effects of the status quo created by the victory of the Euromaidan-not only in terms of the change of Ukraine's geopolitical orientation and Russia's apparently compromised interests, but also in terms of the perceived change of status of different ethno-political communities; the proximity of the Russian border, trans-border ethnic politics, and the activities of nationalist groups from Russia; the residual influence of the once-powerful networks associated with clients of the former president Viktor Yanukovych; the relative weakness of organized pro-Ukrainian groups; and last but not least, the incremental collapse of the law enforcement apparatus, which drastically reduced the capacity of Ukrainian authorities.

30. Melykh, O., & Korbut, A. (2020). Entertainment media in the context of hybrid war in the post-Soviet countries: the case of Ukraine. *Economic Annals-Xxi*, *182*(3-4), 25-33. https://doi.org/10.21003/ea.V182-03

The article provides a complex analysis of how entertainment media can serve to undermine a country's resilience and security amidst hybrid war using the case of Ukraine as an example. The paper documents that before the launch of Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014, Russian media products had been heavily present in Ukrainian media space, including the entertainment segment. In 2017, Ukraine restricted access to some Russian media products and social media in its territory in an effort to counter disinformation and the use of user data by Russian security services via their access to the social media based in the Russian jurisdiction. Despite the measures taken by the state to address security challenges, build resilience and fight disinformation in the media, the influence of Russian entertainment media in shaping public opinion remains significant. In this paper, the authors analyze segments of the media space where Russian entertainment products are present in Ukraine, the tools used by Russia to enforce its narratives through media content, and the ways Ukraine has responded to these. This paper aims at demonstrating the role of entertainment mass media in the resilience of countries and how it is used in the context of hybrid war. Also, it looks at the efforts to counter this influence. The research shows that Russian entertainment media and content act as a soft power or cultural affinity element alongside misinformation or manipulations via news or information content. By using historical references, demonstrating civilizational and moral superiority, showing Slavic brotherhood, Russia and russocentric forces use entertainment media to shape and manipulate public opinion. As content consumption switches from linear media, such as television, to non-linear clusters of conventional and digital outlets, the room for the distribution of manipulative messages and narratives expands. Among other things, this undermines the resilience of countries and endangers their national security, especially in the hybrid war context. Much is being done to counter this impact. Ukraine's restrictive measures against some Russian media, social networks and content have been effective in that they have decreased the consumption and the trust for Russian media amongst Ukrainian audiences. Offering alternative content, produced domestically and internationally, has contributed to diversification of the content, moving the audiences from the Russocentric cultural product to a more diverse one.

31. Mitchell, S. M. (2020). Clashes at Sea: Explaining the Onset, Militarization, and Resolution of Diplomatic Maritime Claims. *Security Studies*, *29*(4), 637-670. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2020.1811458

Maritime disputes feature prominently in global politics, but we lack full understanding about how they arise and why they are militarized. China's maritime conflicts with neighboring states (for example, Senkaku/Diaoyu, Spratly Islands) have generated over a dozen militarized clashes at sea since 1991. Confrontations in the Kerch Strait between Russia and Ukraine in November 2018 created similar concerns about the escalation of the situation to interstate war. Maritime diplomatic clashes are frequent; the Issue Correlates of War Project identifies 270 dyadic diplomatic claims over maritime areas globally from 1900 to 2010, with close to a third of these disagreements becoming militarized. This paper explores why countries experience diplomatic disagreements over maritime zones, why some maritime claims are militarized, and how countries can peacefully resolve these conflicts. The project is situated theoretically in the issue approach to world politics. Empirical analyses show that maritime areas with more salient resources (oil, fish stocks, minerals, etc.) and previous militarization become more violent on average. States with greater naval capabilities make more claims to offshore maritime areas and use more coercive strategies unless they face countries with similar naval strength. Unlike territorial disputes, maritime conflicts are more likely to occur

between democratic, developed states and are more successfully settled through multilateral institutions. The findings show the conditions under which maritime claims may become a flashpoint for broader clashes at sea between major powers.

32. Mykhnenko, V. (2020). Causes and Consequences of the War in Eastern Ukraine: An Economic Geography Perspective. *Europe-Asia Studies*, *72*(3), 528-560. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2019.1684447

This essay provides an economic geography perspective on the causes and consequences of the war in eastern Ukraine. It focuses on the controversial proposition that the armed conflict in 2014 was triggered by domestic, economically determined factors. The essay argues that economic and material circumstances in the region had generated neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for a locally rooted, internally driven armed conflict. The role of the Kremlin's military intervention was paramount for the commencement of hostilities. As the human and economic costs of the war continue to mount, Ukraine's war-ravaged eastern regions face further depopulation, economic decline and erosion of development.

33. Ofitsynskyy, Y. (2020). THE ESTIMATION OF THE WAR IN DONBAS BY SCIENTISTS AND FORMER POLITICIANS ON THE PAGES OF THE NEWSPAPER THE NEW YORK TIMES (MARCH 1, 2014 - FEBRUARY 11, 2015). *Skhidnoievropeiskyi Istorychnyi Visnyk-East European Historical Bulletin*(15), 230-244. https://doi.org/10.24919/2519-058x.15.204977

The aim of the research is to analyze the opinions of scientists and former high-ranking politicians on the war in Donbas during March 1, 2014 and February 11, 2015 and on this basis to illustrate the best ways to end the conflict. The research methodology is based on the principles of scientificity, systematicity, verification, historicism and the use of general scientific (analysis, synthesis, generalization) and specially-historical (historical-genetic, historical-comparative, historical-typological, historical-systemic) methods as well as the method of content analysis. The scientific novelty is based on the fact that for the first time in the historiography of the war in Donbas, the views of scholars and former politicians on the war in Eastern Ukraine during March 1, 2014 and February 11, 2015 have been investigated. The conclusions The experts listed Russia's efforts to prevent Ukraine's accession to the EU and the NATO and the historical hostility between the Ukrainians and the Russians among the causes of the war in Donbas. Some analysts did not think Russia would try to invade Ukraine, but maintained that it would rather support the war in Donbas in order to prevent Ukraine from moving closer to the EU and the NATO. Other experts, meanwhile, believed that the Kremlin might not stop in Ukraine but use the Russians in the Baltic countries to create "frozen" conflicts there. The opinions on whether to provide weapon to Ukraine were divided. A number of analysts favoured this move, as it would cause more damage to Russia and deter it from a further aggression. In contrast, the others thought that providing Ukraine with weapon would only intensify the war against Russia, which Ukraine would not win, and which would be a humiliation for the EU, the USA and NATO. One way of resolving the war consisted in the full exhaustion of Russia by sanctions and other measures: Ukraine's strengthening by the West through assistance with intelligence, non-lethal equipment, an information campaign, humanitarian aid, political and economic reforms, reaching a ceasefire, financing not only the Ukrainian government but also the Ukrainians. Another solution should be diplomatic, providing Donbas with autonomy within Ukraine transferring substantial local self-government powers to the Russian-speaking residents of the East.

34. O'Loughlin, J., & Toal, G. (2020). Does War Change Geopolitical Attitudes? A Comparative Analysis of 2014 Surveys in Southeast Ukraine. *Problems of Post-Communism*, *67*(3), 303-318. https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2019.1672565

In 2014, Ukraine descended into war. The geographically delimited nature of the war in Ukraine, confined to two eastern oblasts, raises the questions of whether war changes geopolitical attitudes in regions proximate to the fighting. Using attitudinal surveys with similar questions in April and December 2014 in the contested territory of southeastern Ukraine three possible effects--that war polarizes populations along national lines, that war rallies the majority to a patriotic cause, and that war induces strategic hedging among non-core nationality populations in government-controlled regions-are examined and generally supported by the survey results.

35. Osiichuk, M., & Shepotylo, O. (2020). Conflict and well-being of civilians: The case of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war. *Economic Systems*, *44*(1), Article 100736. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecosys.2019.100736

This paper investigates the contemporaneous effect of conflict on civilians living outside of the conflict zone. Applying a multi-dimensional concept of well-being, it uses two large household surveys over 2012-2016 to analyze how the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war affected the financial well-being and health of people in both countries. We find that the conflict significantly worsened financial well-being in both countries. The impact mostly operates by worsening expectations about financial well-being and is inversely related to the distance from the conflict zone. Our analysis indicates an increase in chronic diseases in Ukraine over a longer period. Mental health is negatively impacted in both countries at the earlier stages of the conflict.

However, in Russia this effect is significant only in the region bordering the conflict zone, while in Ukraine it is significant in regions farther away from the conflict zone.

36. Prykhodko, I., Matsehora, Y., Kolesnichenko, O., Bolshakova, A., Bilyk, O., & Haydabrus, A. V. (2020). The Main Factors and Personality Characteristics to Predict the Risk of Suicide by Military Personnel in Hostilities. *Brain-Broad Research in Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience*, *11*(3), 72-87. **https://doi.org/10.18662/brain/11.3/110**

The problem of non-combat losses due to suicides of military personnel is relevant for most of the armed forces of states participating in local armed conflicts. The posthumous pathopsychological study of materials from the investigation of suicides by Ukrainian military personnel made it possible to identify the main factors of committing suicides during the period of participation in hostilities in eastern Ukraine in 2014-2019: problems of adaptation to combat conditions; insufficient level of professional and psychological training to perform missions in combat conditions; acute stressful reactions to participation in hostilities; physical and mental exhaustion, demotivation; dysfunctional families; loneliness or breakup with a beloved woman; offenses and disciplinary actions; alcohol abuse. The main types of personality who committed suicide in different periods of hostilities were: in 2014-2016 "Demonstratively-Dependent", having two subtypes "Demonstratively-Maladaptive" and "Demonstratively-Masked"; in 2017-2019 "Asthenic-Depressive", which has two subtypes "Constitutionally-Weak" and "Exhausted-Demotivated". The manifestation of PTSD symptoms, physical and mental exhaustion, demotivation, indifference of society to the problems of veterans can significantly increase the risk of suicide in the post-war period. The division into periods of suicidal activity of servicemen suggests that the identified types (subtypes) of personality become suicidal only in extreme conditions with impaired adaptation and self-realization. The identified reasons for committing suicides and the typification of military personnel-suicides associated with different periods of participation in hostilities are not exhaustive.

37. Sambanis, N., Skaperdas, S., & Wohlforth, W. (2020). External Intervention, Identity, and Civil War. *Comparative Political Studies*, *53*(14), 2155-2182, Article 0010414020912279. **https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020912279**

We examine how external intervention interacts with ethnic polarization to induce rebellion and civil war. Previous literature views polarization as internally produced-the result of demographic characteristics or intergroup differences made salient by ethnic entrepreneurs. We complement these approaches by showing that polarization is also affected by international politics. We model intervention's effect on civil war via the pathway of ethnic identification-a mechanism not previously identified in the literature. In our model, local actors representing different groups are emboldened by foreign patrons to pursue their objectives violently. This, in turn, makes ethnic identity salient and induces polarization. Without the specter of intervention, polarization is often insufficient to induce war and, in turn, in the absence of polarization, intervention is insufficient to induce war. We illustrate the model with case evidence from Ukraine.

38. Samberg, A., Stetsiuk, Y., Divizinyuk, M. M., Kovalchuk, V., Soloviov, I., Matukhno, V., . . . Honcharenko, Y. (2020, Sep 21-25). A Proof-of-Concept of Light-weight Smart Cone for Explosive Ordnance Mitigation in Non-permissive Operating Environment. *Proceedings of SPIE* **[Counterterrorism, crime fighting, forensics, and surveillance technologies iv]. Conference on Counterterrorism, Crime Fighting, Forensics, and Surveillance Technologies IV, Electr Network.**

The prolonged armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine since 2014 has generated the increasing public safety concern about landmines, abandoned unexploded ordnance (UXO) and small-size explosive remnants of war, which are spreading around the region of a conflict. Such ordnance can be used for making the improvised explosive devices (IED) as well. The background studies have identified the following key obstacles which make UXO demining and cleaning in that region challenging: an absence of government-endorsed national technical standards against which demining activity can be measured in crowded areas and non-permissive operating environment (i.e. public transport hubs and metro), and not enough human and technical capacity. Demining is carried out often using different techniques and outdated equipment. During the applied research project, the available open source international best practices and the UXO risk assessment methods were reviewed and assessed, firstly. Secondly, a new demining methodology was developed for improving the existing standard operating procedures of the bomb disposal units of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU). Thirdly, a proof-of-concept was designed for field trials. A prototype of a light-weight smart steel cone was constructed which can cover small-size UXO in critical infrastructures like metro without using heavy commercial explosive ordinance disposal robots and causing a minimum impact to environment and ecology. Live field testing was conducted. Finally, based on the successful trials, the recommendations for the standard operating procedures (SOP) of the bomb disposal units of the SESU were produced. For example, this cone can be stored in metro station and easily transported by a security guard, who covers abandoned UXO. If an object goes off before the bomb squad arrives on site, then this device can efficiently protect the crowed area and environment from the bomb fragments. This new demining equipment was granted a patent.

39. Schmid, U. (2020). The Ukraine crisis Civil war or Russian hybrid war? *Ukraine: Contested Nationhood in a European Context*, 68-76.

Ukraine: Contested Nationhood in a European Context challenges the common view that Ukraine is a country split between a pro-European West and a pro-Russian East. The volume navigates the complicated cultural history of Ukraine and highlights the importance of regional traditions for an understanding of the current political situation. A key feature is the different politics of memory that prevail in each region, such as the Soviet past being presented as either a foreign occupation or a benign socialist project. Finally, the book analyses Ukraine's political and economic options for the future. Can the desired integration into EU structures overcome the concentration of investment of power in the hands of a few oligarchs and a continuing widespread culture of corruption? Will proposals to join NATO, which garnered robust support among the populace in the aftermath of the Russian aggression, materialise under the current circumstances? Is the political culture in Ukraine sufficiently functional to guarantee democratic procedures and the rule of law?

40. Schmitt, O. (2020). How to challenge an international order: Russian diplomatic practices in multilateral security organisations. *European Journal of International Relations*, *26*(3), 922-946, Article 1354066119886024. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119886024

Many policy and academic debates focus on the extent to which Russia is a revisionist power challenging the 'liberal world order'. However, there is little agreement on the primary motives explaining the behaviour of Russia, some pointing to her unsatisfied great power ambitions and neo-imperial ideologies, and others to genuine security concerns. Adjudicating those claims is important because of their policy implications for engagement and/or deterrence towards Russia. This article contributes to this debate through a theoretical contribution to practice-based approaches to International Relations. Using De Certeau's understanding of practices, it analyses Russian diplomatic practices in multilateral security organisations and illustrates how this helps infer foreign policy motives, contrary to the field-specific relationalism of Bourdieu-inspired practice approaches. Empirically, it builds on 126 interviews and participant observation in three multilateral security organisations (the United Nations, the NATO-Russia Council and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe). The article shows that at least since 2014, Russian diplomats in the three organisations consistently defend policies and use narratives that reveal more interest in status recognition, sometimes at the expense of security concerns.

41. Sereda, V. (2020). 'Social Distancing' and Hierarchies of Belonging: The Case of Displaced Population from Donbas and Crimea. *Europe-Asia Studies*, *72*(3), 404-431. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1719043

Following the 2013-2014 protests against then Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, Russia's annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict in Donbas, one of the major challenges for Ukrainian society has been the displacement of over two million of its inhabitants. In 2015, at the peak of the displacement, Ukraine found itself among the five countries in the world, after Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Nigeria, with the highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) associated with conflict and violence, and it continues to rank highest in Europe. Very little research has been done to provide a detailed analysis of how internally displaced persons living in Ukraine and outside the country claim and negotiate their belonging in the aftermath of the Revolution of Dignity and the ensuing war. Feeling of belonging is constructed through a relational process of self- and external categorisation and depends on acknowledgement by other members of the chosen group, therefore this essay also examines the strength and regional specificity of the social distancing towards different groups of Ukrainian IDPs.

42. Shapoval, Y., Vasylieva, I., & Matviienko, I. (2020). Ukrainian Society in 2014-2020: Problems of Decommunization Politics. *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*(4), 110-124.

The purpose of the article is to analyze the key areas, public reception and consequences of decommunization politics, which has gained new impetus after Euromaidan. The methodological basis is an interdisciplinary approach. It includes a political component, as well as taking into account the fact that decommunization implies a worldview and cultural transformation of Ukrainian society. The principle of historicism, multifactoriality and comprehensive approach is used. The scientific novelty lies in the attempt to conceptualize the events of 2014-2020 related to the implementation of decommunization politics. Conclusion. The impetus for the politics of decommunization was the lack of a fully formed national historical narrative and the desire to form such a narrative. Cognitively, the object of decommunization is the history of Ukraine in the twentieth century, with special emphasis on the Soviet period and the national liberation struggle. Spatially, such an object is the public / symbolic space of cities and villages of Ukraine and its information and cultural space, where communication on the themes of the historical past takes place. A fundamental element of the politics of memory in Ukraine in 2014-2020 is the condemnation of the crimes of the communist regime, which in the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war is gradually becoming conventional. The most powerful instrument of decommunization was the legislative one - the adoption and implementation of four laws of April 9, 2015. The adoption of laws on decommunization, together with the use of an institutional tool - the activities

of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, stimulated the process of separation from the communist / totalitarian past, from its symbolism and toponymy. Condemnation of the crimes of the communist government and the (completely unrealized) lustration procedure are the basic foundations of postcolonial discourse and elements of the roadmap for the formation of the Ukrainian political nation. Contrary to the claims of some critics of the politics of decommunization, the recognition of the ruling regime as criminal does not mean that there was nothing positive in the country subordinate to it, or that the "independence fighter" cannot a priori commit a crime. Sociological survey data show that the attitude of Ukrainian society to decommunization and its practical implementation is ambiguous and has a clear regional specificity.

43. Stefanescu, D. C., & Papoi, A. (2020). NEW THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF STATES - CYBER THREAT. *Scientific Journal of Silesian University of Technology-Series Transport*, *107*, 177-182. **https://doi.org/10.20858/sjsutst.2020.107.13**

Globalisation brought an electronic communications reliance, as well as some repercussions on the world's states, mainly in the sphere of cyber security. In recent years after the events in Ukraine, the cyber threat became a certainty and risk. We must be conscious that cyber attacks will grow up considerably, and one of their forms is the hybrid war, with its conventional and non-conventional, military and non-military capabilities. The emergence of a new battlefield - the cyberspace - is a reality, where military operations are carried out through sophisticated technology. For this purpose, states need to increase their cyber defence capabilities to prevent and combat aggression from the virtual environment to critical infrastructure, communications systems, and last but not least, the people.

44. Tytarenko, D. (2020). " The Enemy has Invaded our Country Again ... " World War II in the Politics of History on the Territory of the "Donetsk People's Republic" (2014-2016). *Jahrbucher Fur Geschichte Osteuropas*, *68*(3-4), 508-556. **https://doi.org/10.25162/jgo-2020-0017**

The article explores the politics of history concerning World War II in the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR). It draws on official documents and media resources from the DPR, on personal impressions of the zone of military conflict, and on interviews conducted by the author with eyewitnesses who survived World War II and are now living through the new armed conflict in the Donbass region. The issues the article examines are commemorative practices related to Victory Day, the perception of contemporary events among the local population, especially among eyewitnesses of the two wars, the interpretation of the events of war in science, education, culture, and the media. The continuity of the tradition of struggle to protect the motherland against "modern fascism" is a distinctive feature of the politics of history in the DPR. The article emphasizes that the political instrumentalization of history by all parties is one of the factors delaying the resolution of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine.

45. Voronova, L. (2020). Between Dialogue and Confrontation: Two Countries - One Profession Project and the Split in Ukrainian Journalism Culture. *Central European Journal of Communication*, *13*(1), 24-40. **https://doi.org/10.19195/1899-5101.13.1(25).3**

In a process of continuously adjusting to and counteracting the circumstances of conflict since 2014, the Ukrainian media community has become polarized (Budivska & Orlova, 2017). Nygren et al. (2018) observe a confrontation between the ideal of neutrality in coverage and favoring "patriotic journalism" in practice among Ukrainian journalists. This article takes this discussion further and highlights the role of professional journalism associations and international organizations in the struggles within the journalism culture in the situation of conflict. The article uses Ginosar's (2015) interpretation of Hanitzsch's (2007) model of journalism culture and Mouffe's (2013) conceptualization of agonistic vs. antagonistic struggle to discuss the project Two Countries - One Profession is initiated and supported by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. Finally, it draws on the reactions by the Ukrainian media community.

46. Wittke, C. (2020). The Politics of International Law in the Post-Soviet Space: Do Georgia, Ukraine, and Russia 'Speak' International Law in International Politics Differently? *Europe-Asia Studies*, *72*(2), 180-208. **https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1732303**

Since the Soviet Union's collapse, Ukraine, Georgia and Russia have faced the challenge of taking their positions in the politics of international law as part of their transformation processes. Strong dynamics of conflict have shaped these states' politico-legal actions and interactions, for example, the Russo-Georgian War, the annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict in East Ukraine. This essay explores whether, how and why Georgia, Ukraine and Russia 'speak' international law in international politics differently. It discusses conceptual approaches to empirically analysing the processes of translating political preferences into legal arguments as well as how 'communicators of international law' in the post-Soviet region use the language of international law differently.

47. Yakoviyk, I. V., Chyzhov, D. A., Karpachova, N. I., Hlushchenko, S. V., & Chaliuk, Y. O. (2020). National security policy in Ukraine: a change in the system of power relations of the modern world. *Revista San Gregorio*(42), 224-235.

The article deals with the problems of finding ways to increase the effectiveness of government national security policy in the system of power relations of the modern world. The author reveals the essence and public administration nature of such phenomena as "national security of the state", "national security policy", "national security of Ukraine". The study analyses the approaches to shaping modern national security policy of Ukraine, as well as its organizational and legal support. The system of the most urgent threats to the national security of Ukraine is revealed. The author concludes that the current legislative support of government policy in this area does not meet the needs of overcoming most of these threats. It is emphasized that Ukraine must resume its activity in offering its own armaments, military equipment and peacekeeping contingent for the needs of the UN and other international organizations; create a new geopolitical space in the regions of Eastern Europe and the Black Sea, becoming a regional leader there. An important area of the national security policy is the fight against agents of influence of the Russian Federation, which currently occupy an important place in the system of economic and even public administration relations in Ukraine. The author proved the need to expand the contours of security policy in Ukraine by developing and implementing more active (aggressive) mechanisms aimed not only at counteracting external threats, but also at promoting their own national and civilizational interests in the geopolitical space. The need to introduce branch, sectoral, regional state programs of development of separate segments of the system of national security of Ukraine is studied. The article also emphasizes the need to develop a system of indicators to counter agents of influence of foreign countries abounding in the political environment of Ukraine. At the same time, the author defends the position on the need to introduce mirror mechanisms and tools to combat external threats, including in a hybrid, nonlinear war against Ukraine.

2021

1. Aliyev, H. (2021). When neighborhood goes to war. Exploring the effect of belonging on violent mobilization in Ukraine. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, *62*(1), 21-45. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2020.1756366

Why do some geographical locales experience higher levels of violent mobilization during armed conflicts than others? Existing studies on high-risk mobilization examined economic greed and ethno-nationalist grievances, as well as incentives- and sanctions-based motivations to fight in civil wars. In order to explain violent mobilization beyond the extant theories of participation in civil wars, this article borrows from ethnography, psychology, and anthropology the previously unexplored in security studies concept of "belonging" to a locality. Drawing its empirical insights from unique interview data on mass wartime mobilization, which occurred between March and September 2014 in Ukraine, this study argues that belonging to a particular locale serves as a robust cause of violent mobilization. Using a rare sample of former and active members of pro-government paramilitary battalions from one carefully selected locality in Kyiv, reveals that individuals engaged in high-risk mobilization in the East Ukraine's conflict were influenced by the sense of belonging more than by political or ethnic grievances.

2. Bjorge, N. M., & Kalnes, O. (2021). Cultures of anarchy: Images of Russia in the narrative of Norwegian mainstream news media during the Ukraine crisis 2014. *Media War and Conflict*, *14*(2), 150-173. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635219864024

This article examines the role of the news media through a case study of the narratives about the 2014 Ukraine crisis in three major Norwegian newspapers. The conflict also contained a 'war' between competing strategic narratives from the involved actors, with a potential for cross-national cascades into the Norwegian narrative. The authors' focus is on the framing of Russia during the most dramatic month of March 2014. They applied the images related to Wendt's cultures of anarchy (see Social Theory of International Politics, 1999) to classify the framing of Russia. The Norwegian media narrative was relatively consistent in framing Russia as choosing a path leading away from being a rival of Norway and the West, towards becoming their enemy. This was close to the narrative of the Norwegian government and in clear opposition to the Russian narrative. While this supports Hoskins and O'Loughlin's 'arrested war' hypothesis (published in Information, Communication & Society, 2015), it also raises questions about professional media norms.

3. Bratko, A., Zaharchuk, D., & Zolka, V. (2021). Hybrid warfare - a threat to the national security of the state. *Revista De Estudios En Seguridad Internacional-Resi*, *7*(1), 147-160. https://doi.org/10.18847/1.13.10

In the context of hybrid warfare, an urgent question arises as to the adequacy of responding to its challenges. Ukraine, the EU countries and NATO are facing new threats, which require democracies to make changes in military and political activities, to find new forms and methods of ensuring national security. Hybrid warfare as a form of undeclared war is conducted with the integrated use of military and nonmilitary instruments (economic, political, informational and psychological, etc.), which fundamentally changes the

nature of military struggle. Thus, the change in the nature of the current armed conflict and the hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine have created an impetus to accelerate transformations and structural changes in the security and defence sector of Ukraine. One of the priority areas of defence reform is the modernization of the management system of the security and defence sector in order to bring it in line with modern military conflicts, achieve interoperability of Ukraine's defence forces, systematic transition to NATO standards (STANAG) in the organization, armament and training of troops (forces), as well as in the system of operational decision-making. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has launched a process of destroying the system of European and transatlantic security. The Kremlin's hybrid actions against Ukraine and other regional states are undermining stability in the area from the Baltic to the Black Sea, creating a serious challenge to peace and security in the region. Ukraine can become a powerful ally with significant military capabilities and invaluable practical experience, including in the field of combating hybrid threats, with successful reforms for NATO membership and a relevant consensus in NATO.

4. Chinchilla, A., & Driscoll, J. (2021). Side-Switching as State-Building: the Case of Russian-Speaking Militias in Eastern Ukraine. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2021.2013760

Why do some militias bandwagon with the state during a civil war while others resist state authority? A formal model highlighting the role of material incentives treats militia commanders as rent-seekers competing for security sector jobs run by civilians. Western donors can send aid to inflate the size of the pie that civilians distribute to militia commanders. Our key result is a partial incorporation equilibrium by which jointly-sustainable strategies selected by a minimum winning coalition of battalion commanders maximize their share of rents. Battalion commanders outside this coalition do best by remaining outside the state. We evaluate the model using an analytic narrative of contemporary Ukraine - a hard case for our theory since ideology and ethnicity play an important role in most standard accounts of the conflict. Analysis of a volunteer battalion incorporation dataset, results from a survey of 64 Ukrainian volunteer battalion members, and a short discussion of the Azov Battalion suggest the salience of intra-Ukrainian distributional politics to militia commanders' incorporation strategies.

5. da Silva, T. (2021). The irregular fighter put to the test of post-Soviet wars. *Revue D Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest*, 52(1), 209-227. https://doi.org/10.3917/receo1.521.0209

The media coverage of irregular armed groups during the conflict in Ukraine has spurred many comments about the presumably new forms of warfare that, used by Russia, characterize the 21st century. However the use of irregular forces, which have no official military status, is far from being new in the history of warfare, and it is even normal since the end of WW II. To contribute to the discussion on irregular armed forces, this article analyzes the origins of the phrase in military and academic literature and presents a short historical description of various forms of this irregularity. These remarks are then brought to bear on post-Soviet conflicts, in particular in Transnistria and the Donbas.

6. Demianenko, B., & Demianenko, A. (2021). MILITARIZATION OF THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS IN OCCUPIED CRIMEA (2014 - 2019). *Skhidnoievropeiskyi Istorychnyi Visnyk-East European Historical Bulletin*(19), 228-238. https://doi.org/10.24919/2519-058x.19.233845

The purpose of the study is to try to determine the nature and specifics, forms and subjects of the educational process militarization in annexed peninsula attracting materials from open sources (information resources of the Russian Federation authorities, occupation authorities of the Crimea, materials of the Regional Human Rights Center, the Crimean Human Rights Group, Helsinki Human Rights Union, ZMINA Human Rights Center, NGO Almenda Civic Education Center, online publications, etc.). Research methodology is based on the principles of historicism, systematic, scientific, authorial objectivity, the use of general scientific (dialectical, method of analogies, analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, comparative), interdisciplinary (methods of philosophy, political science, social psychology, synergetic, statistical analysis, contextual analysis), historical (retrospective, problem-chronological, discourse analysis, methods of "detection") methods of research. The scientific novelty is that the essence, peculiarities, forms and subjects of the educational process militarization in the annexed Crimea by the Russian Federation during 2014 - 2019 have been found out on the basis of attracting open source materials. The Conclusions. It is noted that the transformation of the Crimeans social life over the last five years is primarily related to the militarization of the educational process, sports and culture. The occupying power organizes various activities among children and young people for this purpose: games, competitions, excursions, competitions on military subjects, organizes paramilitary children's camps, cultural mass events, lectures, conferences, theatrical performances, creates special militarized educational classes, lessons and meetings of military and patriotic, spiritual and patriotic education, etc. The most ambitious of such militant activities are the various military sports and military patriotic games. It is stated that the substantive policy of the educational process militarization in the annexed Crimea is aimed at: first, the active propaganda of the service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, including the contract; secondly, to educate a large army of potential carriers and defenders of the "Russian world"; third, to cultivate violence and war.

7. Dzutsati, V. (2021). Geographies of hybrid war: rebellion and foreign intervention in Ukraine. *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, *32*(3), 441-468. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2020.1849897

What explains the variation in violence in the internationalized civil conflict? This study identifies such conflict as an adaptation of insurgency warfare by the state. The analysis of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine indicates that violence levels peak in the areas where the preexisting political loyalties for the challenger state were strongest, where the central government of the incumbent state has inadequate access, and where the impact of war on civilians is relatively low. The study also points to the importance of scaling factors for determining the intensity of violence.

8. Erlich, A., & Garner, C. (2021). Subgroup Differences in Implicit Associations and Explicit Attitudes during Wartime. *International Studies Quarterly*, *65*(2), 528-541. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab005

When their country is at war, individuals express support for their government and hostility toward the foreign adversary, leading to the "rally 'round the flag" effect. What is less understood is how, during a rally, ethnic identity and proximity to conflict relate to attitudes toward the home state and the adversary. Moreover, individuals may feel pressure to answer patriotically when asked about the conflict, particularly individuals who share an ethnic identity with the majority population of the foreign adversary, leading to biased measures of opinion. We study these dynamics in the context of Ukraine's ongoing war with Russia, comparing responses from self-identified ethnic Ukrainians and Russians in four cities in Ukraine. Using a lab-based implicit association test (IAT) and survey with 600 respondents, we examine whether respondents' implicit biases, reflexive preferences that are hard to manipulate, match their explicitly stated preferences for either Ukraine or Russia. We find that, on average, ethnic Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine are explicitly and implicitly pro-Ukraine, although we observe slightly lower levels of pro-Ukraine bias among ethnic Russians. We also find that 70 percent of those who are implicitly pro-Russia are explicitly neutral or pro-Ukraine, highlighting the need to study implicit associations in sensitive settings.

9. Fomitchova, A. (2021). Volunteers in the formation of the Ukrainian military apparatus (2014-2018) Self-organization dynamics at the return of the State. *Revue D Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest*, *52*(1), 137-170. https://doi.org/10.3917/receo1.521.0137

The Ukrainian armed forces were unprepared for the armed conflict that broke out in the spring of 2014. In the post-revolutionary situation, mobilization for this conflict involved spontaneous groups of volunteers supported by civilian networks of aid to armed groups. Despite a rationalization under way of the Ukrainian armed forces, an informal logic prevailed, as can be seen from the day-to-day management of the war, and combat units had a degree of self-management in interaction with volunteer networks and civilian associations. This delegation of some military functions to civilian actors did not mean that the state was shedding its prerogatives as the state remains the reference point for those who are mobilized. The mobilization of these volunteers, who are assuming a classical state function, has contributed to the formation of the country armed forces and, even more, of the state during a war.

10. Guliyev, F., & Gawrich, A. (2021). NATO vs. the CSTO: security threat perceptions and responses to secessionist conflicts in Eurasia. *Post-Communist Economies*, *33* (2-3), 283-304. https://doi.org/10.1080/14631377.2020.1800316

While there is a growing body of research on the role of international organisations (IOs) in regional security governance, relatively little attention has been paid to IO responses to the secessionist conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), in Abkhazia/South Ossetia in Georgia as well as in Crimea/Eastern Ukraine. This article explores the differences between NATO's and the CSTO's responses to the three conflicts. Our findings demonstrate that NATO neglected the conflict in NK which stands in sharp contrast to its active responses to the outbreak of war in Georgia (2008) and Crimea/Eastern Ukraine (2014). The CSTO, however, has largely avoided any engagement in all three cases. Three factors were of crucial importance to explain this variation: the level of regional security institutionalisation, both IOs' geostrategic threat perceptions as well as both IOs' mutual perception, hence, their IO-IO (non)relationship.

11. Hauter, J. (2021). Forensic conflict studies: Making sense of war in the social media age. *Media War and Conflict*, Article 17506352211037325. https://doi.org/10.1177/17506352211037325

Online media is a blessing and a curse for academic research on war. On the one hand, the internet provides unprecedented access to information from conflict zones. On the other hand, the prevalence of disinformation can make it difficult to use this information in a transparent way. This article proposes digital forensic process tracing as a methodological innovation to tackle this challenge and make case study research on the causes of war fit for the social media age. It argues that two important features of process-tracing methodology - source criticism and Bayesian updating - are well developed in theory but are rarely applied to the study of armed conflict. Digital forensic process tracing applies these features to online media sources by drawing on the journalistic practice of open source intelligence (OSINT) analysis. This article uses the case of the war in eastern Ukraine's Donbas region to illustrate the usefulness of the proposed methodology.

12. Hauter, J. (2021). How the War Began: Conceptualizing Conflict Escalation in Ukraine's Donbas. *Soviet and Post Soviet Review*, *48*(2), 135-163. https://doi.org/10.30965/18763324-20201380

This article proposes a new theoretical framework based on conflict escalation theory and the concept of critical junctures to facilitate a more transparent analysis of the war in Ukraine's Donbas. It argues that researchers have proposed a variety of causes of the outbreak of violence in the region. However, in the absence of an overarching theoretical framework, it remains difficult to analyse the interplay of these causes and compare their explanatory power. In response, this article develops a theory-guided escalation sequence model. According to this model, the conflict's formative phase consisted of an escalation sequence that lasted from April until August 2014 and comprised six critical junctures. This article argues that attempts to explain the conflict should be evaluated and compared in terms of their ability to explain these critical junctures. It concludes that similar escalation sequence models could improve research on armed conflict beyond the case of the Donbas.

13. Ihor, T., Yuliia, K., Yurii, D., Mariia, M., & Olha, R. (2021). Features of detection and obtaining evidence of war crimes committed in the context of international armed conflict. *Cuestiones Politicas*, *39*(69), 74-90. https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.3969.04

The scientific article is devoted to a comprehensive understanding of international legal, procedural, and organizational problems of investigation of war crimes committed during the military conflict in the south and east of Ukraine. It develops the author's concept of investigation of war crimes committed during the armed conflict, scientifically substantiated theoretical provisions and specific patterns that are manifested in the field of legal support, organization of investigation, collection of evidence, methods of investigation of crimes of this type. It is concluded that there is a need to specify the components of war crimes in national legislation. Recommendations for further improvement of criminal and criminal procedure legislation of Ukraine in order to fulfill the state's international obligations in the field of international humanitarian law are given.

14. Karpenko-Seccombe, T. (2021). Separatism: a cross-linguistic corpus-assisted study of word-meaning development in a time of conflict. *Corpora*, *16*(3), 379-416. https://doi.org/10.3366/cor.2021.0228

This paper considers the role of historical context in initiating shifts in word meaning. The study focusses on two words - the translation equivalents separatist and separatism - in the discourses of Russian and Ukrainian parliamentary debates before and during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict which emerged at the beginning of 2014. The paper employs a cross-linguistic corpus-assisted discourse analysis to investigate the way wider socio-political context affects word usage and meaning. To allow a comparison of discourses around separatism between two parliaments, four corpora were compiled covering the debates in both parliaments before and during the conflict. Keywords, collocations and n-grams were studied and compared, and this was followed by qualitative analysis of concordance lines, co-text and the larger context in which these words occurred. The results show how originally close meanings of translation equivalents began to diverge and manifest noticeable changes in their connotative, affective and, to an extent, denotative meanings at a time of conflict in line with the dominant ideologies of the parliaments as well as the political affiliations of individuals.

15. Khaldarova, I. (2021). Brother or 'Other'? Transformation of strategic narratives in Russian television news during the Ukrainian crisis. *Media War and Conflict*, *14*(1), 3-20. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635219846016

This article explores how Russian television news deconstructed the narrative embracing Ukrainians as 'brothers' through repositioning them within an imagined social reality wherein Ukrainians assume the guise of a threatening 'Other'. The research material comprises extracts from Channel One, which is one of Russia's most significant and popular television channels. The data was collected from the channel's website over two years from 1 November 2012 to 31 October 2014. The sample of 480 news stories was selected on the basis of tag words and engagement with the stories on social media. Frames comprising visual, auditory and textual streams were analysed to explore the narratives about Ukrainians that were promulgated both before and during the Ukrainian crisis. The data revealed that, prior to the conflict, the media portrayed Ukraine as Russia's 'little brother'. Following Euromaidan, Channel One replaced this guise with that of an enemy in order to appeal directly to the cultural and spiritual values of its audience. Applying the conceptual framework of strategic narrative, the study illustrates the dynamics at play in the transformation of one image into another.

16. Khalymon, S., Hrynko, S., Zolka, V., Hrynko, R., & Volynets, N. (2021). Legal regulation of unmanned aerial vehicles application in the surveillance of the state border of Ukraine. *Amazonia Investiga*, *10*(40), 190-200. https://doi.org/10.34069/ai/2021.40.04.19

The goal of the article is to develop proposals for the improvement of the existing normative legal documents regulating UAVs application in the surveillance of the state border of Ukraine. The research methods have been selected based on the goal and tasks of the research. A complex of general scientific and special-scientific methods has been used in the process of the research. In particular, the use of comparative and formal-logical methods made it possible to investigate the evolution of legal regulation of UAVs application by the law enforcement agencies and military formations in Ukraine. The logical and legal method has been used for the development, argumentation and determination of the directions of improving the legal regulation of UAVs application in the process of the state border surveillance. The article reveals the proposals for the improvement of the existing normative legal documents regulating unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) application in the surveillance of the state border of Ukraine. It is concluded that UAVs application is effective in the surveillance of the state border of Ukraine, since information obtained with the help of these aerial vehicles allows to effectively and rapidly establish facts of the state border violation and detain its violators.

17. Kolb, A. G., Hrushko, M., Teteriatnyk, H., Chepik-Trehubenko, O., & Kotliar, O. (2021). Peculiarities of Realization of the International Mechanism for the Protection of the Rights of Victims Armed Conflict in the East of Ukraine. *Cuestiones Politicas***, 39(71), 334-349. https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.3971.17**

The article analyzes the content of international legal acts related to the protection of the rights of victims of military conflicts. At the same time, its results identify the characteristics of its implementation in Ukraine. It has been established that some of these legal sources have not been ratified by Ukraine or otherwise Ukraine has not given them a binding legal effect. Using a documentary-based methodology close to legal and political hermeneutics, this article develops scientifically sound and relevant proposals aimed at improving the legal mechanism to protect the legitimate interests and rights of the victims of the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine. It is concluded that the current legal problems not only negatively affect the state of law enforcement activity in Ukraine, which is directly related to the content of this process, but also does not allow adequate influence on the determinants that give rise to, and cause military and territorial conflicts in Ukraine, a situation that can be extrapolated to other societies near or far.

18. Kolenichenko, T., Nahorna, N., Maksom, K., Mekshun, A., & Syla, T. (2021). THE GLOBAL AND UKRAINIAN EXPERIENCE OF SOCIAL REINTEGRATION OF HYBRID WAR VETERANS IN THE MODERN SOCIETY CONDITIONS. *Ad Alta-Journal of Interdisciplinary Research***, 11(2), 77-82.**

The purpose of the academic paper was to determine the social reintegration's features of the hybrid warfare's veterans under the conditions of modern society, to compare the reintegration practices in Ukraine and other countries. Methodology. The results attest to the fact that the social reintegration of veterans in Ukraine is based on projects and programs, including budget programs on financing various social reintegration measures. Psychosocial assistance to veterans and social cohesion in communities are based on the activities as follows: trainings on social cohesion, reintegration and fundraising, preparation of grant projects for social cohesion of communities; qualified psychological support for veterans and their families affected by the military conflict in Ukraine.

19. Korolov, V., Korolova, O., Milkovicha, I., Zaietsa, Y., Zhyvchuka, V., Lytvyn, V., & Bublyk, M. (2021, Apr 22-23). Information-Reference System Creation Prerequisites for the Ground Forces Identification on the Battlefield According to NATO Standards. *CEUR Workshop Proceedings-Series* **[Colins 2021: computational linguistics and intelligent systems, vol i]. 5th International Conference on Computational Linguistics and Intelligent Systems (COLINS), Kharkiv, UKRAINE.**

Fighting in modern military conflicts is primarily characterized by unpredictability and nonstandard features of combat, rapid raids, opening fire from long distances on "closed targets", with limited time for decision-making and lack of situational awareness. This leads to the fact that under the influence of objective and subjective factors there is a high probability of getting under friendly fire. The war in eastern Ukraine, military conflicts in the former Soviet Union (Moldova, Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh), the former Yugoslavia, etc., mostly took place in a limited area, and the weapons and military equipment used on both sides were usually produced in the same country and they not visually differ significantly. Therefore, the existing methods and means of recognition in this situation simply did not work. Analyzing the causes for falling under friendly fire, we note two main ones. The so-called "position error", which is associated with the quality of weapons (ability to fire accurately), imperfect ammunition (premature operation, the fire coming short of target) or an error in aiming at a target, and an "error of identification" when the fire is deliberately conducted on one's own troops, which have been mistaken for an enemy. All this stems from the inaccuracy or lack of information, gross errors of control, which are possible during the war. The inherent feature of mobile combat, with the rapidity of fire exchanges, which do not leave time for reflection, also plays an important role. The application of the relevant basic doctrine to prevent troops from falling under friendly fire during intense battle, at first glance, is quite simple and includes: 1 Tracking from the control points the actions of friendly forces, constant

monitoring over their movement and location; Determining the location of enemy positions by collecting information in real time; Division into "friendly" and "enemy" by means of surveillance and aiming systems or by other special systems; In case of receiving a positive identification - opening fire on the target. Unfortunately, practice shows that this task is quite difficult, given the negative impact of a number of factors, namely: Modern offensive military operations are carried out at a fairly high pace and around the clock, with the movement of troops in unfamiliar terrain in conditions of limited visibility; Most combat clashes and fire exchanges occur rapidly, with shelling of quickly moving targets over long distances; Virtually unlimited combat range of the weapons significantly affects the ability of the shooter to destroy the target when determining a positive identification (despite the presence of thermal detection, especially in the desert or steppe zone); Error-free real-time determination of their own location, as well as friendly and enemy forces is determined not only by visibility conditions, but also depends on the orientation and the availability of sufficient time for commanders to form a clear idea of fire exchange with the enemy. The task of recognizing the affiliation of forces on the battlefield or in the area of operations is solved by a combination of control procedures, situational intelligence, the use of technical means and effective training. As this task is complicated by increased distance, terrain complexity and reduced visibility, the main means of preventing misidentification and fratricide, especially at the level of military units and above, is the use of effective management measures. The purpose of combat identification is, based on a common doctrine, providing effective training and compliance with the rules of combat operations, improving situational intelligence, as well as methods, means and devices of recognition, in order to increase combat effectiveness and, consequently, reduce casualties of friendly troops. The purpose of target identification is to determine the nature of the object on the battlefield as allied, enemy, neutral or non-combat. Mutual identification of ground forces on the battlefield is carried out by establishing a stable relationship and the use of certain methods and methods of control, namely: control of forces and means in combat, automatic and manual request and response systems, personnel training, and battlefield management systems. Allied forces are identified and recognized by many means. The effectiveness of these tools directly depends on the training that commanders and fighters undergo before the operation. Such means include: identification of configurations of personnel and armaments, dynamics of actions; time parameters, sound characteristics, electronic radiation, infrared spectrum; signals, information about the deployment of troops; ground panels (pointers) of combat identification, etc. Combat Identification (CID) devices of NATO member armies are used in accordance with established identification algorithms for the identification of Allied troops. These devices help identify friendly troops on the battlefield or in the combat zone to reduce the risk of striking coalition forces. CID devices can unmask formation positions, so they should used or activated for a limited or fixed period. Time limits for the use of these devices are set at the appropriate command level. Among the numerous means of recognition, the following are considered the most effective: Battlefield Target Identification Devices (BTID); identification based on the means of automatic transmission of data about their troops (Radio Based Combat Identification - RBCI); Reverse Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system; Recognition by means of radio tags (Radio Frequency Identification tags - RF tags). Standards, methods and procedures for the use of means and devices of combat identification include: combat identification panel (Combat Identification Panel - CIP), identification thermal panel, thermal recognition beacon, emitters of the near infrared (IR) spectrum, reflective tape, or reflective near infrared spectrum, vehicle marking system. Thus, in the process of combat identification, a wide range of devices that work on different physical principles is used. This generates huge amounts of information that requires appropriate analysis in the implementation of combat identification. At the same time, in order to ensure the efficiency of the coalition forces' management, the time allowed for information processing and decision-making is extremely limited. This leads to information overload of the commander. In order to reduce this workload and increase combat effectiveness and, as a result, reduce the number of casualties of friendly troops, the objective of developing an Information and Reference System for the recognition of ground forces on the battlefield according to NATO standards is relevant. The aim of the article is to find the ways to increase efficiency of combat identification of ground forces on the battlefield according to NATO standards.

20. **Kuryliak, V. (2021). ACTIVITIES OF THE ADVENTIST DEVELOPMENT AND RELIEF AGENCY IN EASTERN UKRAINE.** *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe*, *41*(4), 288-310, Article 21.

The charitable organization of the Seventh-day Adventist Church has been active in the conditions of the military conflict in the East of Ukraine since 2013, particularly during the difficult events on Euromaidan in the center of the capital of Ukraine. Since 2014, ADRA Ukraine has implemented more than 150 humanitarian projects in the east and throughout Ukraine. Among the largest were "Eastern Angel," "Hands of Hope," and "Social Transport." Through food and non-food programs, ADRA Ukraine volunteers, together with other churches and international organizations, help people affected by the military conflict in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In addition, ADRA Ukraine in the east and mainland of Ukraine provides psychological and material assistance to the military and immigrants from the occupied territories of Ukraine, helping to treat psychological trauma, repair various types of damage from shelling, and establish water supply in the destroyed areas. The activities of ADRA Ukraine are actively covered by the media, though with limited reach: it is usually a Protestant mass media, which narrows the potential audience, so the majority of

the population does not have the opportunity to hear about the charitable deeds of this organization. The Protestant religious minority of Ukraine did not stay away from the tragic events that befell Ukraine and destroyed the lives of civilians, but continued to support through charitable organizations, such as ADRA Ukraine, to restore and facilitate the better living conditions of war victims.

21. Larys, M., & Souleimanov, E. A. (2021). Delegated Rebellions as an Unwanted Byproduct of Subnational Elites' Miscalculation: A Case Study of the Donbas. *Problems of Post-Communism.* **https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2021.1943449**

The literature on delegated rebellion has treated principals (external states) and their agents (rebel groups) as the main factors in the inception of rebellion. Intriguingly, no attention has been paid to subnational elites as a separate, third actor. This article takes a novel perspective on delegated rebellion by ascribing agency to subnational elites. It introduces the theoretical concept of strategic entrapment, which shows that even subnational elites unwilling to follow the path of rebel violence may be trapped between the incipient rebel groups and a principal. As a result, subnational elites are sidelined and replaced by the principal's rebel proxies.

22. Leustean, L. N. (2021). When States Fail: The Politics of Orthodox Churches, Forced Displacement and Humanitarian Structures in Serbia and Ukraine. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *34*(2), 1923-1945. **https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feaa005**

In Serbia, during the 2015 European refugee crisis, the Orthodox Church mobilized communities in providing humanitarian aid before local authorities and the government issued an organized response. Two years later, in December 2017, with the support of the Orthodox Church, Ukraine exchanged war prisoners with the separatist authorities in Donbas. In both countries, the social and political involvement of Orthodox Churches in dealing with forced displacement was unprecedented. Drawing on literature review and interviews with 25 representatives of governmental and civil-society bodies, members of the clergy and academics, this article explores the ways in which, in Serbia and Ukraine, when states fail to offer support for populations affected by violence, religious communities have been among the first actors to take over state governance and provide human security. It argues that, by doing so, Orthodox Churches become open to politicization from state authorities. The article contributes to the study of religion and forced displacement by linking the politicization of Orthodox Churches to the concept of state failure.

23. Melicharek, M. (2021). War Song in a Service of Ideology. Comparative Essay on the Example of Yugoslav and Ukrainian-Russian Conflicts. *Balkanistic Forum*, *3*, 148-168. **https://doi.org/10.37708/bf.swu.v30i3.7**

Both the official army music and combatants' informal folk songs have always played a noteworthy role in their respective societies regardless whether this music was created as means of actual propaganda or subsequently as part of reinvented commemorative culture. This article focuses on comparison of the two most recent European armed conflicts, namely 1) the ethnically motivated conflicts in former Yugoslavia between 1992 and 1995/1999, and 2) the interethnic violence followed by Russian military intervention in Ukraine in 2014; the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has not yet been settled and still threatens to escalate. Building on wide range of primary and secondary sources (mainly of Western, Central and South- Eastern European provenience) that has been ignored by a regional scholarship, the paper seeks to provide a contextual background behind the war songs and to compare their prevalent patterns and typology of their inner dynamics and transformations. This paper will not inquire into international, economical or military implications of the aforementioned armed conflicts; it will focus specifically on textual and contextual analysis of those songs. Study brings completely new insights on phenomenon of war songs in East European and former Yugoslav environment and brings much-needed light on the intertwined social, cultural and identity relations that can be established between the former Yugoslav and post-Soviet countries. This topic is very important since state doctrine, national narratives, historical memory affect current and also future development of both regions what is clearly visible on elaborated material.

24. Nieto, J. J. (2021). Russia's information operations in the Eastern Ukraine conflict. *Comunicacion Y Hombre*(17), 153-163. **https://doi.org/10.32466/eufv-cyh.2021.17.623.153-164**

The fall of the USSR generated a progressive change in the relations between countries that were once part of the state apparatus of the Eurasian giant. The evolution of this process, within the framework of the post-Soviet space, has been significantly marked by the management of information in the scenarios resulting from the conflicts of interest arising from territorial disputes, which emerged in the new map of Eastern Europe. The Ukrainian national problem has been one of the main chapters of the International pages in the global media. The events that took place around the war in Dombass continue to be, today, a recurring theme in the press. In this context, information operations have been a factor of special relevance when it comes to influence events, in order to favor a specific political agenda and generate a state of opinion that pushes the strategic movements of the actors involved. The Russian Federation, as heir of the legacy left behind by the Soviet Union, has several interests in the Eastern region of Ukraine. On the other side, there is the policy deployed from Kiev in recent years, which is a gradual approach to the European Union and the West. This

paper studies the Russian propaganda techniques applied to the Ukrainian conflict, the use of fake news as a weapon of hybrid warfare and its possible effectiveness, according to the current status of the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Lugansk.

25. Nitsova, S. (2021). Why the Difference? Donbas, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk After Ukraine's Euromaidan Revolution. *Europe-Asia Studies*, *73*(10), **1832-1856. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2021.1912297**

The pro-Russian protests that spread across the east and south of Ukraine in the aftermath of the Euromaidan Revolution set largely similar regions on starkly different trajectories. While Donbas saw a successful rebellion and later slid into war, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk managed to avoid a separatist scenario. In this article, I examine the critical early stages of the pro-Russian unrest and argue that the initial success of the separatist rebellion in Donbas and its failure in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk can be best explained by the differences in elite strategies and civil society organisation in the respective regions.

26. Ociepka, B., & Arendarska, J. (2021). Cultural Diplomacy as a Network and Networking in International Relations: The Case of Cultural Diplomacy in Russia. *Sage Open*, *11*(4), Article **21582440211054119. https://doi.org/10.1177/21582440211054119**

This article discusses the European Union (EU) member states' cultural institutes as nodes of cultural diplomacy networks and a network approach in the analysis of cultural diplomacy at the time of Russia's war in eastern Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea in 2014. This study's hypothesis is that the international crisis over the war in Ukraine pushed the EU member states to establish new ties linking their cultural establishments. The authors analyzed the EU countries' cultural diplomacy documents and considered the concepts of network structure, network synergy, and issue networks to investigate whether EU governments- and especially their cultural agencies-understand cultural diplomacy as a network. The results of the study show that while the nodes of cultural diplomacy in Russia and the selected EU countries continued their communication during the international crisis, the expected interactions among CIs in Austria, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Poland were hardly established.

27. Olzacka, E. (2021). The Role of Museums in Creating National Community in Wartime Ukraine. *Nationalities Papers-the Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, *49*(6), **1028-1044. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2020.39**

In the aftermath of the violent Revolution of Dignity (2013/2014) and the subsequent war in Donbas (2014-), a heroic story about the new beginning of a "united, Ukrainian nation" began to emerge. Shaping this new narrative are new museum projects devoted to Ukraine's developing history. This article examines the process of these new institutions' formation, the content of created exhibitions, and the activities conducted therein. It focuses on the role of the museums in activating, unifying, and integrating both the Ukrainian national community and civil society. This article is based on a qualitative analysis of materials collected during seven research stays in Ukraine, from June 2017 to August 2019, and focuses on four cases-Ukraine's First ATO Museum in Dnipro; the Museum of the Heavenly Hundred in Ivano-Frankivsk; the Ukrainian East exhibition in the National Museum of the History of Ukraine in the Second World War in Kyiv; and a project of the Museum of the Revolution of Dignity in Kyiv. The examined institutions are presented not only as places for gathering artifacts but also as laboratories of civic activism, participation, and dialogue.

28. Pham, T., Talavera, O., & Tsapin, A. (2021). Shock Contagion, Asset Quality and Lending Behaviour: The Case of War in Eastern Ukraine. *Kyklos*, *74*(2), 243-269. **https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12261**

Focusing on the current geopolitical conflict in Eastern Ukraine, this paper examines the economic impact of military intervention on the banking sector and the contagion which is triggered by this type of negative shock. Our study reveals that banks which issued more loans within conflict areas during the pre-conflict period were subsequently left with a higher level of non-performing loans in the non-conflict markets following the onset of the dispute. This impact can be seen most clearly in the regional markets which are closer geographically to the conflict zone. There is also evidence of the "flight to headquarters" effect in local lending. While banks tend to reduce their credit supply, it is within the regional markets located farther from head offices where the most significant reduction in lending can be observed. Further examination shows that the degree of lending reduction is lesser for politically connected banks and for larger banks. Finally, the negative economic effects of the conflict are long-lasting but less profound once the ceasefire agreements are reached.

29. Pidkuimukha, L. (2021). History as a Weapon: Second World War Imagery in the Ongoing Russian-Ukrainian Cyberwar. *Cognitive Studies-Etudes Cognitives*(21), **Article 2479. https://doi.org/10.11649/cs.2479**

The article focuses on the characteristics of military posters employed as an element of the ongoing Russia-Ukrainian hybrid war in the Donbas region. The paper also examines the functions which posters fulfil in times of military conflict and analyses the role which posters play in persuading and mobilizing society,

recruiting soldiers, and maintaining high morale among troops. The research material includes posters that were exhibited in 2014-2017, when the most significant battles took place. The article focuses on the verbal aspects of the posters as well as on the visual constructions of "friends" and "foes". Furthermore, this investigation analyses the Second World War (WWII) images and symbols that have been used in both pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian posters.

30. Prykhodko, I., Lyman, A., Matsehora, Y., Yurieva, N., Balabanova, L., Hunbin, K., Morkvin, D. (2021). The Psychological Readiness Model of Military Personnel to Take Risks during a Combat Deployment. *Brain-Broad Research in Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience, 12*(3), 64-+. **https://doi.org/10.18662/brain/12.3/220**

The purpose of this article is to present an empirically-derived psychological readiness model of military personnel to take risks during combat deployment. The model was developed using the methods of semantic differential, peer review, and factor analysis. Its theoretical basis is the concept of "hardiness". The study involved 104 military personnel of the National Guard of Ukraine had combat experience in the War in Eastern Ukraine. The model includes four components: "Ability for volitional efforts (mobilization)", "Military brotherhood", "Professional identity", "Self-control (endurance)". Their content covers the emotional-volitional, cognitive, motivational, moral, active-practical, existential-being, and interpersonal-social spheres of the individual. The leading role in the model belongs to strong-willed features, combat cohesion, patriotism, and adaptive resources of the individual, which make it possible to maintain the effectiveness of military personnel's combat activities under conditions of risk. The basis of the psychological readiness of military personnel to actively act and overcome difficulties in conditions of risk (uncertainty, direct threat to health and life) with the absence of reliable guarantees for success is hardiness. It is suggested that the model can be used for psychological selection procedures, professional and psychological training of military personnel, predicting their behavior under conditions of risk, and developing strategies for psychological support in the post-deployment period. This will reduce psychogenic losses during hostilities.

31. Quinn, J. M., Dhabalia, T. J., Roslycky, L. L., Wilson, J. M., Hansen, J. C., Hulchiy, O., McElligott, J. E. (2021). COVID-19 at War: The Joint Forces Operation in Ukraine. *Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness*, **Article Pii s1935789321000884. https://doi.org/10.1017/dmp.2021.88**

The ongoing pandemic disaster of coronavirus erupted with the first confirmed cases in Wuhan, China, in December 2019, caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV2) novel coronavirus, the disease referred to as coronavirus disease 2019, or COVID-19. The World Health Organization (WHO) confirmed the outbreak and determined it a global pandemic. The current pandemic has infected nearly 300 million people and killed over 3 million. The current COVID-19 pandemic is smashing every public health barrier, guardrail, and safety measure in underdeveloped and the most developed countries alike, with peaks and troughs across time. Greatly impacted are those regions experiencing conflict and war. Morbidity and mortality increase logarithmically for those communities at risk and that lack the ability to promote basic preventative measures. States around the globe struggle to unify responses, make gains on preparedness levels, identify and symptomatically treat positive cases, and labs across the globe frantically rollout various vaccines and effective surveillance and therapeutic mechanisms. The incidence and prevalence of COVID-19 may continue to increase globally as no unified disaster response is manifested and disinformation spreads. During this failure in response, virus variants are erupting at a dizzying pace. Ungoverned spaces where nonstate actors predominate and active war zones may become the next epicenter for COVID-19 fatality rates. As the incidence rates continue to rise, hospitals in North America and Europe exceed surge capacity, and immunity post infection struggles to be adequately described. The global threat in previously high-quality, robust infrastructure health-care systems in the most developed economies are failing the challenge posed by COVID-19; how will less-developed economies and those health-care infrastructures that are destroyed by war and conflict fare until adequate vaccine penetrance in these communities or adequate treatment are established? Ukraine and other states in the Black Sea Region are under threat and are exposed to armed Russian aggression against territorial sovereignty daily. Ukraine, where Russia has been waging war since 2014, faces this specific dual threat: disaster response to violence and a deadly infectious disease. To best serve biosurveillance, aid in pandemic disaster response, and bolster health security in Europe, across the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) and Black Sea regions, increased NATO integration, across Ukraine's disaster response structures within the Ministries of Health, Defense, and Interior must be reinforced and expanded to mitigate the COVID-19 disaster.

32. Rodgers, J., & Lanoszka, A. (2021). Russia's rising military and communication power: From Chechnya to Crimea. *Media War and Conflict*, **Article 17506352211027084. https://doi.org/10.1177/17506352211027084**

Most scholars working on Russia's use of strategic narratives recognize the importance of the Russian state. Nevertheless, the authors argue that much of the attention on strategic narratives has given insufficient appreciation for how Russia has developed its military and media policies in a coordinated manner: learning

from its mistakes and failures as it went along, and becoming more efficient each time. In making their case, they examine three theatres of Russian military activity and their accompanying media coverage: the wars in Chechnya in 1994-1995 and 1999-2000; war with Georgia in 2008 over the separatist territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; and Ukraine, especially Crimea, since 2014. The Russian leadership addressed the shortcomings on each occasion, with the news media being increasingly weaponized as time went on. The authors argue that scholars should see Russia's evolving uses of those military and media power resources as part of a single strategic process. How the Russian state goes about its media policy can accentuate the military intervention for better or for worse as far as its image is concerned.

33. **Rudyi, N., Makarchuk, V., Zamorska, L., Zdrenyk, I., & Prodan, I. (2021). Democratic state-legal regime: Twenty-First Century threats.** *Amazonia Investiga*, *10*(44), 288-294. https://doi.org/10.34069/ai/2021.44.08.28

The article deals with the democratic state-legal regime in the light of the twenty-first century threats. It is noted that the presence of formal features of a democratic regime does not always ensure the functioning of such mechanisms and institutions of democracy as the division of power, freedom of speech and assembly, fair elections and others. The main internal and external destructive elements influencing both settled and developing liberal-democratic regimes are determined. Emphasis is placed on the destructive activities of the Russian Federation in destroying and discrediting the basic institutions of liberal democracies and popularizing the China model of an undemocratic state-legal regime. The influence of scientific and technological progress, political, social, economic, environmental and military factors on the transformation of liberal-democratic regimes and the world global order is revealed. The danger (for the whole liberal-democratic world in general and Ukraine in particular) of the use of such a phenomenon as "hybrid war" by the Russian Federation in the context of the spread of the fascist concept of "Russian world" is pointed out. It is proved that there is the need to preserve a liberal-democratic state-legal regime, as the most successful of all regimes offered to humanity, for future generations.

34. **Schram, P. (2021). Hassling: How States Prevent a Preventive War.** *American Journal of Political Science*, *65*(2), 294-308. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12538

Low-level military operations outside of war are pervasive in the international system. These activities have been viewed as destabilizing by both academics and policy makers, as miscalculations or missteps in conducting low-level operations can risk escalation to war. I show the opposite can be true: these operations can prevent escalation to a greater war. I examine a type of low-level conflict that I call "hassling" in the common framework of bargaining and war. The critical feature of hassling is that it weakens a targeted state. I find that when a rising power rules out peaceful bargains, hassling the rising power can prevent a preventive war, with efficiency gains for the involved states. This intuition is formalized in a dynamic model of conflict and is explored through examinations of Israel's Operation Outside the Box (2007), the United States' involvement in Iraq (1991-2003), and Russia's operations in Ukraine (beginning in 2014).

35. **Shaw, D. O., & Aliyev, H. (2021). The Frontlines Have Shifted: Explaining the Persistence of Pro-State Militias after Civil War.** *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism.* https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2021.2009633

Many ceasefire and peace agreements stipulate the disarmament and demobilization of pro-state armed groups involved in the conflict, yet few of these groups ever completely demobilize. This study seeks to explain the process of incomplete demobilization by advancing a theoretical argument that pro-state armed groups are least likely to disarm and demobilize when the monopoly on violence is fragmented, and when there is relative balance of capabilities and interests between the government and pro-state armed groups. Under these circumstances, both governments and pro-state armed groups may favor incomplete demobilization enabling them to pursue their strategic objectives. We draw on unique interview data with pro-state paramilitaries from Ukraine to empirically illustrate our theoretical expectations.

36. **Sheremet, O. S., Voluiko, O. M., Posmitna, V. V., Poda, T., & Bidzilya, Y. M. (2021). Political and legal aspects of the information warfare.** *Amazonia Investiga*, *10*(45), 31-41. https://doi.org/10.34069/ai/2021.45.09.3

This article describes the technological features of information warfare and possible lawful mechanisms to counter information attacks. The aim of the article is to analyse the political and legal features of information warfare. The tactics of the aggressor state's behaviour in a hybrid war was substantiated using the case of the information war between Russia and Ukraine. The channels of information dissemination, which are most often used for disintegration and disinformation purposes, were studied. Problematic issues of the domestic public space that most often appear in the perspective of disinformation attacks on the Internet are determined: the activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, cooperation between Ukraine and the EU, reforms in Ukrainian society, temporarily occupied territories and annexed Crimea, corruption in Ukraine. The tactics of confrontation between countries in the information space was analysed - attempts to establish their "security belt" from other actors in international relations and to maintain their own dominant influence in certain regions by spreading misinformation. Promising areas of further research will be the analysis of the

peculiarities of the national legal systems' development in order to counter misinformation in the context of the continuous development of democracy in the world.

37. Shkliarov, V., Mironova, V., & Whitt, S. (2021). Legacies of Stalin or Putin? Public Opinion and Historical Memory in Ukraine. *Political Research Quarterly*, **Article 10659129211041633. https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129211041633**

Our research considers the relationship between historical memory and political evaluations of the past and present. We first examine how historical reflection on the Soviet Union under Stalin is influenced by memories of familial suffering during World War II and victimization under the widespread Soviet gulag prison system. Based on a 2019 representative survey of Ukraine, we show that respondents who recall family members being injured or killed fighting during World War II and those who recount families being imprisoned in Soviet gulags have increased positive and negative appraisals of the Soviet Union under Stalin respectively. However, we also find that favorable opinions of Stalin are strongly predicted by approval of Vladimir Putin, who has actively promoted rehabilitation of Stalin's legacy to bolster personalist rule at home and justify revisionist agendas abroad, including in Ukraine. Our results underscore interactions between the present and past in shaping historical memory such that what appears as enduring legacies of the past could also be a function of present political circumstances.

38. Shuvalova, I. (2021). "The Timeless Opolchenets": Popular Songs and the Making of the Donbas Insurgent. *Region*, *10*(1), 85-108.

Since the outbreak of the war in Donbas in 2014, the term opolchenie (insurgency) has become firmly associated with the militant groups controlling parts of eastern Ukraine. The word emerged as their preferred autonym, adopted by the progovernment Russian media and snubbed by Ukrainian outlets. Historically applied to the Russian volunteer military formations, "opolchenie" foregrounds the contentious idea of the grassroots nature of Donbas militias. Politically, it gestures towards the symbolic totality of the "Russian World" ("Russkii mir") mobilized to fight off foreign invaders. Using multimodal discourse analysis, I scrutinize the myth behind the name, examining how the image of the "opolchenets" ("insurgent") is cultivated as a transhistorical embodiment of heroic and virtuous Russianness in contemporary popular songs about the war in Donbas. I argue that songs serve to construct and popularize the new "opolchenets" identity in the Donbas region, simultaneously as an alternative to and extension of extant complex local identities.

39. Sosnina, O., Mykytiv, O., Mykytiv, H., Kolenichenko, T., & Holovach, A. (2021). International Aspects of the Protection of Victims' Rights in the Conditions of Armed Conflict in Ukraine. *Cuestiones Politicas*, *39*(71), 433-457. **https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.3971.24**

Using a comparative methodology based on documentary, the objective of the research was to analyze the international aspects involved in the defense of the rights of the victims of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. The priority of using military force to resolve questionable issues, national contradictions of an ethical, religious, political, territorial, economic, etc. nature that are in dispute, remains one of the essential characteristics of today's realities. Everything allows us to conclude that in almost all regions where there are armed conflicts, laws are violated and prohibited means and methods of warfare are used, related to the violation of the principles of distinction, of proportionality admitted in the process of artillery rocket attacks and air attacks of rockets and bombs, recruitment, training, financing and/or use of mercenaries in military activities, destruction of human settlements, executions in the form of intentional killings for reasons of hatred or political, ideological, racial, national, religious enmity, torture, among other inhumane behaviors and appalling atrocities, which by their nature and degree of brutality cannot go unpunished and constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity.

40. Szeptycki, A. (2021). Poland versus Russia: Competition in Ukraine. *East European Politics and Societies*, *35*(4), 1113-1135, **Article 0888325420950803. https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325420950803**

This study analyses relations in the triangle Poland-Russia-Ukraine since 2004, bringing an insightful perspective to the realist concept of competition in international relations. For the last sixteen years, despite their unequal power, Poland and Russia have competed in Ukraine. This competition involves not only a fight for influence (quite limited in the case of Poland), but also in respect of the political and economic model that is to be implemented in Ukraine and its international identity. Poland wants Ukraine to become "European": stable, democratic, and with a free market economy, to secure the eastern border of Poland, and to limit Ukraine's dependence on Russia. This policy is executed both through bilateral cooperation and the Euro-Atlantic institutions, especially the European Union (EU). Russia, on the other hand, wants Ukraine to keep its post-Soviet identity. An authoritarian and corrupted Ukraine, remaining culturally a part of the "Russian world," is perceived as guaranteeing Russian interests there, in particular in the context of the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance and EU towards the East. For this reason, Russia aims at impeding the development of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation. Until 2014 Russia was largely successful in realizing its agenda thanks to the multiple channels of dependence existing between it and Ukraine. However, since the Revolution of Dignity and the beginning of the Russian war against Ukraine, the latter has engaged in a clearly

discernible, though uncertain, path to Europeanization, which may favor the implementation of the Polish scenario for Ukraine.

41. Teleki, C. (2021). Detainee Operations in Ukraine Risk or Opportunity for International Law? *Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies*, *12*(1), 111-140.   https://doi.org/10.1163/18781527-bja10023

Detention operations have been a salient feature of the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Often referred to as exchanges or swaps of detainees, the operations leading to the simultaneous release and transfer of detainees (SRTD) offer fertile terrain for inquiring about the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). This article attempts to fill a gap in the literature on detention operations outside the war on tenor framework. It offers a chronological review of the detention operations that have taken place in Ukraine since the beginning of the military conflict This paper then follows a classical two-step analysis first of IHL, IHRL and domestic law provisions applicable to stuns and, second, of the impact of these provisions on the human rights protection of the persons involved. The preliminary conclusions of this analysis indicate that, despite the praise of the international community for the SKTDS in Ukraine, human rights violations have resulted from SRTDS. More specifically, the legal framework under which SRTDS take place appears to be a 'cocktail' of IHL. and IHRL. provisions. Certainly, stuns have attracted international media coverage and support for Ukraine. At the same time, however, the 'hidden cost' of these operations begins to be understood as well because the legal status of many participants in the stuns appears to worsen, access to justice appears to be hampered and the independence of justice appears to be threatened as a result of these operations.

42. Tkachuk, A., & Tkachuk, P. (2021). Hybrid War as a Phenomenon of Semantic Postmodern Discourse with Emphasis on the Military Constant as a Factor of National Security. *Postmodern Openings*, *12*(3), 190-215. https://doi.org/10.18662/po/12.3/335

The article states the core thesis about two asymmetric modes of existence of war - physical and discursive. The purpose of the article is to substantiate the analytical and practical necessity of distinguishing between two modes of existence of hybrid warfare as a phenomenon of physical reality and as a discursive construct, as well as to raise questions about the value specificity of the relationship between them. The methodology of work represents the implication of two asymmetric modes of war existence - physical and discursive. The relationship between the two modes can be described in particular through modern cognitive-semantic and communicative approaches. Analysis, synthesis (thesis antithesis), description, distinction, historical perspective, forecasting and hermeneutic tools of comprehension are the core methods of this work. In the military (material) dimension, any military confrontation in general (and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in particular) is localized, while the discourse of this hybrid war has become global. The interpretive component of hybrid warfare is implemented through discursive verbal-semiotic means. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the concept of victory. The Ukrainian dimension embodies the postmodern practical representation of the analysis of the problem of hybrid warfare as a war of interpretations.

43. Umland, A. L. (2021). FAR-RIGHT IN UKRAINE BEFORE AND AFTER EUROMAIDAN: FROM ULTRANATIONALIST PARTY POLICY TO ETHNO-CENTRAL "NON-CIVIL" SOCIETY. *Sravnitelnaya Politika-Comparative Politics*, *12*(1), 89-117. https://doi.org/10.24411/2221-3279-2021-10008

Partisan-political ultranationalism was so far weak in post-Soviet Ukraine. The three main political forces, VO "Svoboda", "Right Sector" and "National Corps", despite the increased public awareness and growing nationalist sentiments among the population of Ukraine, remained politically marginalized after the 2013-2014 Euromaidan. Neither the loss of Crimea nor the war in Donbass increased the electoral support of radical nationalist groups. However, in the context of Russia's ongoing "hybrid war" against Ukraine, far-right activists, sometimes associated with ultra-nationalist political parties, have gained more recognition in the Ukrainian public since 2014. The activities of anti-democratic non-governmental organizations and their periodic cooperation with the Ukrainian state require careful monitoring. This article provides an overview of the development of the right-wing radical political spectrum in Ukraine before and after the "Revolution of Dignity".

44. Wood, G. R. (2021). The organization of volunteer battalions in Ukraine. *Constitutional Political Economy*. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-021-09342-w

When war broke out in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, the government of Ukraine failed to provide adequate defense to maintain its territorial integrity. In the wake of this government failure, several private volunteer efforts arose to meet popular demand for military action against Russian-backed Separatists. These volunteer battalions had to find alternative methods of aligning their incentives with the population wishing to be defended, and alternative methods of aligning the incentives of their leadership and their recruits. The success of these battalions depended on the potential for political careers and favors, the strength of reputation mechanisms in small communities, and the potential for loot and spoils. These factors shaped the size, characteristics, and activities of the volunteer battalions.

45. Yanev, L. (2021). Jurisdiction and Combatant's Privilege in the MH17 Trial: Treading the Line Between Domestic and International Criminal Justice. *Netherlands International Law Review*, *68*(2), 163-188. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40802-021-00193-8

This article focuses on the MH17 Trial that is currently underway in the Netherlands, dealing with the shooting down of a civilian aircraft over Eastern Ukraine and the resulting deaths of all 298 persons on board. Two legal questions arising from the prosecutorial strategy to charge the four accused with 'ordinary' crimes under the Dutch Criminal Code-instead of with war crimes-are studied here. First, the jurisdictional basis on which the District Court of The Hague is trying MH17, and its effect on the applicable laws, is examined. It is argued that, contrary to what the Prosecution has submitted, jurisdiction over the killing of the 93 non-Dutch nationals on board of flight MH17 can only be established on the basis of the less known title of delegated (representative) jurisdiction: a conclusion that also brings certain legal requirements. Second, this paper analyzes the way the MH17 Prosecutor defined the notion of 'combatant's privilege' under international humanitarian law and his arguments for rejecting a combatant status for the separatist armed forces that shot down flight MH17 over Eastern Ukraine. All this analysis is then used to explain why it was indeed more sensible for the Prosecution to charge the four accused with murder and intentionally causing an aircraft to crash under Dutch criminal law, than with war crimes under international law.

46. Yurchuk, Y. (2021). Historians as Activists: History Writing in Times of War. The Case of Ukraine in 2014-2018. *Nationalities Papers-the Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, *49*(4), 691-709. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2020.38

This article elucidates the role of historians in times of war and the peculiarities of popular history narratives written by historians who became activists. The article focuses on historians who call themselves "Likbez. Historical Front." This cohort gave rise to a new professional species-activist historians-who are different from so called memorians or propagandists, who work in service of authorities. Likbez historians tried to use their power to influence and promote their activist agenda not only in the realm of memory and history but also in reformation of state institutions. I argue that for Likbez historians, securitization of the past is the main strategy employed for producing historical knowledge. Historians' work is a part of postcolonizing process observed in Ukrainian society since the Maidan protests. As the analysis shows, popular history narratives written with an open activist agenda are a result of many compromises made by scholars in the intersection of several factors: professional ambitions, political and civic aims, social and political context, popular expectations, and market environment. In line with the increased attention to agency in memory studies, this article demonstrates that historians have a much more nuanced relation to power than straightforward opposition or co-option.

47. Zhurzhenko, T. (2021). Fighting Empire, Weaponising Culture: The Conflict with Russia and the Restrictions on Russian Mass Culture in Post-Maidan Ukraine. *Europe-Asia Studies*, *73*(8), 1441-1466. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2021.1944990

This essay explores the controversial restrictions on Russian mass culture in post-Maidan Ukraine as an element of a complex palimpsest of post-Soviet culture wars. It addresses public debates and political controversies around the role of Russian culture in Ukraine in order to explain why and how they evolved into a Kulturkampf following the Euromaidan and the Russian aggression in 2014. The essay focuses on three central aspects of this Kulturkampf: limiting the import of Russian books and printed products; restrictions on Russian films and television products; and the ban on Russian artists touring in Ukraine.

2022

1. Bluszcz, J., & Valente, M. (2022). The Economic Costs of Hybrid Wars: The Case of Ukraine. *Defence and Peace Economics*, *33*(1), 1-25. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2020.1791616

With more than ten thousand casualties, the ongoing hybrid Ukrainian war between pro-Russian separatists and the government in the Donbass region, Ukraine's productive core, has taken a severe toll on the country. Using cross-country panel data over the period 1995-2017, this paper estimates the causal effects of the Donbass war on Ukraine's GDP. Our counterfactual estimation by the synthetic control method shows that Ukraine's per capita GDP foregone due to the war amounts to 15.1% on average for 2013-2017. Separate analysis for the affected regions of Donetsk and Luhansk indicates an average causal effect of 47% for 2013-2016. Results are robust to pre-war confounds, namely, the Orange Revolution and Ukrainian-Russian gas disputes. As such, we discuss mechanisms underlying the war's causal effects on economic performance, which is of broader relevance for debates on the role of government in hybrid conflict management.

2. Hoban, I. (2022). Militarization of childhood(s) in Donbas: 'Growing together with the Republic'. *Cooperation and Conflict*, *57*(1), 108-129, Article 00108367211036917. https://doi.org/10.1177/00108367211036917

This essay critically examines how the militarization of childhood(s) takes place in the Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics. The intensification of hostilities in Eastern Ukraine in mid-2014 has had a

profound impact on local populations, particularly children. While no systematic recruitment and participation of children in conflict has been reported, childhood has become what Agathangelou and Killian would characterize as a 'site for displacement and maneuvering for militarization.' Drawing on feminist methodologies, I examine processes of the militarization of children's everyday lives. This article investigates a range of ways in which authorities of proto-states in the Donbas region address children as participants and potential collaborators in the processes of militarization. In my analysis, I examine how war and preparation for it are simultaneously co-constituted by the geopolitical-legitimation of new proto-states-and everyday practices, such as engaging with school curricula, visiting museums, and (re)inventing historical narratives. Understanding of mechanisms that militarize childhood and how children become subjects and objects of militarization allows for a critical analysis that reveals spaces of everyday violence. This article, therefore, enhances our understanding about the intersections of childhood, militarism, and security.

3. Hook, K., & Marcantonio, R. (2022). Environmental dimensions of conflict and paralyzed responses: the ongoing case of Ukraine and future implications for urban warfare. *Small Wars and Insurgencies.* **https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2035098**

Unique within the recent history of environmental hazards, eastern Ukraine illustrates the dangers arising from conflict in an urban landscape heavily modified by human action (including coal extraction and nuclear testing) and requiring active management. To analyze these dynamics and their implications, we examine industrialization in the Donbas region and warfare-accelerated environmental risks. Using primary data and ethnographic interviewing, we compare responses by state and international institutions tasked with monitoring and environmental redress in the context of larger mandates, noting widespread shortfall. This article contributes to emergent environment and warfare related literature by exploring how actors with divergent goals coalesce in downgrading environmental concerns, despite increasing risks, motivation to assist, and widening impact across country and continental divides. Significant for the study of small wars, a lack of international political will for 'forgotten conflicts' increases the likelihood of shared environmental risks being treated as simply another policy item to be negotiated. However, environmental disasters routinely cross international borders and pose long-lasting, compounding harm to direct, indirect, and even uninvolved parties. Furthermore, such dynamics may increasingly characterize warfare as urbanization and industrialization continue their global spread, with active war-time environmental management ushering in profound challenges and new areas of needed expertise.

4. Koval, N., Kulyk, V., Riabchuk, M., Zarembo, K., & Fakhurdinova, M. (2022). Morphological Analysis of Narratives of the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict in Western Academia and Think-Tank Community. *Problems of Post-Communism.* **https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2021.2009348**

This paper examines representations of the ongoing conflict in and around Ukraine by scholars and policy analysts in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Greece, and Poland. Combining strategic narrative analysis and conceptual morphology, we deconstruct the main narratives of the conflict, identify the structural concepts of each narrative and analyze their use. We identify six key narratives of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict according to their presentation of what happened and their proposed way out of the conflict. In each country, the predominant approaches reflect a certain degree of coherence between political preferences and academic/analytical ideas.

5. Makhortykh, M., & Bastian, M. (2022). Personalizing the war: Perspectives for the adoption of news recommendation algorithms in the media coverage of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. *Media War and Conflict*, *15*(1), 25-45, Article 1750635220906254. **https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635220906254**

The use of algorithmically tailored individual news feeds is increasingly viewed as an important strategy for accommodating consumers' information needs by legacy media. However, growing personalization of news distribution also raises normative concerns about the societal function of legacy media, in particular when dealing with personalization of traumatic and polarizing content. To extend the discussion of these concerns beyond the current focus on the role of news personalization in Western democracies, this article offers a conceptual assessment of perspectives for adopting personalization for conflict coverage in Ukraine and Russia, where media systems enjoy a lesser degree of press freedom. Using the coverage of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine as a case study, the article offers a conceptual framework for assessing the impact of personalization on the distribution of conflict-related news in a non-Western context.

6. Poiarkova, T. (2022). "Others" in the Ukrainian Society as a Result of the Modern Russian-Ukrainian War. *European Journal of Sustainable Development*, *11*(1), 20-30. **https://doi.org/10.14207/ejsd.2022.v11n1p20**

The article is devoted to the usage of identification processes as means of struggle with enemies during "the new wars". The meaning of the notion "others" is distinguished through the analysis of such definitions as "others/their our" ("other out-group" and "other in-group") and "others/outsiders". The actual problems of "the others" for contemporary Ukraine, caused by significant transformations due to Russian aggression which

has been lasting since 2014, are shown. Russia-Ukrainian military conflict is an example of a "new war's" means that ruins a state not only inside but outside. The Russian Federation is depictured using controlled identification processes in the occupied Crimea and so-called LPR-DPR that, in future, may work against Ukraine. The main attention is paid to the difference, basis and directions of forced migrations in the Crimea and the LPR-DPR which were made by the RF. It is determined that in the Crimea the RF actively changes the demographic situation in the Crimea by: 1) forcing the Crimean Tatar population to leave; 2) substituting the Crimean political elite by migrants from continental Russia; 3) populating the territory by Russian servicemen. In contrast to the Crimea, demographic policy of the RF in the LPR-DPR is of temporary character and is directed to the accommodation either of servicemen or the RF's mercenaries in order to take part in the war. After accomplishing their mission, they will return to the RF. The author analyses the practice of "society compaction" in the LPR-DPR as the means to change the local population into "others/outsiders" for the RF as well as for Ukraine.

7. Shinar, C. (2022). Ukraine's Struggle for Independence. *European Review*, *30*(1), 43-57, Article Pii s1062798720001076. **https://doi.org/10.1017/s1062798720001076**

In this article, I summarize the justification for Ukrainian state sovereignty, in spite of Russia's claim of the non-existence of such sovereignty. The Russians invaded Ukraine claiming their right to justify their interests. The occupation of Crimea by Russian forces and their declaration of its annexation to Russia was an act of aggression disapproved of by the United Nations (2014). I also outline the nature of the limited war between Ukraine and Russia that is managed by ethnic Russians living in the Donbas region and Russian emissaries.

8. Sopilko, I., Svintsytskyi, A., Krasovska, Y., Padalka, A., & Lyseiuk, A. (2022). Information wars as a threat to the information security of Ukraine. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, *39*(3), 333-347. **https://doi.org/10.1002/crq.21331**

The study gives definitions of information war (information warfare) and related terms, such as cyberwar and others, indicates the purposes, objects, subject matter, and subjects of the concepts under consideration. The author also considers the features of strategic information warfare conducted by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the stages in the development of information war, and the classification of its types and methods. The approaches of scientists who studied certain aspects of information warfare were analyzed, based on their work relevant conclusions were drawn and the conceptual basis of the paper was formed. Independently, the definition and characteristics of the concept of cyber warfare inextricably linked with information warfare are given. Methods for solving the problems arising during the information war are introduced, ways of ensuring the information security of the state are provided. Information war in this study is considered as methods and means of presenting information to form the point of view needed by the organizers of information propaganda and the corresponding public opinion in a certain group of people. The author made an in-depth analysis of the regulatory and legal instruments in force for counterfeiting information warfare and protecting the Ukrainian people from it, pointed out the deficiencies of such documents, and gave recommendations for their further advancement. Recommendations are given to improve the current information awareness among Ukrainians, the directions of the state policy in this field are suggested and ways to ensure the stability of the national information security system of Ukraine are provided.